In theology and philosophy, probabilism (from Latin probare, to test, approve) is an ancient Greek doctrine of academic skepticism. It holds that in the absence of certainty, plausibility or truth-likeness is the best criterion. The term can also refer to a 17th-century religious thesis about ethics, or a modern physical–philosophical thesis.
Probabilist doctrines continue to be debated in the context of artificial general intelligence, as a counterpoint to the use of non-monotonic logic, as the proper form for knowledge representation remains unclear.
This view was advanced by the Spanish theologian Bartolomé de Medina (1527–1581) and defended by many Jesuits. It was heavily criticised by Blaise Pascal in his Provincial Letters and by St. Alphonsus Ligourí in his Theologia Moralis, as leading to moral laxity. Opposed to probabilism is probabiliorism (Latin probabilior, "more likely"), which holds that when there is a preponderance of evidence on one side of a controversy one is obliged to follow that side, and tutiorism (Latin tutior, "safer"), which holds that in case of doubt one must take the morally safer side. A more radical view, "minus probabilissimus", holds that an action is permissible if a single opinion allowing that action is available, even if the overwhelming weight of opinion proscribes it.
The doctrine became particularly popular at the start of the 17th century, as it could be used to support almost any position. By mid-century, such thinking, termed Laxism, was recognized as scandalous.J. Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), , "The Scandal of Laxism" p. 83.
|
|