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Adlertag ("Eagle Day") was the first day of Unternehmen Adlerangriff ("Operation Eagle Attack"), an air operation by Nazi Germany's Luftwaffe (German air force) intended to destroy the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The operation came during the Battle of Britain after Britain rejected all overtures for a negotiated peace with Germany. However, Adlertag and subsequent operations failed to destroy the RAF or gain local air superiority.
On 16 July 1940 Hitler gave the German armed forces ( Wehrmacht) Directive No. 16 ordering provisional preparations for the invasion of Britain.Trevor-Roper 2004, pp. 74–79. This operation was codenamed Operation Sea Lion ( Unternehmen Seelöwe). Before this could be carried out, Air supremacy or air supremacy was required. The Luftwaffe was to destroy the RAF in order to prevent it from attacking the invasion fleet or providing protection for the Royal Navy's Home Fleet, which might attempt to prevent a landing by sea. On 1 August Hitler gave the Luftwaffes commander-in-chief, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe Directive No. 17 ("for the conduct of air and sea warfare against England") to launch the air assault.
The essential target was RAF Fighter Command. The service's destruction would deny the British their air superiority asset and feeling vulnerable to air attack might negotiate for peace. Throughout July and early August, the Germans made preparations for Adlertag. The date of the assault was postponed several times because of bad weather. Eventually, it was carried out on 13 August 1940. The German attacks on 13 August inflicted significant damage and casualties on the ground, but, marred by poor intelligence and communication, they did not significantly impair Fighter Command's ability to defend British air space.Bungay 2000, p. 210.
Göring had promised Hitler that Adlertag and Adlerangriff would achieve the results required within days, or at worst weeks. It was meant to be the beginning of the end of RAF Fighter Command, but Adlertag and the following operations failed to destroy the RAF, or gain the necessary local air superiority.Bungay 2000, p. 210. As a result, Operation Sea Lion was postponed indefinitely.
The German offensive—named Unternehmen Gelb (Operation Yellow), also known as the Manstein Plan—began in the west on 10 May 1940. The central campaign—the Battle of France—ended in Allied defeat and the destruction of the main French Army forces. The British Expeditionary Force escaped encirclement during the Battle of Dunkirk, but the Wehrmacht captured Paris on 14 June and overran half of France. The French surrendered on 25 June 1940.Hooton 2007, pp. 47–48, p. 77, p. 86.
With Western Europe neutralised, the OKL and OKW turned their attention to Britain, which was now home to the Allied base of operations in Europe. Hitler hoped Britain would negotiate for an armistice, for which he was prepared to offer generous terms. The tentative offers made by Hitler were rejected by the Churchill coalition government.Parker 2000, pp. 98–99. Hitler now ordered the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to prepare for an amphibious assault of Britain, codenamed Operation Sealion. The Luftwaffe was to eliminate enemy Airpower and the Kriegsmarine was ordered to make all the necessary preparations for transporting the German army ( Heer) across the English Channel. The Luftwaffe
In the second phase of attacks, shipping, coastal airfields, radar and stations south of London were attacked during 8–18 August. The Luftwaffe gradually increased the frequency of attacks. German bombers also raided targets as far north as Liverpool during night hours.James 2000, pp. 49–62.
The first major raid inland and against RAF airfields came on 12 August. RAF Hawkinge, RAF Lympne, RAF Manston and radar stations at Pevensey, Rye and Dover were to be destroyed. Portsmouth docks were also targeted.James 2000, pp. 63–64, 70. The results of the raids were mixed. The radar station at Ventnor was badly damaged and others targeted were also damaged, but not destroyed. All were in working order by the following morning. Attacks against the harbour and RAF stations failed to destroy them. Though none were in full working order at the end of the day, all were back in action the following morning. Unknown to German intelligence, Lympne itself was not even an operational station. This sort of intelligence blunder contributed to the failure of Adlertag.James 2000, p. 70.
The Germans had not achieved a degree of success commensurate with their exertions. Nevertheless, in the belief they were having considerable effect on Fighter Command, they prepared to launch their all-out assault on the RAF the following day.James 2000, p. 71. By 12 August, German air strength had reached acceptable levels. After bringing its serviceable rates up, the Luftwaffe began Adlertag with 71 percent of its bomber force, 85 percent of its Bf 109 units, and 83 percent of its Bf 110 units operational.Murray 1983, p. 51.
Joseph Schmid was commander of the Luftwaffe's Military Intelligence Branch ( Abteilung 5 as Chief IC). Throughout this time, Schmid's reports made a series of errors. In July 1940, Schmid grossly overestimated the strengths of the Luftwaffe and underestimated the RAF. The most serious mistakes were made concerning radar, airfield identification, and production sites. Schmid asserted that the number of operational airfields in southern England were severely limited; estimated that the British could produce only 180–330 fighters per month (the true figure was 496) and that figure would decrease, indicating that the RAF could not sustain a long battle of attrition. Schmid also claimed the command at all levels was rigid and inflexible, with fighters being tied to home bases. In his list of omissions, Schmid failed to mention the RAF maintenance and organisation operations, which put back damaged aircraft with rapid effect. He anticipated a short battle. Crucially, Schmid failed to mention radar at all.Bungay 2000, pp. 187–188.Hooton 1994, pp. 19–20.Ray 2009, pp. 46–47.
The lack of sustained and concentrated attacks on radar left it free to help direct the deployment of RAF units at opportune moments. Its continued warnings of incoming raids were a crucial benefit to Fighter Command. The Luftwaffe also had poor intelligence on the type of RAF airfields. It made repeated errors, often misidentifying airfields as Fighter Command bases, which turned out to belong to RAF Coastal Command and RAF Bomber Command. On Adlertag, most of the targets on the Luftwaffes list—if destroyed—would not have impaired Fighter Command in the slightest.Mason 1969, pp. 236–237.
The first indications of incoming air raids were received by the Chain Home Radio Direction Finding (RDF) facilities, which were located along the coastlines of Britain. In most circumstances, RDF could pick up formations of Luftwaffe aircraft as they organised over their own airfields in northern France and Belgium. Once the raiding aircraft moved inland behind the radar stations, the formations were plotted by the ROC. The information from RDF and the Observer Corps were sent through to the main operations room of Fighter Command Headquarters at RAF Bentley Priory. The plots were assessed to determine whether they were "hostile" or "friendly". If hostile, the information was sent to the main "operations room", which was in a large underground bunker.Bungay 2000, pp. 61–69.
Here, the course information of each raid was plotted by Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF), who received information by telephone.Parker 2000, p. 123. Additional intelligence was provided by the Y Service radio posts, which monitored enemy radio communications, and the Ultra decoding centre based at Bletchley Park, which gave the RAF intelligence on the German order of battle.Bungay 2000, p. 192. Colour-coded counters representing each raid were placed on a large table, which had a map of Britain overlaid and squared off with a British Modified Grid. As the plots of the raiding aircraft moved, the counters were pushed across the map by magnetic "rakes". This system enabled the main "Fighter Controller" and Dowding to see where each formation was heading, at what height, and in what strength. This allowed an estimate to be made of possible targets. The age of the information was denoted by the colour of the counter. The simplicity of the system meant that decisions could be made quickly.Bungay 2000, pp. 61–69.
This information was simultaneously sent to the headquarters of each group, where it was cross-checked through a filter room before being sent through to another operations room, housed in an underground bunker. Because Group had tactical control of the battle, the operations room was different in layout from the main headquarters at Bentley Priory. The main map on the plotting table represented the group command area and its associated airfields. Extensive radio and telephone equipment transmitted and received a constant flow of information from the various sector airfields as well as the Observer Corps, AA Command and the navy. The "Duty fighter controller" was the Group GOC's personal representative and was tasked with controlling how and when each raid would be intercepted. If the telephone system failed engineers would be on site within minutes to repair the broken links.Bungay 2000, pp. 61–69.
For an hour after dawn on 13 August, there were few German tracks upon the plot tables in operations rooms, and none at all in the central and eastern Channel. The first signs of concentration, however, came earlier than usual, for between 05:30 and 05:40 two formations of 30 or more aircraft were located in the Amiens area. For 30 minutes, they remained over land, but at 06:10 they began moving inland. The ROC and radar tracked them and guided the RAF units to intercept. Unaware of the German intent, the controllers directed three full squadrons and detachments of three others were alerted by 06:15. No. 151 Squadron RAF was protecting a convoy in the Thames, No. 111 was protecting RAF Hawkinge and No. 74 was covering RAF Manston. Parts of No. 85, No. 43 and No. 238 were also airborne near London. By 06:25, the German formations were well over the Channel. No. 238 was moved to cover their own base at RAF Warmwell. No. 257 was also ordered to take off at 06:20 to patrol Canterbury. Not satisfied with the strength of the forces already airborne, controllers dispatched squadrons 601, 213, 64 and 87 to intercept between 06:30 and 06:35. The first combats began at 06:30.James 2000, pp. 71–73.
Owing to the mistake by the ROC, and the Geschwader being missed approaching the eastern, instead of central Channel by radar, KG 2 hit the RAF airfield. KG 2 claimed 10 Spitfires destroyed on the ground. In fact, no Fighter Command fighters were lost. For some time afterward, this wrong claim convinced German intelligence that Eastchurch was a fighter station and the Luftwaffe would launch seven fruitless raids on it in the coming weeks. Added to this mistake was the failure to keep up pressure. Raids were spaced out, giving the field time to recover.Bungay 2000, pp. 207–208. The station was used by RAF Coastal Command, which lost five in the attack and one Coastal Command Spitfire. However, severe damage was done to the infrastructure. Much equipment and ammunition was destroyed and 16 of the Command's personnel were killed.Mason 1969, p. 238. RAF Eastchurch was back in operation by 16:00.James 2000, p. 73.Hough and Richards 2007, p. 157.
Eventually the bombers were intercepted. KG 2 lost five Do 17s in the attempt; six Dorniers were also badly damaged. In return, accurate fire from the Dornier gunners shot down two Hurricanes from the attacking squadrons, which included No. 111, No. 151 and No. 74, which was led by Adolph Malan. Malan himself shot down one Do 17.Hough and Richards 2007, pp. 155–157. Another source suggests the destruction of five Do 17s and another seven damaged.Goss 2005, p. 60. German manpower losses amounted to 11 killed in action and nine prisoners of war.
The cancellation order had not reached Luftflotte 3 HQ at all. Its commander, Hugo Sperrle ordered attacks to commence. At 05:00, 20 Junkers Ju 88s of I./KG 54 took off to bomb the Royal Aircraft Establishment's airfield at 'RAF Farnborough' (RAE Farnborough). At 05:05, 18 Ju 88s from II./KG 54 took off for RAF Odiham. At 05:50, 88 Junkers Ju 87s of StG 77 began heading for Portland Harbour. The raids were escorted by about 60 Bf 110s of Zerstörergeschwader 2 (Destroyer Wing 2; ZG 2), and V./LG 1 and 173 Bf 109s from Jagdgeschwader 27 (JG 27), JG 53 and JG 3, which all flew ahead of the bomber stream to clear the airspace of enemy fighters. StG 77's target was obscured by cloud, but KG 54 continued to their target. RAF fighters from RAF Northolt, RAF Tangmere and RAF Middle Wallop intercepted. Four Ju 88s and one Bf 109 from JG 2 were shot down. The German fighters claimed six RAF fighters and the bombers another 14. In reality, the bombers only damaged five. The Bf 109s destroyed only one and damaged another. Of the five RAF fighters damaged by the bombers, two were write-offs. Of the 20 claimed, just three fighters were lost and three pilots were wounded. None were killed.Bungay 2000, p. 208.
Further missions by II./KG 54 to RAF Croydon were cancelled.de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 184. I./KG 54 struck at the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) base at Gosport.de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 179. ZG 2 was supposed to provide escort during one these attacks, and in a breakdown of communications, arrived over the target without their Ju 88s, which had been ordered to stand down. One Bf 110 was shot down by No. 238 Squadron RAF.Mason 1969, pp. 238–239.
At 11:10, V./LG 1 Bf 110s took off in advance of a raid by KG 54, possibly to tempt RAF fighters into battle before the main assault, so the RAF would be out of position. The bombers' mission was cancelled. The order did not reach V./LG 1 who continued to their target area. The 23 Bf 110s continued to the target of Portland. They ran into Hurricane of No. 601 Squadron and lost six Bf 110s destroyed and three damaged. Only one Hurricane was shot down and another damaged.Bungay 2000, p. 208. A second source states only four Bf 110s were destroyed,de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 372. whilst a third gives the loss of five destroyed and five damaged. The Zerstörergeschwader optimistically claimed 30 RAF fighters destroyed (in reality RAF fighter losses in aerial combat amounted to 13 throughout the entire day), for a loss of 13 Bf 110s.Weal 1999, p. 47. The morning's effort had been a fiasco.Bungay 2000, p. 210. The attacks showed a serious German technical failure in air-to-air communication.
II., and III./JG 53 and III./ZG 76 flew escort for the Ju 87s. ZG 2 and JG 27 flew escort for LG 1. In response the whole of No. 10 Group RAF intercepted. One Staffel (Squadron) of II./StG 2 was badly hit by No. 609 Squadron RAF; six out of nine Ju 87s were shot down.Bungay 2000, p. 210. StG 1 and 2 gave up on their original targets owing to clouds. Both headed for Portland.Bungay 2000, p. 210.
I./LG 1 abandoned Boscombe Down and bombed Southampton instead. No. 238 Squadron had been detailed to intercept, but the fighter escort was too strong and the bombers were not diverted from their course. Several warehouses were destroyed and a cold storage plant was also knocked out. All fires were under control by dusk.James 2000, p. 77. One III./LG 1 dropped its bombs by RAF Middle Wallop Sector Station by mistake. Only Andover airfield was hit, and it was used for bomber operations, not fighters.Bungay 2000, p. 210. III./LG 1 lost two Ju 88s. The 13 Ju 88 Gruppen (Groups) had lost six destroyed and many damaged. They had escaped lightly.Weal 2000. p. 54. The bombing succeeded in destroying a bicycle factory, a furniture warehouse and a refrigerated meat depot.Korda 2009, p. 167. Luftwaffe intelligence had not identified the Southampton Spitfire factory—on the waterfront near the docks—as an important target. Poor intelligence suggested it was a bomber factory. Only later, in September, was it attacked and severely damaged. However, even then the Germans were unaware of the damage inflicted to Spitfire production. The factory would later be broken up and production dispersed.Mason 1969, p. 237.
Erprobungsgruppe 210 were sent further east for an operation to attack targets near Southend. They took off at 15:15 and were escorted by ZG 76. They found unbroken cloud over Essex. No. 56 Squadron RAF intercepted, but Erprobungsgruppe 210 dropped their bombs over Canterbury. II./StG 1 was sent to bomb airfields near Rochester. It failed to find the target and returned without incident. IV./LG 1—also with Ju 87s—was sent after RAF Detling. JG 26 went out on a fighter sweep to clear the skies in advance of the attack. JG 26 lost one Bf 109 over Folkestone from an unknown cause. The Ju 87s bombed the station and 40 Bf 109s strafed it, killing the commander.Bungay 2000, p. 211. The operations block was hit, causing high casualties. The losses were disastrous for No. 53 Squadron RAF, which lost a number of Blenheims on the ground.Warner 2005, p. 258. The commander killed was Group Captain E P Meggs-Davis. RAF Station Commanders – South East England One Squadron Leader was killed—a J.H Lowe—and a further two were wounded. One of the wounded men was a First World War ace Robert J. O. Compston.Saunders 2013, p. 211. The station's casualties amounted to 24 killed and 42 wounded.Saunders 2013, p. 212. However, Detling was not an RAF Fighter Command station and the attack did not affect No. 11 Group RAF in any way.Mason 1969, p. 240.
In the afternoon, a force of 80 Do 17s of KG 3—escorted by JG 51, JG 52, JG 54 and 60 Bf 109s from JG 26 (some 270 aircraft in all)—headed for Eastchurch airfield and the Short Brothers factory at Rochester. III./KG 3 broke away from the main formation and attacked Eastchurch while II./KG 3 headed for Rochester. Significant damage was done to the factory producing the Short Stirling heavy bomber. The RAF's No. 3, No. 64, No. 111, No. 151, No. 234, No. 249, No. 601 and No. 609 squadrons intercepted. According to the account of JG 26, the British fighters made little impression on the bombers.Baker 1996, p. 113. Three JG 51 Bf 109s were shot down in skirmishes with RAF fighters.Mason 1969, p. 242.
RAF Bomber Command also took part in the day's fighting. Although Charles Portal—AOC (Air Officer Commanding)—had protested against the pointlessness of attacking airfields in Scandinavia, the Air Ministry insisted on such raids. No. 82 Squadron RAF sent twelve Bristol Blenheims to bomb KG 30 airfields at Aalborg, Denmark. One pilot turned back complaining of "fuel problems" and was court-martialled. That bomber was the only one to return. The rest fell to AAA fire and fighters.Bungay 2000, p. 211. Some 24 airmen were killed and nine were captured.
The failure of the Luftwaffe to identify the radar chain and distinguish RAF fighter bases from those of other RAF commands undermined its ability to destroy the British fighter defences. The Luftwaffe underestimated British radar, and they had not realised its importance in the British operational system.Parker 2000, p. 311.Bungay 2000, pp. 68–69. To the contrary, OKL believed that the radar stations would benefit the German effort by sending RAF forces into large-scale air battles for the Luftwaffe to decimate. The RAF aircraft industry supported the losses and its pilots were replaced sufficiently to limit the RAF's decline in strength and deny the Germans victory. Conversely, the RAF were able to ensure the serviceability rates and aircrew numbers of the Luftwaffe declined in August–September.
Having failed to defeat the RAF, the Luftwaffe adopted a different and clearer strategy of strategic bombing known as the The Blitz. However, as with the campaign against the RAF, the types of targets differed radically and no sustained pressure was put under any one type of British target.Overy 1980, pp. 34, 36. Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy.Hooton 1997, p. 38. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it had even begun.Bungay 2000, p. 379. The end result of the air campaign against Britain in 1940 and 1941 was a decisive failure to end the war. As Hitler committed Germany to ever increasing military adventures, the Wehrmacht became increasingly overstretched and was unable to cope with a multi-front war. By 1944, the Allies were ready to launch Operation Overlord, the invasion of Western Europe. The Battle of Britain ensured that the Western Allies had a base from which to launch the campaign and that there would be a Western Allied presence on the battlefield to meet the Soviet Union Red Army in central Europe at the end of the war in May 1945.Addison and Crang 2000, p. 270.Bungay 2000, pp. 393–394.
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