Defamation is a communication that injures a third party's reputation and causes a legally redressable injury. The precise legal definition of defamation varies from country to country. It is not necessarily restricted to making that are , and can extend to concepts that are more abstract than reputation such as dignity and honour.
In the English-speaking world, the law of defamation traditionally distinguishes between libel (written, printed, posted online, published in mass media) and slander (oral speech). It is treated as a civil wrong (tort, delict), as a crime, or both.
Defamation and related laws can encompass a variety of acts (from general defamation and insultas applicable to every citizen – to specialized provisions covering specific entities and social structures):
Roman law was aimed at giving sufficient scope for the discussion of a man's character, while it protected him from needless insult and pain. The remedy for verbal defamation was long confined to a civil action for a monetary penalty, which was estimated according to the significance of the case, and which, although punitive in its character, doubtless included practically the element of compensation. But a new remedy was introduced with the extension of the criminal law, under which many kinds of defamation were punished with great severity. At the same time increased importance attached to the publication of defamatory books and writings, the libri or libelli famosi, from which is derived the modern use of the word libel; and under the later emperors the latter term came to be specially applied to anonymous accusations or , the dissemination of which was regarded as particularly dangerous, and visited with very severe punishment, whether the matters contained in them were true or false.
The Praetorian Edict, codified circa AD 130, declared that an action could be brought up for shouting at someone contrary to good morals: " qui, adversus bonos mores convicium cui fecisse cuiusve opera factum esse dicitur, quo adversus bonos mores convicium fieret, in eum iudicium dabo." Digest 47. 10. 15. 2. In this case, the offence was constituted by the unnecessary act of shouting. According to Ulpian, not all shouting was actionable. Drawing on the argument of Labeo, he asserted that the offence consisted in shouting contrary to the morals of the city (" adversus bonos mores huius civitatis") something apt to bring in disrepute or contempt (" quae... ad infamiam vel invidiam alicuius spectaret") the person exposed thereto. Digest 47. 10. 15. 3–6. Any act apt to bring another person into disrepute gave rise to an actio injurarum. Digest 47. 10. 15. 25. In such a case the truth of the statements was no justification for the public and insulting manner in which they had been made, but, even in public matters, the accused had the opportunity to justify his actions by openly stating what he considered necessary for public safety to be denounced by the libel and proving his assertions to be true. The second head included defamatory statements made in private, and in this case the offense lay in the content of the imputation, not in the manner of its publication. The truth was therefore a sufficient defense, for no man had a right to demand legal protection for a false reputation.
In Anglo-Saxon England, whose legal tradition is the predecessor of contemporary common law jurisdictions, slander was punished by cutting out the tongue. Historically, while defamation of a commoner in England was known as libel or slander, the defamation of a member of the English aristocracy was called scandalum magnatum, literally "the scandal of magnates".
This implies a right to legal protection against defamation; however, this right co-exists with the right to freedom of opinion and expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR as well as Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 19 of the ICCPR expressly provides that the right to freedom of opinion and expression may be limited so far as it is necessary "for respect of the rights or reputations of others". Consequently, international human rights law provides that while individuals should have the right to a legal remedy for defamation, this right must be balanced with the equally protected right to freedom of opinion and expression. In general, ensuring that domestic defamation law adequately balances individuals' right to protect their reputation with freedom of expression and of the press entails:
Paragraph 47 states:
In common law jurisdictions, civil lawsuits alleging defamation have frequently been used by both private businesses and governments to suppress and censor criticism. A notable example of such lawsuits being used to suppress political criticism of a government is the use of defamation claims by politicians in Singapore's ruling People's Action Party to harass and suppress opposition leaders such as J. B. Jeyaretnam.Cameron Sim, The Singapore Chill: Political Defamation and the Normalization of a Statist Rule of Law, 20 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 319 (2011). High Court awards PM Lee $210,000 in damages in defamation suits against TOC editor Terry Xu and article author ( Straits Times) 1 September 2021 Over the first few decades of the twenty first century, the phenomenon of strategic lawsuits against public participation has gained prominence in many common law jurisdictions outside Singapore as activists, journalists, critics of corporations, political leaders, and public figures are increasingly targeted with vexatious defamation litigation. As a result, tort reform measures have been enacted in various jurisdictions; the California Code of Civil Procedure and Ontario's Protection of Public Participation Act do so by enabling defendants to make a special motion to strike or dismiss during which discovery is suspended and which, if successful, would terminate the lawsuit and allow the party to recover its legal costs from the plaintiff.
It is also necessary in these cases to show that there is a well-founded public interest in the specific information being widely known, and this may be the case even for . Public interest is generally not "what the public is interested in", but rather "what is in the interest of the public".
Other defences recognised in one or more common law jurisdictions include:
Some jurisdictions have a separate tort or delict of verbal injury, intentional infliction of emotional distress, involving the making of a statement, even if truthful, intended to harm the claimant out of malice; some have a separate tort or delict of "invasion of privacy" in which the making of a true statement may give rise to liability: but neither of these comes under the general heading of "defamation". The tort of harassment created by Singapore's Protection from Harassment Act 2014 is an example of a tort of this type being created by statute. There is also, in almost all jurisdictions, a tort or delict of "misrepresentation", involving the making of a statement that is untrue even though not defamatory. Thus a surveyor who states a house is free from risk of flooding has not defamed anyone, but may still be liable to someone who purchases the house relying on this statement. Other increasingly common claims similar to defamation in U.S. law are claims that a famous trademark has been diluted through tarnishment, see generally trademark dilution, "intentional interference with contract", and "negligent misrepresentation". In America, for example, the unique tort of false light protects plaintiffs against statements which are not technically false but are misleading.Edward C. Martin. "False light". . Cumberland School of Law, Samford University Libel and slander both require publication.50 Am.Jur.2d libel and slander 1–546
Although laws vary by state; in America, a defamation action typically requires that a plaintiff claiming defamation prove that the defendant:
Many jurisdictions within the Commonwealth (e.g. Singapore, Ontario, and the United KingdomDefamation Act 1952) have enacted legislation to:
Defamation in Indian tort law largely resembles that of England and Wales. Indian courts have endorsed the defences of absolute Pukhraj v State of Rajasthan 1973 SCC (Cri) 944. and qualified privilege, Rustom K. Karanjia and Anr v Krishnaraj M.D. Thackersey and Ors. (1970) 72 BOMLR 94. fair comment, Ram Jethmalani Vs. Subramaniam Swamy 2006 (87) DRJ 603. and justification. Santosh Tewari and Ors V State of U.P. and Anr 1996 (20) ACR 808. While statutory law in the United Kingdom provides that, if the defendant is only successful in proving the truth of some of the several charges against him, the defence of justification might still be available if the charges not proved do not materially injure the reputation,Defamation Act, 1952 (England). there is no corresponding provision in India, though it is likely that Indian courts would treat this principle as persuasive precedent.. Recently, incidents of defamation in relation to public figures have attracted public attention.
The origins of U.S. defamation law pre-date the American Revolution. Though the First Amendment of the American Constitution was designed to protect freedom of the press, it was primarily envisioned to prevent censorship by the state rather than defamation suits; thus, for most of American history, the Supreme Court did not interpret the First Amendment as applying to libel cases involving media defendants. This left libel laws, based upon the traditional common law of defamation inherited from the English legal system, mixed across the states. The 1964 case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan dramatically altered the nature of libel law in the country by elevating the fault element for public officials to actual malicethat is, public figures could win a libel suit only if they could demonstrate the publisher's "knowledge that the information was false" or that the information was published "with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not". Later the Supreme Court held that statements that are so ridiculous to be clearly not true are protected from libel claims, as are statements of opinion relating to matters of public concern that do not contain a provably false factual connotation. Subsequent state and federal cases have addressed defamation law and the Internet.
American defamation law is much less plaintiff-friendly than its counterparts in European and the Commonwealth countries. A comprehensive discussion of what is and is not libel or slander under American law is difficult, as the definition differs between different states and is further affected by federal law. Some states codify what constitutes slander and libel together, merging the concepts into a single defamation law.
New Zealand received English law with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in February 1840. The current Act is the Defamation Act 1992 which came into force on 1 February 1993 and repealed the Defamation Act 1954. Defamation Act 1992 New Zealand as at 1 March 2017 New Zealand law allows for the following remedies in an action for defamation: compensatory damages; an injunction to stop further publication; a correction or a retraction; and in certain cases, punitive damages. Section 28 of the Act allows for punitive damages only when a there is a flagrant disregard of the rights of the person defamed. As the law assumes that an individual suffers loss if a statement is defamatory, there is no need to prove that specific damage or loss has occurred. However, Section 6 of the Act allows for a defamation action brought by a corporate body to proceed only when the body corporate alleges and proves that the publication of the defamation has caused or is likely to cause pecuniary loss to that body corporate.
As is the case for most Commonwealth jurisdictions, Canada follows English law on defamation issues (except in Quebec where the private law is derived from French civil law). In common law provinces and territories, defamation covers any communication that tends to lower the esteem of the subject in the minds of ordinary members of the public. Murphy v. LaMarsh (1970), 73 W.W.R. 114 Probably true statements are not excluded, nor are political opinions. Intent is always presumed, and it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended to defame. In Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto (1995), the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the actual malice test adopted in the US case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Once a claim has been made, the defendant may avail themselves of a defence of justification (the truth), fair comment, responsible communication, or privilege. Publishers of defamatory comments may also use the defence of innocent dissemination where they had no knowledge of the nature of the statement, it was not brought to their attention, and they were not negligent.
Under the actio iniuriarum, harm consists in the infringement of a personality right, either "corpus", "dignitas", or "fama". Dignitas is a generic term meaning 'worthiness, dignity, self-respect', and comprises related concerns like mental tranquillity and privacy. Because it is such a wide concept, its infringement must be serious. Not every insult is humiliating; one must prove contumelia. This includes insult ( iniuria in the narrow sense), adultery, loss of consortium, alienation of affection, breach of promise (but only in a humiliating or degrading manner), et cetera. "Fama" is a generic term referring to reputation and actio iniuriarum pertaining to it encompasses defamation more broadly Beyond simply covering actions that fall within the broader concept of defamation, "actio iniuriarum" relating to infringements of a person's corpus provides civil remedies for assaults, acts of a sexual or indecent nature, and 'wrongful arrest and detention'.
In Scots law, which is closely related to Roman Dutch law, the remedy for defamation is similarly the actio iniuriarium and the most common defence is "veritas" (i.e. proving the truth of otherwise defamatory statement). Defamation falls within the realm of non-patrimonial (i.e. dignitary) interests. The Scots law pertaining to the protection of non-patrimonial interests is said to be 'a thing of shreds and patches'.Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (W. Green, 2010), at para.1.02 This notwithstanding, there is 'little historical basis in Scots law for the kind of structural difficulties that have restricted English law' in the development of mechanisms to protect so-called 'rights of personality'.Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (W. Green, 2010), at para.17.17 The actio iniuriarum heritage of Scots law gives the courts scope to recognise, and afford reparation in, cases in which no patrimonial (or 'quasi-patrimonial') 'loss' has occurred, but a recognised dignitary interest has nonetheless been invaded through the wrongful conduct of the defender. For such reparation to be offered, however, the non-patrimonial interest must be deliberately affronted: negligent interference with a non-patrimonial interest will not be sufficient to generate liability.Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (W. Green, 2010), at para.17.13 An actio iniuriarum requires that the conduct of the defender be 'contumelious'Robert Black, A Historical Survey of Delictual Liability in Scotland for Personal Injuries and Death (Continued), (1975) 8 CILS 189, at 195—that is, it must show such hubristic disregard of the pursuer's recognised personality interest that an intention to affront ( animus iniuriandi) might be imputed.David Ibbetson, 'Iniuria, Roman and English' in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Hart, 2013), at 40
There can be regional statutes that may differ from the national norm. For example, in the United States, criminal defamation is generally limited to the living. However, there are 7 states (Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah) that have criminal statutes regarding defamation of the dead. Idaho Code § 18-4801 , Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:47 , Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.510, and No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American Jurisprudence by Gregory C. Lisby, 9 Comm. L. & Pol'y 433 footnote 386.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has also published a detailed database on criminal and civil defamation provisions in 55 countries, including all European countries, all member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, America, and Canada.
Questions of group libel have been appearing in common law for hundreds of years. One of the earliest known cases of a defendant being tried for defamation of a group was the case of R v Orme and Nutt (1700). In this case, the jury found that the defendant was guilty of libeling several subjects, though they did not specifically identify who these subjects were. A report of the case told that the jury believed that "where a writing ... inveighs against mankind in general, or against a particular order of men, as for instance, men of the gown, this is no libel, but it must descend to particulars and individuals to make it libel." R v Orme and Nutt, 1700 This jury believed that only individuals who believed they were specifically defamed had a claim to a libel case. Since the jury was unable to identify the exact people who were being defamed, there was no cause to identify the statements were a libel.
Another early English group libel which has been frequently cited is King v. Osborne (1732). In this case, the defendant was on trial "for printing a libel reflecting upon the Portuguese Jews". The printing in question claimed that Jews who had arrived in London from Portugal burned a Jewish woman to death when she had a child with a Christian man, and that this act was common. Following Osborne's anti-Semitic publication, several Jews were attacked. Initially, the judge seemed to believe the court could do nothing since no individual was singled out by Osborne's writings. However, the court concluded that "since the publication implied the act was one Jews frequently did, the whole community of Jews was defamed." King v. Osborne, 1732
Though various reports of this case give differing accounts of the crime, this report clearly shows a ruling based on group libel. Since laws restricting libel were accepted at this time because of its tendency to lead to a breach of peace, group libel laws were justified because they showed potential for an equal or perhaps greater risk of violence. For this reason, group libel cases are criminal even though most libel cases are civil torts.
In a variety of Common Law jurisdictions, criminal laws prohibiting protests at funerals, sedition, false statements in connection with elections, and the use of profanity in public, are also often used in contexts similar to criminal libel actions. The boundaries of a court's power to hold individuals in "contempt of court" for what amounts to alleged defamatory statements about judges or the court process by attorneys or other people involved in court cases is also not well established in many common law countries.
He who publishes or reproduces, by any means, calumnies and injuries made by others, will be punished as responsible himself for the calumnies and injuries whenever its content is not correctly attributed to the corresponding source. Exceptions are expressions referring to subjects of public interest or that are not assertive (see Article 113). When calumny or injury are committed through the press, a possible extra penalty is the publication of the judicial decision at the expenses of the guilty (Article 114). He who passes to someone else information about a person that is included in a personal database and that one knows to be false, is punished with six months to three years in prison. When there is harm to somebody, penalties are aggravated by an extra half (Article 117 bis, §§ 2nd and 3rd). Argentine Penal Code (official text) – Crimes Against Honor (Articles 109 to 117-bis)
In 2006, uniform defamation laws came into effect across Australia. In addition to fixing the problematic inconsistencies in law between individual States and Territories, the laws made a number of changes to the common law position, including:
The 2006 reforms also established across all Australian states the availability of truth as an unqualified defence; previously a number of states only allowed a defence of truth with the condition that a public interest or benefit existed. The defendant however still needs to prove that the defamatory imputations are substantially true.
The law as it currently stands in Australia was summarised in the 2015 case of Duffy v Google by Malcolm Blue in the Supreme Court of South Australia:
Defences available to defamation defendants include absolute privilege, qualified privilege, justification (truth), honest opinion, publication of public documents, fair report of proceedings of public concern and triviality.
Australia's first Twitter defamation case to go to trial is believed to be Mickle v Farley. The defendant, former Orange High School student Andrew Farley was ordered to pay $105,000 to a teacher for writing defamatory remarks about her on the social media platform.
A more recent case in defamation law was Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited 2015, heard in the Federal Court of Australia. This judgment was significant as it demonstrated that tweets, consisting of even as little as three words, can be defamatory, as was held in this case..
According to the OSCE report on defamation laws, "Azerbaijan intends to remove articles on defamation and insult from criminal legislation and preserve them in the Civil Code".
To establish civil liability for defamation, the plaintiff must establish, on a balance of probabilities, the existence of an injury (fault), a wrongful act (damage), and of a causal connection (link of causality) between the two. A person who has made defamatory remarks will not necessarily be civilly liable for them. The plaintiff must further demonstrate that the person who made the remarks committed a wrongful act. Defamation in Quebec is governed by a reasonableness standard, as opposed to strict liability; a defendant who made a false statement would not be held liable if it was reasonable to believe the statement was true.
The criminal portion of the law has been rarely applied, but it has been observed that, when treated as an indictable offence, it often appears to arise from statements made against an agent of the Crown, such as a police officer, a corrections officer, or a Crown attorney. In the most recent case, in 2012, an Ottawa restaurant owner was convicted of ongoing online harassment of a customer who had complained about the quality of food and service in her restaurant.
According to the OSCE official report on defamation laws issued in 2005, 57 persons in Canada were accused of defamation, libel and insult, among which 23 were convicted – 9 to prison sentences, 19 to probation and one to a fine. The average period in prison was 270 days, and the maximum sentence was four years of imprisonment.
In 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a person who posts hyperlinks on a website which lead to another site with defamatory content is not publishing that defamatory material for the purposes of libel and defamation law.
According to Article 25 of the Penal Code, "lower imprisonment" is defined as a prison term between 61 days and five years. According to Article 30, the penalty of "lower imprisonment" in its medium or minimum degrees carries with it also the suspension of the exercise of a public position during the prison term. Chilean Penal Code, Book I (see Articles 25 and 30)
Article 416 defines injuria as "all expression said or action performed that dishonors, discredits or causes contempt". Article 417 defines broadly injurias graves (grave slander), including the imputation of a crime or misdemeanor that cannot lead to public prosecution, and the imputation of a vice or lack of morality, which are capable of harming considerably the reputation, credit or interests of the offended person. "Grave slander" in written form or with publicity are punished with "lower imprisonment" in its minimum to medium degrees plus a fine of eleven to twenty "vital wages". Calumny or slander of a deceased person (Article 424) can be prosecuted by the spouse, children, grandchildren, parents, grandparents, siblings and inheritance of the offended person. Finally, according to Article 425, in the case of calumnies and slander published in foreign newspapers, are considered liable all those who from Chilean territory sent articles or gave orders for publication abroad, or contributed to the introduction of such newspapers in Chile with the intention of propagating the calumny and slander. Biblioteca.jus.gov.ar – Penal Code of Chile (see articles 416–417 and 424–425)
"Chapter I" ("General rules"):
"Chapter V" ("Rights to Reputation and Rights to Honor"):
The crime of insult (Article 361, § 1, of the Penal Code) may have led to up to one year of imprisonment or a fine, while unprovoked insult (Article
361-A, § 1) was punished with at least three months in prison. In addition, defamation may have resulted in up to two months in prison or a fine, while aggravated defamation could have led to at least three months of prison, plus a possible fine (Article 363) and deprivation of the offender's civil rights. Finally, disparaging the memory of a deceased person is punished with imprisonment of up to six months (Penal Code, Article 365).
According to the Constitution of India, the fundamental right to free speech (Article 19) is subject to "reasonable restrictions":
Accordingly, for the purpose of criminal defamation, "reasonable restrictions" are defined in Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Section 499 of Indian Penal Code has now been replaced by Section 356 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita). This section defines defamation and provides ten valid exceptions when a statement is not considered to be defamation. It says that defamation takes place, when someone "by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person". The punishment is simple imprisonment for up to two years, or a fine, or both (Section 500).
Some other offences related to false allegations: false statements regarding elections (Section 171G), false information (Section 182), false claims in court (Section 209), false (Section 211).
Some other offences related to insults: against public servants in judicial proceedings (Section 228), against religion or religious beliefs (Section 295A), against religious feelings (Section 298), against breach of peace (Section 504), against modesty of women (Section 509).
According to the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 defamation is prosecuted only upon a complaint (within six months from the act) (Section 199), and is a , non-cognisable and compoundable offence (See: The First Schedule, Classification of Offences).
The 2009 Act repeals the Defamation Act 1961, which had, together with the underlying principles of the common law of tort, governed Irish defamation law for almost half a century. The 2009 Act represents significant changes in Irish law, as many believe that it previously attached insufficient importance to the media's freedom of expression and weighed too heavily in support of the individual's right to a good name.
As a civil offence, defamation is considered a tort case and the court may award a compensation of up to to the person targeted by the defamation, while the plaintiff does not have to prove a material damage.
As a criminal offence, defamation is punishable by a year of imprisonment. In order to constitute a felony, defamation must be intentional and target at least two persons.
Article 31 of the Penal Code establishes that crimes committed with abuse of power or with abuse of a profession or art, or with the violation of a duty inherent to that profession or art, lead to the additional penalty of a temporary ban in the exercise of that profession or art. Therefore, journalists convicted of libel may be banned from exercising their profession. Italian Penal Code , Article 31. Deliberately false accusations of defamation, as with any other crime, lead to the crime of calunnia ("calumny", Article 368, Penal Code), which, under the Italian legal system, is defined as the crime of falsely accusing, before the authorities, a person of a crime they did not commit. As to the trial, judgment on the legality of the evidence fades into its relevance.
Article 92, "Damage to a Foreign National Flag". Seems relevant to the extent that the wording: "...defiles the national flag or other national emblem of a foreign state for the purpose of insulting the foreign state", can be construed to include more abstract defiling; translations of the Japanese term (汚損, ) include 'defacing'.
Article 172, "False Accusations". That is, false (as in complaint, indictment, or information).
Article 188, "Desecrating Places of Worship; Interference with Religious Service". The Japanese term (不敬, ) seems to include any act of 'disrespect' and 'blasphemy'a standard term; as long as it is performed in a place of worship.
Articles 230 and 230-2, "Defamation" (名誉毀損, ). General defamation provision. Where the truth of the allegations is not a factor in determining guilt; but there is "Special Provision for Matters Concerning Public Interest", whereby proving the allegations is allowed as a defence. See also 232: "prosecuted only upon complaint".
Article 231, "Insults" (侮辱, ). General insult provision. See also 232: "prosecuted only upon complaint".
Article 233, "Damage to Credibility; Obstruction of Business". Special provision for damaging the reputation of, or 'confidence' (信用, ) in, the business of another.
For a sample penal defamation case, see also on . The defence alleged, among other things, violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The court found that none of the defence's grounds for appeal amounted to lawful grounds for a final appeal. Nevertheless, the court examined the case ex officio]], and found procedural illegalities in the lower courts' judgments (regarding the exclusion of evidence from testimony, as hearsay). As a result, the court quashed the conviction on appeal, and remanded the case to a lower court for further proceedings.
Under the new Penal Code, decided upon by the Parliament in 2005, defamation would cease to exist as a crime. Rather, any person who believes he or she has been subject to defamation will have to press civil lawsuits. The Criminal Code took effect on 1 October 2015.
Related articles:
In January 2012, The Manila Times published an article on a criminal defamation case. A broadcaster was jailed for more than two years, following conviction on libel charges, by the Regional Trial Court of Davao Region. The radio broadcast dramatized a newspaper report regarding former speaker Prospero Nograles, who subsequently filed a complaint. Questioned were the conviction's compatibility with freedom of expression, and the trial in absentia. The United Nations Human Rights Committee recalled its General comment No. 34, and ordered the Philippine government to provide remedy, including compensation for time served in prison, and to prevent similar violations in the future.
This is distinct from and does not affect plaintiffs right of action under the common law torts of libel and slander as modified by the Defamation Act 1957. The Protection of Harassment Act 2014, which provides for criminal penalties in addition to civil remedies, is specifically designed to address a narrower scope of conduct in order to avoid outlawing an overly broad range of speech, and is confined to addressing speech that causes "harassment, alarm, or distress".
Criminal defamation occurs when a public statement damages the subject's reputation, unless the statement was true and presented solely for the public interest. In addition to criminal law, which allows for imprisonment (up to seven years in case the allegations are false) and monetary fines, one can also sue for damages with civil actions. Generally, criminal actions proceed civil ones with South Korean police as judicial investigators.
In January 2009, according to an article in The Korea Times, a Seoul court approved the arrest of online financial commentator Minerva, for spreading false information. According to the decision, Minerva's online comments affected national credibility negatively. Lawmakers from the ruling Grand National Party proposed a bill, that would allow imprisonment up to three years for online defamation, and would authorize the police to investigate cyber defamation cases without prior complaint.
In September 2015, according to an article in Hankook Ilbo, submitted complaints for insults during online games were increasing. Complainants aimed for settlement money, wasting the investigative capacity of police departments. One person could end up suing 50 others, or more. This led to the emergence of settlement-money hunters, provoking others to insult them, and then demanding compensation. According to statistics from the Cyber Security Bureau of the National Police Agency, the number of cyber defamation and insult reports was 5,712 in 2010, 8,880 in 2014, and at least 8,488 in 2015. More than half of the complaints for cyber insults were game-related (the article mentions League of Legends specifically). Most of the accused were teenagers. Parents often paid settlement fees, ranging from 300,000 to 2,000,000 South Korean won (US$3002000 as of 2015), to save their children from getting .
Article 2 regulates gross defamation (grovt förtal) and has a penalty of up to two years in prison or a fine. In judging if the crime is gross, the court should consider whether the information, because of its content or the scope of its dissemination, is calculated to produce "serious damage". For example, if it can be established that the defendant knowingly conveyed untruths. Article 4 makes it a crime to defame a deceased person according to Article 1 or 2. Most obviously, the paragraph is meant to make it illegal to defame someone's parents as a way to bypass the law.
Article 3 regulates other insulting behaviour (förolämpning), not characterised under Article 1 or 2, and is punishable with a fine or, if it is gross, with up to six months of prison or a fine. While an act of defamation involves a third person, it is not a requirement for insulting behaviour.
Under exemptions in the Freedom of the Press Act, Chapter 7, both criminal and civil lawsuits may be brought to court under the laws on denigration.
On the other hand, defamation is punished only with a maximum monetary penalty of 180 daily penalty units (Article 173–1). Swiss Penal Code – Defamation (Article 173) When it comes to a deceased or absent person, the statute of limitations is 30 years (after the death). Swiss Penal Code – Defamation and calumny against a deceased or absent person (Article 175)
"Part I General Principles", "Chapter II Persons", "Section I Natural Persons":
"Part II Obligations", "Chapter I General Provisions"
"Section 1Sources of Obligations", "Sub-section 5 Torts":
"Section 3Effects Of Obligations", "Sub-section 1 Performance":
In July 2000, the Justices of the Judicial Yuan (司法院大法官)the Constitutional Court of Taiwan delivered the J.Y. Interpretation No. 509 ("The Defamation Case"). They upheld the constitutionality of Art. 310 of the Criminal Code. In the Constitution, Article 11 establishes freedom of speech. Article 23 allows restrictions to freedoms and rights, to prevent infringing on the freedoms and rights of others. The court found that Art. 310 ¶¶ 1-2 were necessary and proportional to protect reputation, privacy, and the public interest. It seemed to extend the defence of truth in ¶ 3, to providing evidence that a perpetrator had reasonable grounds in believing the allegations were true (even if they could not ultimately be proven). Regarding criminal punishments versus civil remedies, it noted that if the law allowed anyone to avoid a penalty for defamation by offering monetary compensation, it would be tantamount to issuing them a licence to defame.
In January 2022, an editorial in the Taipei Times (written by a law student from the National Chengchi University) argued against Articles 309 and 310. Its position was abolishing prison sentences in practice, on the way to full decriminalization. It argued that insulting language should be tackled via education, and not in the courts (with the exception of ). According to the article, 180 urged the Legislative Yuan to decriminalize defamation, or at least limit it to private prosecutions (in order to reserve public resources for major crimes, rather than private disputes and quarrels irrelevant to the public interest).
In June 2023, the Constitutional Court delivered its judgment Case on the Criminalization of Defamation II. The court dismissed all the complaints and upheld the constitutionality of the disputed provisions. It emphasized that excluding the application of substantial truth doctrine on defamatory speeches concerning private matters with no public concern, is proportionate in protecting the victim's reputation and privacy. The court reaffirmed J.Y. Interpretation No. 509 and further supplemented its decision. It elaborated on the offender's duty to check the validity of the defamatory statements regarding public matters, and dictated that the offender shall not be punished if there are objective and reasonable grounds for the offender to believe the defamatory statement is true. The court ruled that untrue defamatory statements concerning public matters shall not be punished unless they are issued under actual malice. This includes situations where the offender knowingly or under gross negligence issued said defamatory statement. In terms of the burden of proof for actual malice, the court ruled that it shall be on the prosecutor or the accuser. To prevent fake news from eroding the marketplace of ideas, the court pointed out that the media (including mass media, social media, and self-media) shall be more thorough than the general public in fact-checking.
In practice, defamation law in Thailand has been found by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to be facilitate hostile and vexatious litigation by business interests seeking to suppress criticism.
Criminal defamation charges in Thailand under Section 326 of the Criminal Code are frequently used to censor journalists and activists critical of human rights circumstances for workers in the country.
Under English common law, proving the truth of the allegation was originally a valid defence only in civil libel cases. Criminal libel was construed as an offence against the public at large based on the tendency of the libel to provoke breach of peace, rather than being a crime based upon the actual defamation per se; its veracity was therefore considered irrelevant. Section 6 of the Libel Act 1843 allowed the proven truth of the allegation to be used as a valid defence in criminal libel cases, but only if the defendant also demonstrated that publication was for the "public benefit".
Noonan v. Staples Noonan v. Staples, 556 F. 3d 20 (1st Cir. 2009), rehearing denied, 561 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2009); accessed 15 December 2014. is sometimes cited as precedent that truth is not always a defence to libel in the U.S., but the case is actually not valid precedent on that issue because Staples did not argue First Amendment protection, which is one theory for truth as complete defence, for its statements. Noonan, n.15. The court assumed in this case that the Massachusetts law was constitutional under the First Amendment without it being argued by the parties.
The use of civil defamation increased, often in lieu of criminal cases, resulting in disproportionate fines and damages, particularly against media and journalists critical of governments. Libel tourism enabled powerful individuals to limit critical and dissenting voices by shopping around the world for the most likely to approve their defamation suits.
As of 2011, 47% of countries had laws against blasphemy, apostasy or defamation of religion. According to the Pew Research Center, 32 had laws or policies prohibiting blasphemy, and 87 had defamation of religion laws.
The legal liability of internet intermediaries gained increasing importance. Private companies could be held responsible for user-generated content that was made accessible through their servers or services, if it was deemed illegal or harmful. Due to uncertain takedown procedures and the lack of legal resources, intermediaries sometimes were excessively compliant with , often outside the legal system and with little legal recourse for the affected content producer. Intermediaries were at times held criminally liable for content posted by a user, when others perceived it violated privacy law or defamation laws. Such cases indicated an emerging trend of preventive censorship, where companies conducted their own monitoring and filtering to avoid possible repercussions. This contributed to a process of privatized censorship, where some governments may rely on private-sector companies to regulate online content, outside of electoral accountability and without due process.
Debate around defamation of religions, and how this impacts the right to free expression, continued to be an issue at a global level. In 2006, UNESCO's executive board adopted a decision on "Respect for freedom of expression and respect for sacred faith and values and religious symbol and cultural icon symbols". In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council made further calls for strengthening religious tolerance and preventing hate speech. Similar resolutions were made in 2012 and 2013. In 2013, 87 governments agreed on the Rabat Plan of Action, for the prohibition of incitement to hatred.
At the same time, an emerging trend was using fines and sanctions. Civil defamation cases were increasingly used, as evidenced by the number of civil lawsuits and disproportionate fines against journalists and media critical of governments. In at least four countries, defamation laws were used by public officials, including heads of state, to restrict critical media across all platforms. Media and civil society increased pressure on authorities, to stop granting public officials a higher degree of protection against defamation in the media.
Blasphemy was not a widespread phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe, where country still had such a provision. According to the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life, 17 countries had laws penalizing religious hate speech.
Seven countries, three of which in the Caribbean, fully or partially decriminalized defamation. Another trend was abolishing laws, which refer specifically to defamation of public officials. The OAS Special Rapporteur expressed concern over the use of terrorism or treason offences against those who criticize governments.
Defamation, copyright, and political issues were identified as the principal motives for content removal.
Two countries decriminalized defamation in 2009, followed by another in 2010. In another case, there was no criminal libel at the federal level, and a minority of states still had criminal defamation laws. In general, criminal penalties for libel were imposed rarely, with two notable exceptions.
According to the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life, eight countries had blasphemy legislation, though these laws were used infrequently.
The range of defences available to those accused of invasion of privacy or defamation expanded, with growing recognition of the public-interest value of journalism. In at least 21 countries, defences to charges of defamation included truth and public interest. This included countries that had at least one truth or public interest defence to criminal or civil defamation (including countries where defence of truth was qualified or limitedfor example, to statements of fact as opposed to opinions, or to libel as opposed to insult).
Civil defamation continued, particularly about content related to the rich and powerful, including public officials and celebrities. There were a high number of claims, prohibitive legal costs, and disproportionate damages. This prompted a campaign against what was seen by some as forum shopping libel laws in the United Kingdom; and that led to reforming the country's defamation law, resulting in the Defamation Act 2013.
Due to legal protection of speech, and practical and jurisdictional limits on effectiveness of controls, censorship was increasingly carried out by private bodies. Privatized censorship by internet intermediaries involved: (i) the widening range of content considered harmful and justified to block or filter; (ii) inadequate due process and judicial oversight of decisions to exclude content or to conduct surveillance; and (iii) a lack of transparency regarding blocking and filtering processes (including the relationship between the state and private bodies, in the setting of filters and the exchange of personal data).
Countries in every region extended criminal defamation legislation to online content. Cybercrime and anti-terrorism laws passed throughout the world; bloggers appeared before courts, with some serving time in prison. Technological advancements strengthened governments' abilities to monitor online content.
In the landmark case of Lohé Issa Konaté v. the Republic of Burkina Faso, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights overturned the conviction of a journalist, characterizing it as a violation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The journalist was subjected to censorship, excessive fines, and a lengthy imprisonment for defamation. Following this legally binding decision, the country in question proceeded to amend its laws and pay the journalist compensation.
In 2016, the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe declared its criminal defamation laws unconstitutional. In 2017, the High Court of Kenya declared Section 194 (criminal defamation) of the Penal Code unconstitutional.
Civil society and press freedom organizations lobbied for changes to the penal codes in their respective countriessometimes successfully. However, even in countries where libel or defamation were explicitly decriminalized, there were often other laws whose broad provisions allowed governments to imprison journalists for a wide range of reasons (cybercrime, anti-terrorism, incitement to violence, national security).
The majority of countries had defamation laws, that were used to charge and imprison journalists. Media outlets were suspended after publishing reports critical of the government or other political elites.
Google transparency reports showed that several governments in the Arab region made requests to remove content (such as YouTube videos), based on allegations of insulting religion and defaming powerful figures.
Journalists were predominantly jailed under anti-state laws, with charges ranging from spreading chaos, promoting terrorism, and inciting dissidence, to incitement against the ruling government. Charges for publishing or spreading false news were the next most frequent. Other defamation or religious insult laws were laid against journalists in several cases.
One recently enacted defamation law received condemnation, including from the United Nations. The law allowed journalists to be jailed if they were found questioning Sharia law or the affairs of the state. From 2014, criminal defamation laws were challenged, both in South and East Asian countries.
Since 2012, more countries in the South-East Europe sub-region decriminalized defamation. Of the , three repealed all general provisions on criminal defamation and insult, retained criminal defamation offences but without the possibility of imprisonment, and retained imprisonment as a possibility. Defamation of public officials, state bodies, or state institutions was criminalized in country. Other forms of criminal offences existed in some countries: insulting public officials, harming the reputation and honour of the head of state, insulting or defaming the state.
Civil laws to protect the reputation of individuals or their privacy were increasingly used. There was an increase in the number of cases where turned to the courts, seeking relief for reputational injuries. Civil defamation lawsuits by politicians limited press freedom, in at least one country of the CIS sub-region.
Public officials throughout the region initiated criminal proceedings against internet users, predominantly against those opposing the ruling party. Claims were based on defamation laws, including charges against parodying political personalities.
Antigua and Barbuda (in 2015), Jamaica (in 2013), and Grenada (in 2012), abolished criminal libel. Trinidad and Tobago partially repealed criminal libel in 2014. The Dominican Republic removed prison sentences for defamation of government bodies and public officials.
New cybercrime laws were passed in two Caribbean countries. In 2017, one country passed an anti-hate law that was criticized for stifling political debate.
In common law countries, criminal defamation laws mostly fell into disuse. In contrast, most civil law countries in Western Europe retained criminal defamation laws. In several Western European countries, defamation was sanctioned more harshly if it involved a public official. In some instances, heads of state were provided more protection to their reputation and punishments were more severe. Some governments strengthened criminal defamation laws to counter online hate speech or cyberbullying.
The European Court of Human Rights had limited influence in according to the court's standards, where (suspended) prison sentences for defamation were considered a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Other had a mixed record when evaluating criminal defamation and freedom of expression.
According to the 2017 OSCE report, criminal defamation laws were in place in at least 21 of the 27 countries in Western Europe and North America. At least 13 states retained statutes penalizing blasphemy or religious insult.
According to reports provided by Meta Platforms, Google, and Twitter, the number of content removal requests received by those platforms from , law enforcement, and executive branches of governments worldwide doubled in the last five yearsto a total of approximately 117,000 requests in 2020. Of these companies, only Google published data on the rationale for content removal requests made by governments; that data showed "defamation" and "privacy and security" as the leading justifications.
Theology and catechist Joseph Deharbe, in , gives practical advice to the faithful: The commandment above all forbids giving false evidence in court. It is never lawful to tell a lie. In general, forbidden are , hypocrisy, detraction, calumny, slander, false , rash ; anything that can injure the honour or character of another. With two exceptions: for the good of the guilty, or when necessary to prevent a greater eviland then, only with charitable intentions and without exaggerations.
The Catholic Encyclopedia has entries for two related concepts, detraction and slander.
Defamation and calumny seem to be used as synonyms for slander.
The degree of sinfulness depends on the harm done, based on three things:
If the victim has been publicly sentenced, or their misdeeds are already , it is to refer to themunless the accused have , or their deeds have been forgotten. But this does not apply to particular communities (a college or monastery are given as examples), where it would be to publish the fact outside said community. But even if the sin is not public, it may be revealed for the common good, or for the benefit of the narrator, listener, or culprit.
The damage from failing to reveal another's sin must be balanced against the evil of . No more than necessary should be exposed, and fraternal correction is preferable. are allowed to criticize public officials. must be able to document the causes and connections of events, and strengthen public conscience.
Those who abet the principal's defamation, are also guilty. Detractors (or their ) must provide restitution. They must restore the victim's and pay them damages. According to the text, allegations cannot be taken back, reparation methods proposed by theologians are unsatisfactory, and the only way is finding the right occasion for a favourable characterization of the defamed.
According to the text, theologians say that the act of lying might not be grievous in itself, but advise mentioning it in confession to determine reparation methods. The important act is injuring a reputation (hence moralism do not consider slander distinct from detraction). The method of injury is negligible.
In a somewhat contradictory opinion, it is stated that there are circumstances where misdeeds can be lawfully exposed, but a lie is intrinsically evil and can never be justified.
Slander violates commutative justice, so the perpetrator must make restitution. Atonement seems achievable by the false statement, which undoes the injury (even if this requires exposing the perpetrator as a liar). Compensation for the victim's losses may also be required.
First, definitions of defamation from Malaysian and Islamic law are listed. According to the paper, definitions by can include: mislead, accuse of adultery, and embarrass or discredit the dignity or honour of another. In the Quran, many more concepts might be included. The author concludes that Islamic definitions are better for classifying defamatory actions.
Second, freedom of speech is compared with teachings of Muhammad. Mentioned among others are: fragmentation of society, divine retribution by the in the afterlife, secrecy, loyalty, and treachery; dignity and honour are again mentioned. The author concludes that freedom of speech should be practised for the sake of justice, and can be lifted if it causes discomfort or unhealthy relationships in society.
Third, Malaysian laws related to defamation are enumerated. According to the author, there were cases with exorbitant damages, interference by third parties, and selective actions against political opposition; having a negative impact on society.
Fourth, the proposal of harmonization is discussed. The author proposes amending Malaysian laws to conform with Islamic legal principles, under the supervision of a specific department. Mentioned are: Islamic customary law ( Adat), secondary sources of Islamic law (such as Urf), and "other laws" practised by people in various countries; provided that they are in line with Islamic divine law ( Maqasid). The author concludes that in the Malaysian context, this proposed harmonization would be justified by Article 3 of the Constitution (with a passing reference to the "supremacy of the Constitution", apparently guaranteed in Article 4).
Finally, the author enumerates proposed steps to bring about this legal reform. Defamation would include:
The two terms seem to be conflated. It is not clear which, if any, corresponds to harmful and true speech, and which to harmful and false speech. Combined with Wikipedia's entry on lashon hara (terms are spelled somewhat differently), it might be deduced that:
According to the article, the tongue ruins the slanderer, the listener, and the maligned. The divine presence will be denied to lie, hypocrisy, , and slanderers. Slander is morally equated to idolatry, adultery, and murder.
According to the authors, some saw quinsy, leprosy (related to Miriam speaking ill of Moses), stoning, as deserved punishments. And the Midrash attributes hardships of various figures (such as Joseph, Moses, Elijah, Isaiah) to sins of the tongue.
As for legal remedies, the article refers to ethical and religious sanctions from the Bible and the Talmud, arguing that the law cannot repair subtle damage to reputationwith two exceptions. Bringing an evil name upon one's wife (punished with a fine and by disallowing divorce). Perjury, which would result in the perpetrator receiving same punishment, as the one their false testimony would have brought upon the falsely accused.
The authors conclude that calumny was met with righteous indignation and penal severity in Jewish thought, and this was in accordance with the ethical principle of treating the honour of others as one's own.
According to the authors, the Law of Moses prescribed flagellation and monetary compensation for a husband who, without reasonable cause, questioned the virginity of his newly married wife; and divorce was disallowed (similarly with calumny). The article notes that after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, these laws prescribing fines and capital punishment ceased.
Rabbinical against slander are described as very stringent. Abusive language might have been exempt from any legal liability, unless it was considered slander (against both the living and the deceased). Fines and excommunication were a possibility. But fasting and also seemed to be acceptable .
In most of Europe, article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights permits restrictions on freedom of speech when necessary to protect the reputation or rights of others. Additionally, restrictions of freedom of expression and other rights guaranteed by international human rights laws (including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) and by the constitutions of a variety of countries are subject to some variation of the three-part test recognised by the United Nations Human Rights Committee which requires that limitations be: 1) "provided by law that is clear and accessible to everyone", 2) "proven to be necessary and legitimate to protect the rights or reputations of others", and 3) "proportionate and the least restrictive to achieve the purported aim". This test is analogous to the Oakes test applied domestically by the Supreme Court of Canada in assessing whether limitations on constitutional rights are "demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society" under Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the "necessary in a democratic society" test applied by the European Court of Human Rights in assessing limitations on rights under the ECHR, Section 36 of the post-Apartheid Constitution of South Africa, and Section 24 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Nevertheless, the worldwide use of criminal and civil defamation, to censor, intimidate or silence critics, has been increasing in recent years.
General comment No. 34
Defamation as a tort
Common law
Background
Overview
Some common law jurisdictions distinguish between spoken defamation, called slander, and defamation in other media such as printed words or images, called libel.Linda L. Edwards, J. Stanley Edwards, Patricia Kirtley Wells, Tort Law for Legal Assistants, Cengage Learning, 2008, p. 390. "Libel refers to written defamatory statements; slander refers to oral statements. Libel encompasses communications occurring in 'physical form'... defamatory statements on records and computer tapes are considered libel rather than slander." The fundamental distinction between libel and slander lies solely in the form in which the defamatory matter is published. If the offending material is published in some fleeting form, such as spoken words or sounds, sign language, gestures or the like, then it is slander. In contrast, libel encompasses defamation by written or printed words, pictures, or in any form other than spoken words or gestures. The law of libel originated in the 17th century in England. With the growth of publication came the growth of libel and development of the tort of libel. The highest award in an American defamation case, at US$222.7 million was rendered in 1997 against Dow Jones in favour of MMAR Group Inc; however, the verdict was dismissed in 1999 amid allegations that MMAR failed to disclose audiotapes made by its employees.
Defences
Insurance
Defamation per se
If the plaintiff proves that such a statement was made and was false, to recover damages the plaintiff need only prove that someone had made the statement to any third party. No proof of special damages is required. However, to recover full compensation a plaintiff should be prepared to prove actual damages.
As with any defamation case, truth remains an absolute defence to defamation per se. This means that even if the statement would be considered defamatory per se if false, if the defendant establishes that it is in fact true, an action for defamation per se cannot survive. The conception of what type of allegation may support an action for defamation per se can evolve with public policy. For example, in May 2012 an appeals court in New York, citing changes in public policy with regard to homosexuality, ruled that describing someone as gay is not defamation.
Variations within common law jurisdictions
Additionally, American courts apply special rules in the case of statements made in the press concerning public figures, which can be used as a defence. While plaintiff alleging defamation in an American court must usually prove that the statement caused harm, and was made without adequate research into the truthfulness of the statement; where the plaintiff is a celebrity or public official, they must additionally prove that the statement was made with actual malice (i.e. the intent to do harm or with reckless disregard for the truth).New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964) A series of court rulings led by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) established that for a public official (or other legitimate public figure) to win a libel case in an American court, the statement must have been published knowing it to be false or with reckless disregard to its truth (i.e. actual malice). New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Associated Press estimates that 95% of libel cases involving news stories do not arise from high-profile news stories, but "run of the mill" local stories like news coverage of local criminal investigations or trials, or business profiles. An early example of libel is the case of John Peter Zenger in 1735. Zenger was hired to publish the New York Weekly Journal. When he printed another man's article criticising William Cosby, the royal governor of Colonial New York, Zenger was accused of seditious libel. The verdict was returned as not guilty on the charge of seditious libel, because it was proven that all the statements Zenger had published about Cosby had been true, so there was not an issue of defamation. Another example of libel is the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). The Supreme Court of the United States overruled a state court in Alabama that had found The New York Times guilty of libel for printing an advertisement that criticised Alabama officials for mistreating student civil rights activists. Even though some of what The Times printed was false, the court ruled in its favour, saying that libel of a public official requires proof of actual malice, which was defined as a "knowing or reckless disregard for the truth".
Libel law in England and Wales was overhauled even further by the Defamation Act 2013.
Corporate defamation
Roman Dutch and Scots law
Defamation as a crime
Criticism
Laws by jurisdiction
Summary table
+ Criminal defamation laws by country No Yes Unclear Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Unclear Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Albania
Argentina
Australia
Online
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Civil
Quebec
Criminal
Online
Chile
China
Civil
Criminal
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Civil
Criminal
Germany
Greece
India
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Civil
Criminal
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Philippines
Criminal
Online
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Online
Former Soviet Union
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Civil
Criminal
Other related articles:
Thailand
Civil
Criminal
United Kingdom
United States
Criminal
Online
Venezuela
Yemen
UNESCO reports
2014
Global
Africa
Arab region
Asia-Pacific
Central and Eastern Europe
Latin America and the Caribbean
Western Europe and North America
2018
Global
Africa
Arab region
Asia-Pacific
Central and Eastern Europe
Latin America and the Caribbean
Western Europe and North America
2022
Global
Defamation and religions
Christianity
Detraction
A relatively small defect alleged against a person of eminent station (a bishop is given as example) might be a mortal sin. While an offence of considerable magnitude (drunkenness is given as example), attributed to a member of a social class in which such things frequently happen (a sailor is given as example), might constitute only a venial sin.
Slander
Islam
There would be three types of punishment for defamation:
Other proposed measures include: right of reply, order of , mediation via an ombudsman, empowering the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, finding ways for people to express their views and opinions, education.
Judaism
The Wikipedia article on lashon hara equates it to detraction. And classifies all of slander, defamation, and calumny, as the sameand equal to hotzaat shem ra.
Calumny
Slander
See also
Notes
Citations
Sources
External links
|
|