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The allotment system (; ) was a system used in Sweden for keeping a trained Swedish Army at all times. This system came into use in around 1640, and was replaced by the modern Swedish Armed Forces conscription system in 1901. Two different allotment systems have been in use in Sweden; they are the old allotment system ( äldre indelningsverket) and the new allotment system ( yngre indelningsverket), the latter often referred to as just "the allotment system". The soldiers who were part of these systems were known as "croft soldiers" ( indelta soldater, the Swedish term, does not have the same meaning) due to the small crofts allotted to them.
Originally, the allotment system was the name for a system used to pay servants of the state, like officers and clergy. It was introduced because of an often felt shortage of money, and the allotment system tried to solve this by localising taxes; meaning that payment consisted of an individual's right to collect certain taxes. Later on it referred to an organisation created to provide soldiers to the armed forces, properly known as det ständiga knektehållet (literally "the permanent soldier household"). The reason for this development of the term is that a large part of the allotment system was used to support det ständiga knektehållet.
The impressment of the foot soldiers was called utskrivning (literally "writing out"), and was based on a grouping, called a rote (similar to an English "file" or "ward"; in the eastern parts of the Swedish realm, this became the Finnish ruotu), of ten men from an estate or a few farms, fit for military service and between the ages of 15 and 40. One randomly chosen man from each rote was forced to serve in the province's or county's regiment in case of war.
The organisation of the cavalry was based on a slightly different grouping. This grouping was known as a rusthåll (literally "arm household"), a bigger farm or estate (practically a peasant manor) that could support a horseman with his horse and equipment in exchange for tax exemption. The horseman who volunteered for service was often the estate master himself or a close relative. This option resembled the medieval origin of but no longer carried the Swedish noble status with it, as the cavalryman was not permanently stationed in war, but was allowed to remain home at peacetime. In particular cases, the estate owner received some taxes from neighbours to augment his own tax exemption: as the burden of a cavalryman with horse and equipment was deemed considerable, compensation needed to be commensurate.
The infantry was organized in units of 525 (later 300) men called a landsfänika and the cavalry in units of 300 horsemen called a landsfana. Later on, this was changed to a company—battalion—regiment organisation. The system, used and refined by Gustav Vasa and Gustavus Adolphus, was later to be known as the old allotment system. Many people disliked forced conscription, though, and the peasantry in some provinces soon wrote contracts with the state to provide a certain number of soldiers in exchange for being spared from conscription.
There were a number of reasons for the dislike of the system. First, any of the ten men in each rote could be picked to serve in case of war, which made it hard for the generals to estimate the knowledge and level of practice their soldiers would have. Secondly, the richest of the men in the rote could buy their way out, which in turn sometimes led to the "10th man" being the poorest or weakest in the rote, which of course was not good for the army. The system of forced conscription also often led to .For example, out of 306 forcibly conscripted soldiers in Kronoberg County in 1627, only 60 showed up for the first muster. Nelsson, p. 13.
Allotment for the army was only applied to the countryside and not to the towns, where people were exclusively recruited to the navy. Each province had its own regiment consisting of 1,200 soldiers (and thus also 1,200 rotar, not counting officers) for an infantry regiment, or 1,000 horsemen (and 1,000 rusthåll) for a cavalry regiment. Thus, a rote did not necessarily consist of ten men fit for military service as in the old system; it could instead consist of a single wealthy estate or several small farms, all depending on the tax amount and the number of soldiers the farms or estates would be able to provide.
There were several problems with this system, relating to the fact that a large proportion of the seamen did not live anywhere near the largest naval ports of Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Karlskrona. Many seamen had their crofts along the coast of Norrland and Old Finland, and thus had several hundred kilometres to travel when called into service. Originally, the seamen had to walk the long way to the nearest port; later, they were transported by horse and carriage. Even the latter method of transport, however, took a long time, and soon the state began to provide tools and materials, excepting the actual timber, to the rote so that the farmers could build a large rowing/sailing boat called a lodja. These boats could transport up to 25 men, and could ease the transport to the naval ports.
Recruits in the early 18th century had to be physically and mentally fit, between 18 and 36 years old (18–30 years from 1819, 18–25 years from 1871) and at least 172 centimeters tall (175 cm from 1775, lowered to 167 cm from 1788 as the army was in dire need of soldiers during Gustav III's Russian War). Recruitment at Militaria (Swedish) Many soldiers served in the army for more than 30 years, as there was no service time stated in the contract; instead, being discharged required a reason, such as old age, injury, sickness, or the commission of a crime. Discharges were generally only given at military muster, held once a year, or even more sparsely, even though an interim discharge could be given by the regimental commander if the discharge was supported by the soldier. The interim discharge had to be confirmed at the next general muster.
From the 1680s (army) and early 18th century (navy), all soldiers in a given company were required to have a unique name, to make it easier to give specific orders. This could be problematic when several soldiers had the same name (being usually from rural background, they generally had just a patronymic, and such were often very common, e.g. Andersson, Eriksson, Olsson or Persson), giving rise to the Swedish soldier names. When a soldier appeared before the military scribe, he was given a soldier's name (often, a rote's new soldier received his predecessor's name), which he kept during his service. Those surnames also tended to become hereditary, as the soldier often retained it when he was pensioned or left the service, and his children were also registered under it in census lists and church books—this is the origin of many present-day Swedish surnames. The name was usually short, consisting of only one syllable—to make it easy and rapid to say. The names could be taken from a trait, such as the surname Stolt ("Proud") or from military terms, such as Svärd ("Sword"), but were often related to the rote. A soldier from a rote located in the village of Sundby, for example, could be given the surname Sundin. This meant that surnames often stayed with the croft, rather than with the soldier. Common practice amongst discharged soldiers in the 18th century was to reassume their original name. This changed in the 19th century, and many soldiers kept their old soldier names, passing it on to their children. Each soldier in the regiment also had a unique number, between 1 and 1,200, the number of the rote and croft he belonged to (for example nummer 15 Stolt, number 15 Stolt).
Swedish battle tactics relied on a high level of organisation and the large-scale use of and pikes. Other armies had stopped using pikemen in the late 17th century, solely relying on the bayonet of the musketeer to protect against cavalry attacks. Reasons for the Swedish obstinacy in keeping the pikes and making large use of swords in battle include the Swedish loss in the Battle of Kircholm in 1605, where a modernised Swedish army was severely beaten by Polish hussars—partly due to being equipped with the latest muskets which were hard to handle—and the fact that pikemen were very expensive to hire to armies that were formed by mercenaries; however, as Sweden had the allotment system and thus did not pay a higher salary to pikemen, they were kept.Nelsson, p. 42.
The high level of organisation and morale made it possible to base the combat tactics on close combat, rather than long-range shooting. A regular attack would look like the following: When the enemy musketeers started firing, at ranges up to 100 metres, the Swedish infantry would not answer but keep a swift marching pace, not stopping until the range was as little as 40 metres, where the musketeers in the back of the formation would fire their only salvo. At an even closer range, the musketeers in the front would fire their only salvo, and immediately after that, break into the enemy lines—musketeers using their swords, and pikemen using their pikes.Nelsson, pp. 42–43. This tactic would often result in a fleeing enemy force, which probably stood terrified when their opponent's companies were not stopped by continuous musket fire, but kept marching on towards them in sinister silence.
The new system was put to the test for the first time in 1700, when Sweden, under the reign of Charles XII, was attacked by a coalition of its neighbours Russia, Denmark-Norway and Saxony-Poland in the Great Northern War. The mobilisation of the soldiers worked well thanks to the new system, with Sweden mobilising 43,000 men in allotted regiments, and another 33,000 men from various enlisted regiments.In a total of 57 regiments, whereof 34 allotted and 23 enlisted. Navy units were not included in the 57 regiments. Mobilization statistics at Militaria . (Swedish). The army was one of the largest in Europe at the time, having modern equipment and being very well-trained and organised. However, three enemies were too much, even though Charles XII forced Denmark to leave the war the same year it started, and forced Saxony to leave the war in 1706. After these successful blows to the coalition, Charles XII had the opportunity to sign a peace with the remaining opponent, Russia. He did not, and this decision would have immense effects on the population. Russia's vast plains did not give Charles XII the possibility to beat his enemy with his superior army; instead, he was forced into a war of attrition, a war he could not win.
As the war finally ended in 1721, Sweden had lost an estimated 200,000 men, 150,000 of those from present-day Sweden and 50,000 from the Finnish part of Sweden. This made a huge impact on a population that before the war had barely reached 2 million. The total population did not grow during the 21 years of the war; it was even reduced, according to some sources, as the massive losses outnumbered overall births. Population statistics at Tacticus.nu. (Swedish). For example, the province of Östergötland was supposed to support 2,200 croft soldiers, making up one infantry and one cavalry regiment. Losses had to be replaced, and during the first years of the war, another 2,400 men were conscripted. After the Battle of Poltava in 1709, both regiments had to be completely reraised. At the end of the war, a total of 10,400 soldiers had been conscripted from the province that was meant to support only a fifth, or 2,200. Losses statistics at Militaria . (Swedish). Another regiment, Hälsinge Regiment, had to be completely raised three times during the war. The lack of soldiers became so critical that in the period 1714–1715, the army had to return to the old method of conscripting men by force.
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