Empire

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Koebner, Richard (1964). Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960 /ref>

Few historians follow the Marxist approach and most recognize that imperialism predates the European colonialism and capitalism by at least four millenia.MacKenzie, John M. (2016). "Empires in world history: Characteristics, concepts, and consequences." The Encyclopedia of Empire. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ), vol I, p 2.Dominic Lieven (2012). "Empire, history and the contemporary global order," Proceedings of the British Academy /ref>Kimberly Kagan et al (2010). The Imperial Moment. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 8.

Michael Doyle (2018). 9781501734137, Cornell University Press. . ISBN 9781501734137

1. Empires were vastly larger than states
2. Empires lacked fixed or permanent boundaries whereas a state had fixed boundaries
3. Empires had a "compound of diverse groups and territorial units with asymmetric links with the center" whereas a state had "supreme authority over a territory and population"
4. Empires had multi-level, overlapping jurisdictions whereas a state sought monopoly and homogenization

Empires can expand by both land and sea. Territorial empires (e.g. the Macedonian Empire and Byzantine Empire) tend to be Connected space areas extending directly outwards from the original frontier. The terrestrial empire's maritime analogue is the thalassocracy, an empire composed of islands and coasts which are accessible to its terrestrial homeland, such as the Athenian-dominated Delian League and British Empire) with looser structures and more scattered territories, often consisting of many islands and other forms of possessions which required the creation and maintenance of a powerful navy.

The Delian League, the Roman Empire, and the British Empire developed at least in part under Election auspices. Empires such as the Holy Roman Empire also came together by electing the emperor with votes from member realms through the Imperial election. The Empire of Brazil declared itself an empire after separating from the Portuguese Empire in 1822. France has twice transitioned from being called the republic to being called the French Empire while it retained an overseas empire. Europeans began applying the designation of "empire" to non-European monarchies, such as the Qing Empire and the Mughal Empire, as well as the Maratha Confederacy, eventually leading to the looser denotations applicable to any political structure meeting their criteria of "imperium". Some monarchies styled themselves as having greater size, scope, and power than the territorial, politico-military, and economic facts support. As a consequence, some monarchs assumed the title of "emperor" (or its corresponding translation, tsar, empereur, kaiser, shah etc.) and renamed their states as "The Empire of ..."

Empires were seen as expanding power and administration, and guaranteeing stability, security and legal order for their subjects. They tried to minimize ethnic and religious antagonism inside the empire. Some empires tended to impose their ideas, beliefs and cultural habits on the subject states to strengthen the imperial structure; others opted for Multiculturalism and Cosmopolitanism policies.Steinmetz, George (2013). Sociology and Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline. (Duke University Press), p 9. Anthony Pagden estimates that most of the early empires were multicultural and attempted to incorporate various groups into some larger cosmopolitan whole.Pagden, Anthony (2015). The Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present. (Cambridge University Press), p. 5. The aristocracies that ruled empires were often more cosmopolitan and broad-minded than their nationalistic successors. Cultures generated by empires could have notable effects that outlasted the empire itself.

In the mid-twentieth century, the word "empire" obtained a negative connotation, viewed as inherently immoral or illegitimate. Traditional or overt empire destroyed and discredited itself in the World Wars. The matters are worse in the German language where empire is "reich" and immediately associates with the Third Reich.Dominic Lieven (2012). "Empire, history and the contemporary global order," Proceedings of the British Academy /ref> For the first time in history, countries which proudly called themselves empires disappeared from the map. The postwar world came under the domination of two superpowers both of which proclaimed themselves to be enemies of empire. The West contained the imperialist East and the East and the Global South resisted the imperialist West. Imperialism became a cosmopolitan, multi-front battle cry wielding many diverse and distant peoples in fighting a common enemy.Koebner, Richard (1964). Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960 /ref> As former colonies came to make up the majority of states in the United Nations, "empire" lost all legitimacy in this major international forum. "Any state stupid enough to call itself an empire became subject automatically to UN resolutions on decolonisation."Dominic Lieven (2012). "Empire, history and the contemporary global order," Proceedings of the British Academy /ref> Most postwar histories of empires have been hostile, especially if the authors were promoting nationalism.

With the exception of Rome, the periods of dissolution following imperial falls were equally short. Successor states seldom outlived their founders and disappeared in the next and often larger empire. Only in the wreckage of the Roman Empire, distinguished Robert G. Wesson, a system of full-fledged nation-states evolved and it took a millennium. "It seems almost impossible for a community of free states to reemerge where a universal empire has once stretched across the land and fixed its ways and symbols of authority."Wesson, Robert G. (1967). The Imperial Order. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p 374. Walter Scheidel also finds Europe exceptional among civilizations which experienced imperial unity because for an entire millennium (between Charlemagne and Napoleon) no single power managed to control more than one-fifth of the region’s population.Scheidel, Walter (2021). "The scale of empire: territory, population, distribution." The Oxford World History of Empire. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p. 106. Some empires, like the Neo-Babylonian, Median kingdom and were outright conquered by a larger empire. The historical pattern was not a simple rise-and-fall cycle; rather it was rise, fall, and greater rise, taking on an increasingly global scale.MacKenzie, John M. (2016). "Empires in world history: Characteristics, concepts, and consequences." The Encyclopedia of Empire. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ), vol I, p 1. Raoul Naroll called it "expanding pulsation,"Naroll, Raoul, (1967). "Imperial Cycles and World Order," Peace Research Society, 7: pp 83-101. Christopher Chase-Dunn "upward sweeps,"Chase-Dunn, Chris et al ( 11 August 2006). " /ref> and Ian Morris "exponential growth."Morris, Ian (2012). "The evolution of war," Cliodynamics, vol 3 (1): p 23-24.

Peter Turchin, Walter Scheidel and Rein Taagepera demonstrated this millennia-long trend in mathematically calculated graphs. Turchin showed the largest empire in total area for 2800 BC – AD 1800.Turchin, Peter (2009), "A theory for formation of large empires," Journal of Global History /ref> Scheidel demonstrated population of the largest empire and three largest empires as a share of world population from 700 BC to AD 2000.Scheidel, Walter (2021). "The scale of empire: Territory, population, distribution." The Oxford World History of Empire. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p. 102, fig. 2.7. Taagepera showed the largest empire in total area and share of world population for 3000 BC - AD 2000Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. ), fig 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, p 228, 230, 233. and for the same period five largest empires as share of world land and world population.Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. ), fig 4.1, p 51. The general vector of these graphs, according to Max Ostrovsky, represents a fragment in hyperbola when the hyperbola takes off.Ostrovsky, Max (2006). Y = Arctg X: The Hyperbola of the World Order /ref>

Empires were limited in scope to conquest, as Howe observed, but conquest is a considerable scope. Many fought to the death to avoid it or to be liberated from it. Imperial conquests and attempts of conquest significantly contributed to the list of wars by death toll. The imperial impact on subjects can be regarded as "little," but only on those subjects who survived the imperial conquest and rule. We cannot ask the inhabitants of Carthage and Masada, for example, whether empire had little impact on their lives. We seldom hear the voices of subject peoples because history is mostly written by winners,Peter Garnsey & Whittaker, Charles Richard (1978).  Imperialism in the Ancient World /ref> that is, by the great empires themselves.Wesson, Robert G. (1967). The Imperial Order. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 388. The imperial sources tend to ignore or reduce the resistance by subdued states.Brien, Pierre (2002). From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. (tr. Daniels, Peter T. Indiana: Eisenbrauns) p 79. But two rich primary sources of the subject population are the Hebrew Prophetic books and the Sibylline Oracles.Gruen, Erich S. (2020). “The Sibylline Oracles and resistance to Rome.” The Future of Rome: Roman, Greek, Jewish and Christian Visions. (Eds. Price, Jonathan J. & Berthelot, Katell, Cambridge University Press), p 195.Moshe Weinfeld (1986). "The protest against imperialism in ancient Israelite prophecy." The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations /ref> The hatred towards the ruling empires expressed in these sources makes impression of an impact more serious than estimated by Howe. A classical writer and adherent of empire, Orosius explicitly preferred to avoid the views of subject populations.Orosius. History against the Pagans, IV:23. (tr. Fear, A. T., Liverpool University Press, 2010). And another classical Roman patriot, Lucan confessed that "words cannot express how bitterly we are hated" by subject peoples.Lucan. Civil War, 7:482. (tr. Braund, S. H., Oxford University Press, 1992). More subject voices were revealed by Historian Timothy H. Parson in his research of seven empires from the perspective of their subjects.Parsons, Timothy (2010). The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fall /ref>

In the Amarna Period (15th-13th centuries BC), Egypt, the Middle Assyrian Empire, Hittite Empire, and those of the Mitanni and Elamites formed club of great powers. Egypt and the Hittites emerged as two dominant Empires of the club and in 1274 BC clashed in the Battle of Kadesh. The confrontation was not decisive and soon the Amarna international system was dissolved during the late Bronze Age collapse. All its empires declined. The first empire to recover from the collapse was the Neo-Assyrian Empire (916–612 BC). By 673 BC, Assyria conquered the entire Fertile Crescent including Cyprus and Egypt.

The Assyrian achievement, however, was short lived. In the 6th century BC, the Median Empire, Babylonians, Scythians and Cimmerians allied and defeated the Assyrian Empire. The Assyrian capital, Nineveh, was razed by their combined armies in 612 BC. Never again a world leading empire would be centered in a great River Valley. The fall of Nineveh marks the end of the Bronze Age and the beginning of the Axial Age,Karl Jaspers (1953). The Origin and Goal of History. (New Haven: Yale University Press), p 6-7. when the center of power shifted away from the great River Valleys, and empires suddenly became significantly larger.Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. ), p 121. The Median Empire became the first leading empire, the largest of its day, centered beyond River Valleys. This Empire lasted for about sixty years and was conquered by the Persian Empire.

From 1500 BC in China rose the Shang Empire which was succeeded by the Zhou dynasty Empire around 1100 BC. Chronologically, the collapse of Shang also coincides with the late Bronze Age collapse. Both Shang and Zhou equalled or surpassed in territory their contemporary Near Eastern empires. The Zhou Empire dissolved in 770 BC into feudal multi-state system which lasted for five and a half centuries until the universal conquest of Qin in 221 BC.

Peter Turchin (2009), "A theory for formation of large empires," Journal of Global History /ref> The array of successive and parallel empires of the Age makes "bewildering" impression on imperiometric experts.Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. ), p 126. The Axial threshold is remarkable in world history. From 600 BC, the area of the largest empire would never fell below – a size never reached before 600 BC. The Colonialism surge was less exponential.Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. ), p 229. The Axial surge culminated with the Roman, Kushan and Han Empires ruling over as many as two-thirds of all people on Earth, the most extreme ever degree of imperial consolidation. The relative demographic size of the three largest empires in the world was not as massive before and ever since.Walter Scheidel (2021). "The scale of empire: territory, population, distribution." The Oxford World History of Empire. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p. 102.

The successful and extensive Achaemenid Empire (550–330 BC), also known as the first Persian Empire, covered Mesopotamia, Egypt, parts of Greece, Thrace, the Middle East, much of Central Asia, and North-Western India. It is considered the first great empire in history or the first "world empire".Friedrich Ratzel, "Territorial Growth of States", Human Geography: An Essential Anthology, (eds. Agnew, John, & Livingstone, David & Rogers, Alisdair, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p 527; and "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States", The Structure of Political Geography, (eds. Kasperson, Roger E., & Minghi, Julian V., Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), p 18. It was overthrown and replaced by the short-lived empire of Alexander the Great. His Empire was succeeded by three Empires ruled by the Diadochi—the Seleucid, Ptolemaic, and Antigonid, which, despite being independent, are called the "Hellenistic Empire" by virtue of their similarities in culture and administration.

Meanwhile, in the western Mediterranean the Empires of Carthage and Rome began their rise. Having decisively defeated Carthage in 202 BC, Rome defeated Macedonia in 200 BC and the Seleucids in 190–189 BC to establish an all-Mediterranean Empire. The Seleucid Empire broke apart and its former eastern part was absorbed by the Parthian Empire. In 30 BC Rome annexed Ptolemaic Egypt.

In India during the Axial Age appeared the Maurya Empire—a geographically extensive and powerful empire, ruled by the Mauryan dynasty from 321 to 185 BC. The empire was founded in 322 BC by Chandragupta Maurya through the help of Chanakya,

Namita Sanjay Sugandhi (2025). 9780549744412 . ISBN 9780549744412

In 221 BC, China became an empire when the State of Qin ended the chaotic Warring States period through its conquest of the other six states, starting the Qin dynasty (221–207 BC). Its sovereign adopted the new title of Huangdi (皇帝), which is translated in English as "Emperor". The Qin Empire is known for the construction of the Great Wall of China and the Terracotta Army, as well as the standardization of currency, weights, measures and writing system. It laid the foundation for China's first golden age, the Han dynasty (202 BC–AD 9, AD 25–220). The Han Empire expanded into Central Asia and established trade through the Silk Road. Confucianism was, for the first time, adopted as an official state ideology. During the reign of the Emperor Wu of Han (156–87 BC), the Xiongnu were pacified. In the first two centuries of the Common Era, only four empires stretched between the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean: the Han Empire of China, the Kushan Empire, the Parthian Empire of Persia, and the Roman Empire.Craig Benjamin (2018).  Empires of Ancient Eurasia: The First Silk Roads Era, 100 BCE – 250 CE. (Michigan: Cambridge University Press), p. 2. The collapse of the Han Empire in AD 220 saw China fragmented into the Three Kingdoms, only to be unified once again by the Jin Empire (AD 266–420). The relative weakness of the Jin Empire plunged China into political disunity that would last from AD 304 to AD 589 when the Sui dynasty (AD 581–618) reunited China.

The Romans were the first people to invent and embody the concept of "empire" in their two mandates: to wage war and to make and execute laws. They were the most extensive Western empire until the early modern period, and left a lasting impact on European society. Many languages, cultural values, religious institutions, political divisions, urban centers, and legal systems can trace their origins to the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire governed and rested on exploitative actions. They took slaves and money from the peripheries to support the imperial center. However, the absolute reliance on conquered peoples to carry out the empire's fortune, sustain wealth, and fight wars would ultimately lead to the collapse of the Roman Empire. The Romans were strong believers in what a later imperial age called their "civilizing mission". This term was legitimized and justified by writers like Cicero who wrote that only under Roman rule could the world flourish and prosper. This ideology, that was envisioned to bring a new world order, was eventually spread across the Mediterranean world and beyond. People started to build houses like Romans, eat the same food, wear the same clothes and engage in the same games. Even rights of citizenship and authority to rule were granted to people not born within Roman territory.

The Latin word imperium derives from imperare, meaning "to command", and originally referred to a magistrate's authority (usually in a military sense). As the Roman state expanded overseas, the term began to be used to describe Rome's authority over its colony and . Successful generals were often given the title imperator, an honorific roughly meaning "commander". Although historians use the terms "Republic" and "Empire" to identify the periods of Roman history before and after absolute power was assumed by Augustus, the Romans themselves continued to refer to their government as the Res publica, meaning "public affair". On the other hand, the concept of imperium Romanum, as in, the authority of the Romans, is attested since the 2nd century BC. The modern concepts of "Empire" and "Emperor" did not appear until several centuries later, long after the fall of Rome in the West. Augustus established a new de facto monarchy, but sought to maintain the appearance of a republican government. He and his early successors used the informal titles of augustus and princeps, but over time the title of imperator came to denote the office of (what is now referred to as) "Roman emperor".

The Portuguese Empire colonized vast portions of the Americas, Africa, Asia and Oceania to become one of the most powerful empires of the period, the longest-lived colonial empire in European history,Page, Melvin E. & Sonnenburg, Penny M. (2003). Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia, vol 2, p 481.Brockey, Liam Matthew (2008). Portuguese Colonial Cities in the Early Modern World. (Ashgate Publishing), p XV. and one of the largest empires in history. The Spanish Empire expanded over the same continents as well as in Europe,Thomas, Hugh (2015). World Without End: The Global Empire of Philip II (Penguin). exceeding the Portuguese rival in size and, among colonial empires, remaining second only to Britain.

The British Empire established an absolute imperial record in size and, for a century, was the foremost global power.Niall Ferguson (2002). Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power. (Basic Books). The British established their first empire (1583–1783) in North America by colonising lands that made up British America, including parts of Canada, the Caribbean and the Thirteen Colonies. In 1776, the Continental Congress of the Thirteen Colonies declared itself independent from the British Empire, thus beginning the American Revolution. Britain turned towards Asia, the Pacific, and later Africa, with subsequent exploration and conquests leading to the rise of the Second British Empire (1783–1815), which was followed by the Industrial Revolution and Britain's Imperial Century (1815–1914). It became the largest empire in world history, encompassing one quarter of the world's land area and one fifth of its population.Johnston, Steve, Tea Party Culture War: A Clash of Worldviews, p90, "By 1922, the British Empire presided over 458 million people—one-quarter of the world's population—and comprised more than 13 million square miles." The impacts of this period are still prominent in the current age "including widespread use of the English language, belief in Protestant religion, economic globalization, modern precepts of law and order, and representative democracy."

Throughout the 19th century, the United States government attempted to expand its territory by any means necessary. Regardless of the supposed motivation for this constant expansion, all of these land acquisitions were carried out by imperialistic means. This was done by financial means in some cases, and by military force in others. Most notably, the Louisiana Purchase (1803), the Texas Annexation (1845), and the Mexican Cession (1848) highlight the imperialistic goals of the United States during this "modern period" of imperialism. The U.S. government has stopped adding additional territories, where they permanently and politically take over since the early 20th century, and instead have established 800 military bases as their outposts. With this overt but subtle military control of other countries, scholars consider U.S. foreign policy strategies to be imperialistic.

Many empires endured for centuries, while the age of the ancient Egyptian, Chinese and Japanese Empires is counted in millennia. Most people throughout history have lived under imperial rule. Despite "efforts in words and wars to put national unity at the center of political imagination, imperial politics, imperial practices, and imperial cultures have shaped the world we live in."

Looking at a time frame of several millennia prior to the emergence of a global system, Robert Gilpin, Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry observed that all pre-modern regional systems were initially anarchic and marked by high levels of military competition. But almost universally, they tended to consolidate into universal empires. For millennia, this propensity was the principal feature of pre-modern politics.Gilpin War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 110–116)Deudney, Daniel & G. Ikenberry, John (2015). "America's impact: The end of empire and the globalization of the Westphalian system." /ref> pointing to a fundamental political dynamic.

This dynamic, according to Niall Ferguson, Ikenberry and Deudney, is obscured by our fixation on the Westphalian state. Within the macrohistoric trend, however, European political order was distinctly anomalous because it persisted so long as an anarchy. By comparisons of Jane Burbank, Frederick Cooper and Ferguson, nation-state appears as a "historical novelty" or a "blip on the historical horizon," that "emerged recently from under imperial skies" and whose hold may well prove "ephemeral."Niall Ferguson, "The Unconscious Colossus: Limits of (Alternatives to) American Empire", Daedalus, 134/2, (2005): p 24. Moreover, the consolidations of European states proceeded synchronously with their imperial expansions worldwide. "Ironically, it was the European empires that carried the idea of the sovereign territorial state to the rest of the world..."

Puzzled why there is no non-Western IR theory,Acharya, Amitav & Buzan, Barry (2007). "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?" International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol 7 (3): 287–312. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan sought to apply the discipline to other Asian civilizations. They found the discipline, created in modern Europe, hardly applicabe for the civilizations they selected. Instead of anarchy, international relations appeared usually fixed by the imperial center.Barry Buzan, & Amitav Acharya (2021). Re-imagining International Relations: World Orders in the Thought and Practice of Indian, Chinese, and Islamic Civilizations. (Washington DC: Cambridge University Press), p 117. A later attempt of Bridging Two Worlds aimed to introduce insights from early China and India into their present dialogue for deeper mutual understanding, appreciation and friendship.Acharya, Amitav et al (2023). Bridging Two Worlds: Comparing Classical Political Thought and Statecraft in India and China. (Berkeley: University of California Press . ). The project’s goals are laudable, reviewed the book Sinologist Yuri Pines. However, the use of those classics for modern IR woule rather be "detrimental" as the outcome invariably was IR "fiasco" and "quagmire." Diplomatic failures led to total wars and ultimately to universal empire.Pines, Yuri (2023). "Ancient China and India: The story of IR fiasco?" The China Review'' /ref>

The author of , Hans Kohn, acknowledged that it was the opposite idea—of imperialism—that was, perhaps, the most influential single idea for two millennia, the ordering of human society through unified dominion and common civilization. Kohn, Hans, (1942). World Order in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p 113 Empire is something like the "darling of global historians," usually not because they like it, but because empire was the way history shifted to transnational and global stages.Conrad, Sebastian (2016). What is Global History? /ref>

The prevalence of empire in history was partly due to peace which it establishes for both the conquerors and the conquered, and the by-product of peace, prosperity. The attitude towards the imperial peace since the mid-20th century has been overwhelmingly negative. Within the field of International relations all central concepts have been formulated against a world empire.Bang, Peter Fibiger (2021). "Empire—a world history: Anatomy and concept, theory and synthesis." The Oxford World History of Empire. (Oxford University Press). Vol. 1, p 43. John Kennedy called the idea of Pax Americana "the peace of grave" /ref> History, however, shows that humans eventually "prefer the peace of graveyard over the very graveyard."Ostrovsky, Max (2007). The Hyperbola of the World Order. (Lanham: University Press of America), p 347.

German Sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck finds that the macro-historic process of imperial expansion gave rise to global history in which the formations of universal empires were most significant stages. A later group of political scientists, working on the phenomenon of the current unipolarity, in 2007 edited research on several pre-modern civilizations by experts in respective fields. The overall conclusion was that the balance of power was inherently unstable order and usually soon broke in favor of imperial order.William Wohlforth, & Stuart J. Kaufman, & Richard Little, Balance of Power in World History, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Yet before the advent of the unipolarity, world historian Arnold Toynbee and political scientist Martin Wight had drawn the same conclusion with an unambiguous implication for the modern world:

The earliest thinker to approach the phenomenon of universal empire from a theoretical point of view was Polybius (2:3):

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, having witnessed the battle at Jena in 1806 when Napoleon overwhelmed Prussia, described what he perceived as a deep historical trend:

Fichte's later compatriot, Geographer Alexander von Humboldt, in the mid-Nineteenth century observed a macro-historic trend of imperial growth in both Hemispheres: "Men of great and strong minds, as well as whole nations, acted under influence of one idea, the purity of which was utterly unknown to them."

In 1870, Argentine diplomat, jurist and political theorist Juan Bautista Alberdi described imperial consolidation. As von Humboldt, he found this trend unplanned and irrational but evident beyond doubt in the "unwritten history of events." He linked this trend to the recent Evolution theory: Nations gravitate towards the formation of a single universal society. The laws that lead the nations in that direction are the same natural laws that has formed societies and are part of evolution. These evolutionary laws exist disregarding whether men recognize them.

The Grand Inquisitor of Dostoevski (1880) envisaged a distant future of universal empire ruled by Caesar. The overall unity (human "anthill") has always been one of the main aims of men. The greater was the nation, the more they recognized the need for universal unity. History's great conquerors, such as Genghis Khan and Tamerlan, irrationally expressed this greatest necessity of humanity. The world unification entails long suffering but it will be the last suffering of mankind before the universal Caesar stops it and imposes world peace.Достоевский, Ф.М. (1880). Собрание сочинений в 15 томах /ref> The Inquisitor reminds Jesus that Satan from the beginning proposed him the sword of Caesar over all kingdoms of the world. The allusion is to where universal empire and absolute Caesarism are the ultimate temptation.Nikolai Berdyaev. (1907). . (Санкт Петербург: М. В. Пирожков). This would have stopped all suffering caused by the lack of unity. But Jesus declined the proposal opting instead to grant humans freedom of choice. Due to human nature, however, humans screwed up to choose unity and instead slaughter each other.Vasily Rozanov. (1901). Легенда о Великом Инквизиторе Ф. М. Достоевского /ref>Подосокорский, Николай (2024). "Лакей Смердяков как почитатель Наполеона в романе Ф. М. Достоевского 'Братья Карамазовы,'" Новый Мир /ref> Stressing that freedom plunged humanity into unbearbale suffering, the Inquisitor blames Jesus for his rejection of Devil's imperial gift. Moreover, people took his freedom to science which, in the absence of unity, will lead to such "marvels" that the survivors will crawl to the future Caesar begging him to "save them from themselves." The image of Caesar as Savior from wars is common in Rome and other universal empires.Pines, Yuri (2016). "Qin dynasty, 221–207 BCE." The Encyclopedia of Empire. ((Ed. MacKenzie, John M. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ), p 4. People, adds the Inquisitor, will be free only when they reject freedom and recognize the Caesar. As Jesus failed in his primary mission, earthly rulers took the sword of Caesar. By sword they will wield the world into universal empire and thus fulfill mankind's ancient dream of universal unity as initially proposed to Jesus by Antichrist on the mountain.Беспалов, Алексей (26.December 2013). "Легенда о великом инквизиторе," /ref>

Under the literary style of Dostoevski appears a deep historical insight. In 1946, with the "marvels" of science accomplished, Atomic Scientists repeated the concept of the Grand Inquisitor in their One World or None. In 1967, Robert Wesson published a 500-page comparative research on universal empires searching how these organizations, horrible in his view, repeatedly occurred in history and the next he expected for the same reason on the global scale before the year 2000. His outline of the prime cause seems in agreement with the implication of the Grand Inquisitor: "Always... we need a higher power to prevent us from abusing our little powers and hurting one another... Let someone save us from ourselves. We long to have peace and security... Yet we cannot have all this with freedom, for freedom means the ability to be disorderly..."Wesson, Robert G. (1967). The Imperial Order. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 512.

In 1886, Nietzsche perceived the new warlike age which the Europeans have entered in the "long spun-out comedy of its petty-statism" and, above all, under "parliamentary imbecility." Blaming the shattering of the European empire into small states when the time for petty politics is past, he stressed the threatening attitude of the immense Russia Empire and warned that the next (20th) century "will bring the struggle for the dominion of the world—the compulsion to great politics." Beyond Good and Evil, chapter VI:208-209.

The imperial expansion filled the world . Three famous contemporary observers—Frederick Turner, Halford Mackinder and Max Weber—emphasized the significance of the event. Turner drew his Frontier Thesis, predicting American overseas expansion, and Mackinder proclaimed that the world empire is now in sight.Halford J. Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, J. Murray, London, 1904.

Friedrich Ratzel observed that the "drive toward the building of continually larger states continues throughout the entirety of history" and is active in the present.Fridriech Ratzel, "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States", The Structure of Political Geography, (eds. Kasperson, Roger E., & Minghi, Julian V., Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), p 28. He drew "Seven Laws of Expansionism". His seventh law stated: "The general trend toward amalgamation transmits the tendency of territorial growth from state to state and increases the tendency in the process of transmission." He commented on this law to make its meaning clear: "There is on this small planet sufficient space for only one great state."Cited in Robert Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p 30-31.

Three other contemporaries—Kang Youwei, Josiah Strong and George Vacher de Lapouge—stressed that imperial expansion cannot indefinitely proceed on the definite surface of the globe and therefore world empire is imminent. Kang Youwei in 1885 believed that the imperial trend will culminate in the contest between Washington and Berlin.K'ang Yu-wei, The One World Philosophy, (tr. Thompson, Lawrence G., London, 1958), pp. 79–80, 85. The same year, Josiah Strong bet on the Anglo-Saxons to establish a world empire centered on the United States.Strong, Josuah (1885). Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis /ref>Clarke, Ignatius Frederick (1995). The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles Still to Come /ref> Vacher de Lapouge in 1899 estimated that the final contest will be between Russia and America in which America is likely to triumph.George Vacher de Lapouge, L'Aryen: Son Rôle Social, (Nantes: 1899), chapter "L'Avenir des Aryens". Writing the same year, Charles Oman stressed the technological annihilation of time-space and estimated that a federal union of the Anglo-Saxon race would submit the whole world.Oman, Charles (1899). England in the Nineteenth Century /ref>

Gabriel de Tarde, also writing in 1899, supposed a "law of evolution" forming universal empires which, in his comparison, have nothing else in common. Peoples on all inhabited continents inevitably, it seems, end in gigantic social "baobabs" unifying all within each's own sphere. As long as these spheres remain isolated from each other, they are destined for universal pacification by universal conquest. Thus we have had various pax imperia. Unless the French wake up, the future universal pacification will be either Russian or English. Just as all financial competition tends towards a monopoly and the division of parties towards a one party rule, the division of states, all separately eager for domination, runs towards either the "triumph or accepted preponderance" of one state.In French: Tarde, Gabriel de (1899). Les transformations du pouvoir /ref>

The above envisaged contests indeed took place, known to us as World War I and II. Writing during the First, Oswald Spengler in The Decline of the West compared two emergences of universal empires and implied for the modern world: The Chinese League of States failed as well as the Taoist idea of intellectual self-disarmament. The Chinese states defended their last independence with bitterness but in vain. Also in vain Rome attempted to avoid conquest of the Hellenistic east. Imperialism is so necessary a product of any civilization that when a strongest people refuse to assume the role of master, it is pushed into it. It is the same with us. The Hague Conference of 1907 was the prelude of World War, the Washington Conference of 1921 will have been that of other wars. Napoleon introduced the idea of military world empire different from the preceding European maritime empires. The contest "for the heritage of the whole world" will culminate "within two generations" (from 1922). The destinies of small states are "without importance to the great march of things." The strongest race will win and seize the management of the world.Spengler, Oswald (1922). The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History /ref>

Writing during the next World War, political scientists Derwent Whittlesey, Robert Strausz-Hupé and John H. Herz concluded: "Now that the earth is at last parceled out, consolidation has commenced."Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest, (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942), p 74. In "this world of fighting superstates there could be no end to war until one state had subjected all others, until world empire had been achieved by the strongest. This undoubtedly is the logical final stage in the geopolitical theory of evolution."Robert Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p XI.

Writing in the last year of the War, American theologian Parley Paul Wormer, German historian Ludwig Dehio, and Hungarian-born writer Emery Reves drew similar conclusions. Fluctuating but persistent movement occurred through the centuries toward ever greater unity. The forward movement toward ever larger unities continues and there is no reason to conclude that it has come to an end. More likely, the greatest convergence of all time is at hand. "Possibly this is the deeper meaning of the savage world conflicts" of the 20th century.Wormer, Parley Paul, (1945). Citizenship and the New Day, (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press), p 206.

The famous Anatomy of Peace by Reves, written and published in 1945, supposed that without the industrial power of the United States, Hitler already might have established world empire. Proposing world federalism, the book warned: Every dynamic force, every economic and technological reality, every "law of history" and logic "indicates that we are on the verge of a period of empire building," which is "the last phase of the struggle for the conquest of the world." As an elimination contest, one of the three remaining powers or a combination "will achieve by force that unified control made mandatory by the times we live in… Anyone of three, by defeating the other two, would conquer and rule the world." If we fail to institute a unified control over the world in democratic way, the "iron law of history" would compel us to wage wars until world empire is finally attained through conquest. Since the former way is improbable due human blindness, we should precipitate the unification by conquest as quickly as possible and start the restoration of human liberties within the world empire.Reves, Emery (1945). The Anatomy of Peace, (1 ed. New York & London: Harper & Brothers Publishers), pp 265-266, 268-270.

The year after the War and in the first year of the nuclear age, Einstein and British philosopher Bertrand Russell, known as prominent pacifists, outlined for the near future a perspective of world empire (world government established by force). Einstein believed that, unless world government is established by agreement, an imperial world government would come by war or wars.

(2011). 9781453204597, Open Road Media. . /ref> Three years later, another prominent pacifist, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, generalized on the ancient Empires of Egypt, Babylon, Persia and Greece to imply for the modern world: "The analogy in present global terms would be the final unification of the world through the preponderant power of either America or Russia, whichever proved herself victorious in the final struggle."

Russian colleague of Russell and Niebuhr, Georgy Fedotov, wrote in 1945: All empires are but stages on the way to the sole empire which must swallow all others. The only question is who will build it and on which foundations. Universal unity is the only alternative to annihilation. Unity by conference is utopian but unity by conquest by the strongest power is not and probably the uncompleted in this War will be completed in the next. "Pax Atlantica" is the best of possible outcomes.Георгий П. Федотов, (1945). "Новое Отечество," Новый Град, Нью Йорк: Издательство Чехова, 1952, p 98, 102, 107.

Originally drafted as a secret study for the Office of Strategic Services (the precursor of the CIA) in 1944 and published as a book three years later, The Struggle for the World... by James Burnham concludes: If either of the two Superpowers wins, the result would be a universal empire which in our case would also be a world empire. The historical stage for a world empire had already been set prior to and independently of the discovery of atomic weapons but these weapons make a world empire inevitable and imminent. "The atomic weapons ... will not permit the world to wait." Only a world empire can establish monopoly on atomic weapons and thus guarantee the survival of civilization. A world empire "is in fact the objective of the Third World War which, in its preliminary stages, has already began". The issue of a world empire "will be decided, and in our day. In the course of the decision, both of the present antagonists may, it is true, be destroyed, but one of them must be."James Burnham, Struggle for the World, (New York: The John Day Company, 1947), pp. 33, 50, 53, 55; 134–135, 143.

The next year, world historian Crane Brinton similarly supposed that the bomb may in the hands of a very skillful and lucky nation prove to be the weapon that permits that nation to unify the world by imperial conquest, to do what Napoleon and Hitler failed to do. Combined with other "wonders of science," it would permit a quick and easy conquest of the world.Brinton, Crane, (1948). From Many, One: The Process of Political Integration, the Problem of World Government, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971), pp 88-89, 94. In 1951, Hans Morgenthau concluded that the "best" outcome of World War III would be world empire:

Expert on earlier civilizations, Toynbee, further developed the subject of World War III leading to world empire:

The year this volume of A Study of History was published, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced "a knock-out blow" as an official doctrine, a detailed Plan was elaborated and Fortune magazine mapped the design. Section VIII, "Atomic Armaments", of the famous National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68), approved by President Harry Truman in 1951, uses the term "blow" 17 times, mostly preceded by such adjectives as "powerful", "overwhelming", or "crippling". Another term applied by the strategists was "Sunday punch".Michio Kaku, & Daniel Axelrod, To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans, (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 195.

Having modeled the rise of the world empire on the cases of previous empires, Toynbee noted that, by contrast, the modern ultimate "blow" would be atomic. But he remains optimistic: No doubt, the modern world has far greater capacity to reconstruct than the earlier civilizations had.Toynbee, Arnold, (1948). Civilization on Trial /ref>

A pupil of Toynbee, William McNeill, associated with the case of ancient China, which "put a quietus upon the disorders of the warring states by erecting an imperial bureaucratic structure ... The warring states of the Twentieth century seem headed for a similar resolution of their conflicts." , (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 807. The ancient "resolution" McNeill evoked was one of the most sweeping universal conquests in world history, performed by Qin in 230–221 BC. Chinese classic Sima Qian (d. 86 BC) described the event (6:234): "Qin raised troops on a grand scale" and "the whole world celebrated a great bacchanal". Herman Kahn of the RAND Corporation criticized an assembled group of SAC officers for their war plan (SIOP-62). He did not use the term bacchanalia but he coined on the occasion an associating word: "Gentlemen, you do not have a war plan. You have a war orgasm!"Emphasis added, cited in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon /ref> History did not completely repeat itself but it passed close.

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Circumscription theory

According to the circumscription theory of Robert Carneiro, "the more sharply circumscribed area, the more rapidly it will become politically unified."Robert Carneiro, "The Circumscription Theory: Challenge and Response", American Behavioral Scientist, 31/4, (1988): p 499. The Empires of Egypt,O'Connor, D. B. & Silverman, D. P., Ancient Egyptian Kingship, (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), p XXI.Amelie Kuhrt, The Ancient Near East circa 3000–330 BC, (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), vol. I, pp. 123–124. ChinaYuri Pines & Moreno Garcia, Juan Carlos, "Maat and Tianxia: Building world orders in ancient Egypt and China," Journal of Egyptian History, vol 13 (2020): p 227, http://yuri-pines-sinology.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Moreno-Pines-Maat-and-Tianxia-final.pdfYuri Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), pp. 8–9. and Yamato DynastySince 1979, the only country preserving its Emperor as head of state. Pines, Yuri & Biran, Michal & Rüpke, Jörg (2011). The Limits of Universal Rule: Eurasian Empires Compared /ref> are named the most durable political structures in human history. Correspondingly, these are the three most circumscribed civilizations in human history. The Empires of Egypt (established by Narmer c. 3000 BC) and China (established by Cheng in 221 BC) endured for over two millennia. Expert on comparative imperiology, Robert G. Wesson, emphasized the unique in world history "repetition of universal empires" in Egypt and China.Wesson, Robert G. (1967). The Imperial Order. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 379. German Sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck, criticizing the Western idea of progress, emphasized that China and Egypt remained at one particular stage of development for millennia. This stage was universal empire. The development of Egypt and China came to a halt once their empires "reached the limits of their natural habitat". Sinology does not recognize the Eurocentric view of the "inevitable" imperial fall;Yuri Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).Yuri Pines, The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012). EgyptologyD. B. O'Connor & D. P. Silverman, Ancient Egyptian Kingship, (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995).Aidan Dodson, Monarchs of the Nile, (London: The Rubicon Press, 1995). and Yamato Dynasty pose equal challenges.

Carneiro explored the Bronze Age civilizations. Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William Wohlforth researched the next three millennia, comparing eight civilizations. They conclude: The "rigidity of the borders" contributed importantly to hegemony in every concerned case.Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, The Balance of Power in World History, (London: Palgrave, 2007), p. 237. Hence, "when the system's borders are rigid, the probability of hegemony is high".Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", European Journal of International Relations, 13/2, (2007): p. 178.

The circumscription theory was stressed in the comparative studies of the Roman and Chinese Empires. The circumscribed Chinese Empire recovered from all falls, while the fall of Rome, by contrast, was fatal. "What counteracted this imperial tendency in Europe ... was a countervailing tendency for the geographical boundaries of the system to expand." If "Europe had been a closed system, some great power would eventually have succeeded in establishing absolute supremacy over the other states in the region".Stuart J. Kaufman & William C. Wohlforth & Richard Little, The Balance of Power in World History, (London: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 45–46.

In the 1945 book, The Precarious Balance, on four centuries of the European power struggle, Ludwig Dehio explained the durability of the European states system by its overseas expansion: "Overseas expansion and the system of states were born at the same time; the vitality that burst the bounds of the Western world also destroyed its unity."(tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 50, 90, 279. In a more famous 1945 book, Reves similarly argued that the era of outward expansion is forever closed and the historic trend of expansion will result in direct collision between the remaining powers.Reves 1945: pp 267-268. Edward Carr causally linked the end of the overseas outlet for imperial expansion and World Wars. In the nineteenth century, he wrote during the Second World War, imperialist wars were waged against "primitive" peoples. "It was silly for European countries to fight against one another when they could still ... maintain social cohesion by continuous expansion in Asia and Africa. Since 1900, however, this has no longer been possible: "the situation has radically changed". Now wars are between "imperial powers." Conditions of Peace, (London: Macmillan, 1943), p 113-114.

Hans Morgenthau wrote that the very imperial expansion into relatively empty geographical spaces in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, in Africa, Eurasia, and western North America, deflected great power politics into the periphery of the earth, thereby reducing conflict. For example, the more attention Russia, France and the United States paid to expanding into far-flung territories in imperial fashion, the less attention they paid to one another, and the more peaceful, in a sense, the world was. But by the late nineteenth century, the consolidation of the great nation-states and empires of the West was consummated, and territorial gains could only be made at the expense of one another. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 1948, (New York: McGraw Hill, revised 2006 edition), p 354–357. John H. Herz outlined one "chief function" of the overseas expansion and the impact of its end:

Some later commentators drew similar conclusions:

The opportunity for any system to expand in size seems almost a necessary condition for it to remain balanced, at least over the long haul. Far from being impossible or exceedingly improbable, systemic hegemony is likely under two conditions: "when the boundaries of the international system remain stable and no new major powers emerge from outside the system."Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, The Balance of Power in World History, (London: Palgrave, 2007), p 229, 237; Idem., "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", European Journal of International Relations, 13/2, (2007): p 159. With the system becoming global, further expansion is precluded. The geopolitical condition of "global closure"Gerry Kearns, " Fin de Siècle Geopolitics: Mackinder, Hobson and Theories of Global Closure", Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis, (ed. Peter J. Taylor, London: Belhaven Press, 1993). will remain to the end of history. Since "the contemporary international system is global, we can rule out the possibility that geographic expansion of the system will contribute to the emergence of a new balance of power, as it did so many times in the past."Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, The Balance of Power in World History, p 21. As Quincy Wright had put it, "this process can no longer continue without interplanetary wars."Quincy Wright, A Study of War, (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p 92-93.

Sociologist, Michael Mann, developed the cage metaphor to explain the persistent unity of Egypt. The River Valley was a cage. The whole population was "trapped within the domain of the conqueror," unable to turn backs on emerging authority. A veritable unitary society resulted. Comparing Egypt with other civilizations, Mann concludes: "The social cage was as total as has ever been seen. In this respect it has not been the dominant model of social organization.”Mann, Michael (1987). The Sources of Social Power. (Cambridge University Press), vol I, pp. 111, 114-115, 124. Max Ostrovsky remarked that Mann omitted one system which is even more caged—our own. Egypt could be the most caged of historic civilizations but it was not a “total cage’. Modern world system, being global, is a total cage, and this "model of social organization" will remain until the end of history.Ostrovsky, Max (2006). Y = Arctg X: The Hyperbola of the World Order. (Lanham: University Press of America), pp. 131-132. One of the leading experts on world-systems theory, Christopher Chase-Dunn, also noted that circumscription theory is applicable to the global system, since the global system is circumscribed. In fact, within less than a century of circumscribed existence, the global system overcame the centuries-old balance of power and reached the state of unipolarity. Given "constant spatial parameters" of the global system, its unipolar structure is neither historically unusual nor theoretically surprising.Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", European Journal of International Relations, 13/2, (2007): p. 179.

Randall Schweller theorized that a "closed international system", such as the global system became a century ago, would reach "entropy" in a kind of thermodynamic law. Once the state of entropy is reached, there is no going back. The initial conditions are lost forever. Stressing the curiosity of this fact, Schweller writes that since the moment the modern world became a closed system, the process has worked in only one direction: from many poles to two poles to one pole. Thus, unipolarity might represent entropy—stable and permanent loss of variation—in the global system.Randall L. Schweller, "Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics: Why Polarity Has Become Less Meaningful", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23/1, (2010): pp. 149–151.

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Present

For Dominic Lieven, empire is all about unequal distribution of power and consequent domination. Thus the 2000s world order is more imperial than the 19th-century one because instead of several empire of roughly equal power there is one imperial superpower. ‘Empire’ has therefore replaced "anarchy."Dominic Lieven (2012). "Empire, history and the contemporary global order," Proceedings of the British Academy /ref> Chalmers Johnson argues that the US global network of hundreds of military bases already represents a global empire in its initial form:

Simon Dalby associates the network of bases with the Roman imperial system:

Kenneth Pomeranz and Harvard Historian Niall Ferguson share the above-cited views: "With American military bases in over 120 countries, we have hardly seen the end of empire." This "vast archipelago of US military bases … far exceeds 19th-century British ambitions. Britain's imperium consisted of specific, albeit numerous, colonies and clients; the American imperial vision is much more global…"Kenneth Pomeranz, "Empire & 'Civilizing' Missions, Past & Present", Daedalus, 134/2, (2005): p 43, 45. The greatest conquerors who have ever lived only dreamed of a military presence as expansive as the United States has already achieved.Madden, Thomas F. (2008). Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World. (Dutton Adult), p 164.

Another Harvard historian Charles S. Maier opens his Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors with these words: "What a substratum for empire! Compared with which, the foundation of the Macedonian, the Roman and the British, sink into insignificance."(Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press, 2006), p 1. On almost any criterion, the American Empire in the 2000s transcends the limits of empire that John Darwin has observed since 1400 AD. Those writers who compare America to Victorian Britain "betray a staggering ignorance of the history of both."Darwin, John (2008). After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405. (New York: Bloomsbury Press), p 485.

One of the most accepted distinctions between earlier empires and the American Empire is the latter's unprecedented "global" or "planetary" scope.Manfred Berg (2016). "America, United States of: 20th century to the present." The Encyclopedia of Empire. (Ed. MacKenzie, John M. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ), p 3.Steinmetz, George (December 2005). "Return to empire: The new U.S. imperialism in comparative historical perspective." Sociological Theory /ref>Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization, (Berkeley & Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2003), p XIII. French former Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine wondered: "The situation is unprecedented: What previous empire subjugated the entire world...?"Hubert Vedrine & Dominique Moisi, France in an Age of Globalization, (tr. Gordon, Philip H., Washington: Brookings Institutions Press, 2001), p 2. The quests for universal empire are old but the present quest outdoes the previous in "the notable respect of being the first to actually be global in its reach." James Kurth found that there was "only one empire--the global empire of the United States."Kurth, James (Spring 2003). "Migration and the dynamics of empire." The National Interest. Vol. 71, p. 5. Another historian Paul Kennedy, who in 1986 predicted the imminent US "imperial overstretch," in 2002 acknowledged about the present world system:

Walter Russell Mead observes that the United States attempts to recreate "globally" what the ancient empires of Egypt, China and Rome had each accomplished on a regional basis."America's Sticky Power," Foreign Policy, 141, (March – April 2004): p 48. Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Leeds, Zygmunt Bauman, concludes:

Times Atlas of Empires numbers 70 empires in the world history. Niall Ferguson lists numerous parallels between them and the United States. He concludes: "To those who would still insist on American exceptionalism, the historian of empires can only retort: as exceptional as all the other 69 empires.""The Unconscious Colossus: Limits of (Alternatives to) American Empire," Daedalus, 134/2, (2005): p 20-21.Kramer, Paul A. (2011). "Power and connection: Imperial histories of the United States in the world." The American Historical Review /ref> Fareed Zakaria stressed one element not exceptional for the American Empire—the concept of exceptionalism. All dominant empires thought they were special. "Each empire is unique, each regards itself as holding the truth of the world, each sees its mission as realizing that truth throughout the whole world."Kumar, Krishan (2025). "History, sociology and the study of empires: Reflections of a Historical Sociologist." European Journal of Social Theory. Vol. 28 (1): p. 116. Historian Paul A. Kramer suggested a comparative history of imperial exceptionalisms themselves.

A team of Historians of empire supposed that we witness genesis of the American Empire. Hence, it should not be compared to empires in their height, such as Rome under Hadrian, but rather with emerging empires undergoing their “imperial moment.” In their hypothesis, at a certain moment a powerful state turns into empire. Their research developed into book, titled The Imperial Moment, where each scholar attempted to identify a parallel imperial moment in the empire of his specialization. The six cases of the book are devoted to five historical Empires and the American Empire. Their comparative analysis aims to show how, why and when empires come into being and the American Empire is expected to come.Kimberly Kagan et al (2010). The Imperial Moment. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 6, 174.

The five past cases under concern demonstrate that very few policy makers were aware that their state was on the brink of empire when the key transformation occurred. Later authors, knowing the outcome (empire), write either teleological or tautological histories. Thucydides and Polybius teleologically described empire as the natural culmination of an impersonal process. Others describe pre-imperial events as rational planning of empire, though the participants of those events had no such idea and acted out of different considerations.Kimberly Kagan et al (2010). The Imperial Moment. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 164, 172.

One of the contributors to The Imperial Moment, Roman Historian Arthur Eckstein, in his earlier research had already asked the same question, "At what point does a state begin to have an empire?" and found that this point pre-dates the collective recognition of the imperial situation. The Mediterranean unipolarity was established in 189 BC, but to many intelligent and experienced Greek politicians, according to Polybius ( Histories 1:1–4; 29:21, 27), this did not actually become clear until after 168 BC.Eckstein, Arthur M. (2008). Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 B.C. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 340-342.

Empires evolve from a long series of events in which empire has not been an intended outcome.MacKenzie, John M. (2016). "Empires in world history: Characteristics, concepts, and consequences." The Encyclopedia of Empire. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. ), vol I, p 7. Having criticized Thucydides and Polybius for their "teleological" approach, the Authors of The Imperial Moment drew the same teleological conclusion of empire as the natural culmination of an impersonal process. Empires often seem inevitable after the fact, but inconceivable beforehand. The fact of empire precedes the understanding of the existence of empire. Ideological recognition comes rather late in the game.Kimberly Kagan et al (2010). The Imperial Moment. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), pp. 164, 172. Views of empire as impersonal process are most prominent in theses related to defensive imperialism.

In the case of the United States, the sixth case in The Imperial Moment, the attitude is similar. The imperial situation is new but well known in history and commonly called “empire.” To avoid the word, many alternative terms were tried, such as liberal hegemony, hyperpower, unipolarity, and others. The very panoply of terms suggests that Americans find themselves in a new imperial situation, “largely of their own making, which they do not fully understand.” Eventually, some “unusually perceptive individuals” will grasp the imperial reality and announce the final destination of a “torturous” centuries-long journey: “Last stop, ‘empire.’ Everybody off.”Kimberly Kagan et al (2010). The Imperial Moment. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 163-172.

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Future

In 1945, Historian Ludwig Dehio predicted global unification due to the circumscription of the global system, although he did not use this term. Being global, the system can neither expand nor be subject to external intrusion as the European states system had been for centuries:

Fifteen years later, Dehio confirmed his hypothesis: The European system owed its durability to its overseas outlet. "But how can a multiple grouping of world states conceivably be supported from outside in the framework of a finite globe?"Ludwig Dehio, "Epilogue," The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, 1960, (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p 279.

During the same time, Quincy Wright developed a similar concept. Balance-of-power politics has aimed less at preserving peace than at preserving the independence of states and preventing the development of world empire. In the course of history, the balance of power repeatedly re-emerged, but on ever-wider scale. Eventually, the scale became global. Unless we proceed to "interplanetary wars," this pattern can no longer continue. In spite of significant reversals, the "trend towards world unity" can "scarcely be denied." World unity appears to be "the limit toward which the process of world history seems to tend."Quincy Wright, A Study of War, (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p 92-93, 228, 234.

The same "interplanetary" motif is present also in the Anatomy of Peace: The era of outward expansion is forever closed. "Until and unless we are able to communicate with another planet, the theater of human history will be limited to geographically determined, constant and known dimensions." The historic trend of expansion will result in direct collision between the remaining powers. Multiplied by modern technology, the centripetal forces will accomplish what the greatest empires of the past failed. "For the first time in human history, one power can conquer and rule the world."

The "Father of American Anthropology," Franz Boas, known for his historical particularism and cultural relativism, outlined the "inexorable laws of history" by which political units grow larger in size and smaller in number. The process began in the earliest times and has continued almost always in the same direction. In the long run, the tendency to unification has been more powerful than of disintegration. "Thus the history of mankind shows us the grand spectacle of the grouping of man in units of ever increasing size." The progress in the direction of unification has been so regular and so marked that we must needs conclude that the same tendencies will govern our history in the future. Today the unity of the world is not less conceivable than the modern nations were in the early history. The practical difficulties that stand in the way of the formation of still larger units count for nothing before the "inexorable laws of history."Boas, Franz, (posthumous publication). Race and Democratic Society, (New York: Biblo ad Tannen, 1969), pp 99-100.

Seven later scholars—Hornell Hart,"The Logistic Growth of Political Areas," Social Forces, 26, (1948): p 396-408. Raoul Naroll,"Imperial Cycles and World Order," Peace Research Society, 7, (1967): p 83-101. Louis Morano,"A Macrohistoric Trend towards World Government", Behavior Science Notes, 8, (1973): p 35-40. Rein Taagepera,Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. )."Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for Russia." International Studies Quarterly, 41/3, (1997): 475–504. the author of the circumscription theory Robert Carneiro"Political Expansion as an Expression of the Principle of Competitive Exclusion", Studying War: Anthropological Perspective, (eds. Reyna, Stephen P. & Dawns, Richard Erskine, Gordon and Breach, New Hampshire, 1994)."The Political Unification of the World", Cross Cultural Survey, 38/2, (2004), p 162-177. and Jesse H. Ausubel & Cesare MarchettiMarchetti, Cesare, & Ausubel, Jesse H. (2013). "Quantitative dynamics of human empires," p 2, 49, https://phe.rockefeller.edu/docs/empires_booklet.pdf Adapted from idem (2012). International Journal of Anthropology, vol 27 (1–2): p 1–62—quantitatively researched expanding imperial cycles. Initially, the imperiometric scholars worked with historical atlasesTaagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. ), p 65. but the advent of YouTube created a more dynamic visualization.Bye, Ollie (2017). "The history of the world: Every year," /ref>Brilliant Maps (2025). "The entire history of the world every year in just 60 seconds," /ref> Later spot-checks with Wikipedia showed few disagreements. All seven scholars concluded that imperial cycles represent an historical trend leading to world empire. Naroll and Carneiro found this outcome "close at hand," c. 2200 and 2300 respectively. In 2013, Marchetti and Ausubel estimated that the global empire is to rise within "a couple more generations."Marchetti, Cesare & Ausubel, Jesse H. (2013). "Quantitative dynamics of human empires," Adapted from idem (2012). International Journal of Anthropology, vol 27 (1–2): p 1–62. These predictions surprised their many contemporaries, as the 20th century has seen falls of empires, decolonization, and increase in the number of independent states. Nevertheless, the authors explained, when viewed within the millennial context, this recent reversal appears akin to random fluctuation. Since the dawn of history, the total number of separate polities has been reduced from thousands of tribes and states to about 200 and the number was even less in recent history.Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. ), p 227. None of the authors is determinist: "The future is not obliged to continue past trends; it just often does..."Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. ), p 2, 67.

The reversal of the trend in 20th century those scholars stated, according to Max Ostrovsky, does not exist. Instead, the 20th century is the point when the historical atlases they worked with reverse their approach and begin painting every nominal sovereignty in different color. They had not done so for the earlier history. Most imperial provinces in history were nominally independentAdam Watson (1992). The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. (London: Routledge), pp. 122–125, 131–132, 324. but historical atlases paint them all in the color of their metropole. Since the 20th century, however, political maps begin painting every Vatican, Monaco and Tuvalu in different color. None of the seven mentioned imperiometric scholars counted the sphere under the Monroe Doctrine, for example, or the sphere after the Monroe Doctrine was extended to Eurasia, named Truman Doctrine, and "globalized."Whitaker, Arthur P. (1954). The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline. (New York: Cornell University Press), pp. 175-176.Anatol Lieven (2004). "America right or wrong: An anatomy of American nationalism." The Geopolitics Reader. (Eds. O’Tauthail, Gearoid, & Dalby, Simon. London & New York: Routledge), pp. 171-172. To preserve the consistent approach, Ostrovsky says, in the 20th century we should switch from historical atlases to the map of the Unified Combatant Command.Ostrovsky, Max (2006). The Hyperbola of the World Order. (Lanham: University Press of America), p. 205.Ostrovsky, Max (2018). Military Globalization: Geography, Strategy, Weaponry /ref>

Though unnoted by contemporary imperiometric scholars, the phenomenon reflected in the latter map was envisaged by the founder of the Paneuropean Union, Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi yet in 1943, when he drew a specific and immediate future imperial project: After the War America is bound "to take over the command of the skies." The danger of "the utter annihilation of all enemy towns and lands" can "only be prevented by the air superiority of a single power ... America's air role is the only alternative to intercontinental wars." Despite his outstanding anti-imperialism, Coudenhove-Kalergi detailed:

Coudenhove-Kalergi envisaged a kind of Pax Americana modeled on "Pax Romana":

This period would be necessary transitory stage before World State is eventually established, though he did not specify how the last transformation is expected to occur. Coudenhove-Kalergi's follower in the teleological theory of World State, Toynbee, specified two ways. One is by wars going on to a bitter end at which one surviving great power "knocks out" its last remaining competitor and establishes world empire, like the earlier empires used to on the regional scale. The other alternative is the United Nations. Having devoted his life to the study of history and international affairs, Toynbee did not bet on the United Nations. Instead, he identified symptoms of the traditional power politics leading to the world empire by a universal conquest.

Toynbee emphasized that the world is ripe for conquest: "...Hitler's eventual failure to impose peace on the world by the force of arms was due, not to any flaw in his thesis that the world was ripe for conquest, but to an accidental combination of incidental errors in his measures..." But "in falling by so narrow a margin to win the prize of world-dominion for himself, Hitler had left the prize dangling within the reach of any successor capable of pursuing the same aims of world-conquest with a little more patience, prudence, and tact." With his "revolution of destruction," Hitler has performed the "yeoman service" for "some future architect of a Pax Ecumenica... For a post-Hitlerian empire-builder, Hitler's derelict legacy was a gift of the Gods."

The next "architect of a Pax Ecumenica," known more commonly as Pax Americana, demonstrated "more patience, prudence, and tact." Consequently, as President Dwight Eisenhower put it, the NATO allies became "almost psychopathic" whenever anyone talked about a US withdrawal, and the reception of his successor John F. Kennedy in Berlin was "almost hysterical," as Chancellor Konrad Adenauer characterized it. John Ikenberry finds that the Europeans wanted a stronger, more formal and more imperial system than the United States was initially willing to provide. In the end the United States settled for this "form of empire—a Pax Americana with formal commitments to Europe." According to a much debated thesis, the United States became "empire by invitation." The period discussed in the thesis (1945–1952) ended precisely the year Toynbee theorized on "some future architect of a Pax Ecumenica."

Dissociating America from Rome, Eisenhower gave a pessimistic forecast. In 1951, before he became president, he had written on West Europe: "We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions if for no other reason than that these are not, politically, our frontiers. What we must do is to assist these West peoples." Two years later, he wrote: When it was decided to deploy US divisions to Europe, no one had "for an instant" thought that they would remain there for "several decades"—that the United States could "build a sort of Roman Wall with its own troops and so protect the world."

Eisenhower assured Soviet first secretary Nikita Khrushchev on Berlin in 1959: "Clearly we did not contemplate 50 years in occupation there." It lasted, remarks Marc Trachtenberg, from July 1945 to September 1994, 10 months short of 50 years. Notably, when the US troops eventually left, they left eastward. Confirming the theory of the "empire by invitation," with their first opportunity East European states extended the "invitation."

Oswald Spengler envisaged the "Imperial Age" for the world in both senses of "empire," spatial (as a world-wide unit ruled by one center) and governmental (as ruled by Emperor). Published in 1922, The Decline of the West predicts the triumph of the strongest race in the fight for the whole world within "two generations" and of "Caesarism" over democracy "within a century."Spengler, Oswald (1922). The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History /ref> In 2022, the Spenglerian century ended short of global "Caesarism," albeit two years before its end Donald Trump had been advised to cross the Rubicon.Lemon, Jason, (December 20, 2020). "Arizona GOP Chair calls for Trump to 'cross the Rubicon' in tweet shared by Michael Flynn," Newsweek /ref>

Chalmers Johnson regards the global military reach of the United States as empire in its "initial" form. The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic, (New York: Henry Hobt and Company, 2004), p 187. For Charles H. Fairbanks, it is an empire "in formation"Eakin, Emily (31 March 2002). “All roads led to D. C.” New York Times /ref> and for Kimberly Kagan an "emerging" empire.Kagan, Kimberly et al (2010). The Imperial Moment. (Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), p 6, 174. Dimitri Simes finds that most of the world sees the United States as a "nascent" imperial power. Some scholars concerned how this empire would look in its ultimate form. The ultimate form of empire was described by Michael Doyle in his Empires. It is empire in which its two main components—the ruling core and the ruled periphery—merged to form one integrated whole. At this stage the empire as defined ceases to exist and becomes world state. Doyle exemplifies the transformation on the case of the Roman Emperor Caracalla whose edict in AD 212 extended the Roman citizenship to all inhabitants of the Mediterranean world.

Doyle's case of the Roman Empire had also been evoked by Susan Strange in her 1988 article, "The Future of the American Empire." Strange emphasized that the most persistent empires were those which best managed to integrate the ruling core and the peripheral allies. The article is partly a reply on the published a year earlier bestseller The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers which predicted imminent US "imperial overstretch." Strange found this outcome unlikely, stressing the fact that the peripheral allies have been successfully recruited into the American Empire.

Envisaging a world empire of either the United States or the Soviet Union (whoever is victorious in World War III), Bertrand Russell projected the Roman scenario too: "Like the Romans, they will, in the course of time, extend citizenship to the vanquished. There will then be a true world state, and it will be possible to forget that it will have owed its origin to conquest." International Relations scholar Alexander Wendt supposes world empire by universal conquest and subsequent consolidation, provided the conquering power recognizes all conquered members. For his example he also invokes the Roman Empire.Wendt, Alexander, (2003). "Why the World State is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy," European Journal of International Relations /ref>Wendt, Alexander (2005). "Agency, Teleology and the World State: A Reply to Shannon". European Journal of International Relations. 11 (4): p 595. In satirical criticism of the European pro-American stance in the wake of September 11, French Philosopher Régis Debray warned that the logical culmination of the motto "We are all Americans" would be a modernized Edict of Caracalla extending US citizenship to all the West and thus establishing the United States of the West.In French, Debray, Régis (2002). L'édit de Caracalla ou plaidoyer pour des Etats-Unis d'occident /ref>

In the above views, the Edict of Caracalla is an advanced form of empire. Emmanuel Todd and Magdi Allam disregarded this nuance and compared the Edict with the US citizenship policy in the early 21st century. Todd found the US policy of this time lagging far behind the Roman under Caracalla while Allam stressed that the United States is also a nation forged by immigrants and already the most successful contemporary expression of multiculturalism the world has seen.Burton, Paul J. (2013). "Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Views of the "New Rome" from "Old Europe", 2000–2010". International Journal of the Classical Tradition. Vol. 20 (1–2): pp. 31-32.

To the case of Caracalla, Toynbee added the Abbasid cosmopolitan reformation of 750 AD. Both "were good auguries for the prospect that, in a post-Modern chapter of Western history, a supranational commonwealth originally based on the hegemony of a paramount power over its satellites might eventually be put on the sounder basis of a constitutional partnership in which all the people of all the partner states would have their fare share in the conduct of common affairs." To the cases of Caracalla and the Abbasid revolution, Max Ostrovsky added the Han dynasty overthrow of Qin dynasty in 206 BC and more gradual cosmopolitan reformations he finds characteristic to all persistent empires and expects in the future global empire. The tragedy of empire is that it is disastrous for the conquered in the beginning and eventually for the conquerors, as they lose their privileges and often the very identity, becoming assimilated within the conquered population. Rein Taagepera called it imperial "self-ethnocide."Taagepera, Rein & Nemcok, Miroslav (2024). More People, Fewer States: The Past and Future of World Population and Empire Sizes. (Cambridge University Press. ), p 86. When this distant stage comes to the American Empire, according to Ostrovsky, the green card is abolished since all Earth inhabitants have it by birth.Ostrovsky, Max (2007). The Hyperbola of the World Order /ref>

Crane Brinton expected that the world empire would not be built instantly but not as slowly as Rome, for much in the modern world has been speeded up.Brinton, Crane, (1948). From Many, One: The Process of Political Integration, the Problem of World Government, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971), p 95. Charles Galton Darwin, a grandson of the Charles Darwin, suggested that China, as an isolated and enduring civilization, seems to provide the most relevant model for the global future. As the Chinese Empire, the regions of the world, periodically albeit more rarely, will be united by force into an uneasy world-empire, which will endure for a period until it falls.Darwin, Charles Galton, (1950). "The Next Million Years," The Fate of Man. (New York: G. Braziller, 1961), pp 499, 501. Along China, Ostrovsky mentions Egypt as a model for the future but, by contrast, estimates that the intermediate periods of the global empire will be shorter and rarer.Ostrovsky 2007: pp 352, 362, 367.

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See also

• Colonial empire
• Hegemony
• Linguistic imperialism
• Military globalization
• Nomadic empire
• World domination

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Lists

• List of empires
• List of largest empires
• List of medieval great powers
• List of former sovereign states
• List of transcontinental countries
• List of Hindu empires and dynasties

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Notes

Citations

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Cited sources and further reading

• , review of ; ;
• (2025). 9780691127088, Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691127088
• Josep Colomer (2025). 9781523318902, Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. ISBN 9781523318902
• Wendy Doniger, "The Rise and Fall of Warhorses" (review of David Chaffetz, Raiders, Rulers, and Traders: The Horse and the Rise of Empires, Norton, 2024, 424 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXXII, no. 6 (10 April 2025), pp. 17–19. "Unlike cows, , whose teeth are quite dull, pull up grass by the roots rather than biting off the blades, or they nibble it right down to the ground, thus quickly destroying the land, which may require some years to recover.... Horses in the wild... range constantly to find new territory... The horse came to symbolize conquest through its own natural imperialism. The bred horses and nomadic Eurasian nomads.... Men waged war to get other people's horses so that they could wage war. Horsepower... remained the basic unit of power for centuries.... But the horse-breeding people of the steppes never succeeded in conquering the part of the world west of the Carpathians and the Alps, nor .... where sea power... was decisive." (p. 17.)
• Written for the United Nations Research Institute on Development, UNRISD, Geneva.
• Imanuel Geiss (1983). 9780080303871, Aberdeen University Press. ISBN 9780080303871
• Robert Gilpin (1981). 9780521273763, Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521273763
• Stephen Howe (2025). 9780192802231, Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780192802231
• , Rev. by Mary Q. Innis; foreword by Marshall McLuhan.
• Krishan Kumar (2025). 9780691192802, Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691192802
  , examines the Roman, Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian, British and French empires.
• (2025). 9780745321004, Pluto Press. ISBN 9780745321004

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External links

• Index of Colonies and Possessions

Categories: Articles Which Contain Graphical Timelines, Constitutional State Types, Monarchy