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Modernization theory or modernisation theory holds that as societies become more economically modernized, wealthier and more educated, their political institutions become increasingly liberal democratic and Rationalism. The "classical" theories of modernization of the 1950s and 1960s, most influentially articulated by Seymour Lipset, drew on sociological analyses of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Talcott Parsons.Andrew C. Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986, pp. 44-64; Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. "Modernity and Modernization." Sociopedia.isa. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Israel (2000): 1–15.[1] Modernization theory was a dominant paradigm in the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s, and saw a resurgence after 1991, when Francis Fukuyama wrote about the end of the Cold War as confirmation of modernization theory.Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man . New York: The Free Press, 1992, pp. 68-69, 133-134.
The theory is the subject of much debate among scholars. Critics have highlighted cases where industrialization did not prompt stable democratization, such as Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union, as well as cases of democratic backsliding in economically advanced parts of Latin America. Other critics argue the causal relationship is reverse (democracy is more likely to lead to economic modernization) or that economic modernization helps democracies survive but does not prompt democratization. Other scholars provide supporting evidence, showing that economic development significantly predicts democratization.
After 1945, the Parsonian version became widely used in sociology and other social sciences. Some of the thinkers associated with modernization theory are Marion J. Levy Jr., Gabriel Almond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Walt Rostow, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, David Apter, Alex Inkeles, Cyril Edwin Black, Bert F. Hoselitz, Myron Weiner, and Karl Deutsch.Andrew C. Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986, pp. 44-64; Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 2.
By the late 1960s opposition to modernization theory developed because the theory was too general and did not fit all societies in quite the same way.; Andrew C. Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986; Paul Anthony Cammack, Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World: The Doctrine for Political Development. London: Leicester University Press, 1997. Yet, with the end of the Cold War, a few attempts to revive modernization theory were carried out. Francis Fukuyama argued for the use of modernization theory as universal history. A more academic effort to revise modernization theory was that of Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel in Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy (2005).Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Inglehart and Welzel amended the 1960s version of modernization theory in significant ways. Counter to Lipset, who associated industrial growth with democratization,Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review Vol. 53, Nº 1 (1959): 69–105. Inglehart and Welzel did not see an association between industrialization and democratization. Rather, they held that only at a latter stage in the process of economic modernization, which various authors have characterized as post-industrial, did values conducive to democratization – which Inglehart and Welzel call "self-expression values" – emerge.
Nonetheless, these efforts to revive modernization theory were criticized by many, and the theory remained a controversial one.; "Should Modernization Theory Survive?", a special issue of The Annals of Comparative Democratization 16, 3 (2018) [2]
Anderson explains the idea of an elongated diamond in order to describe the concentration of power in the hands of a few at the top during an authoritarian leadership. He develops this by giving an understanding of the shift in power from the elite class to the middle class that occurs when modernization is incorporated. Socioeconomic modernization allows for a democracy to further develop and influences the success of a democracy. Concluded from this, is the idea that as socioeconomic levels are leveled, democracy levels would further increase. (1992). 9780691037387, Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691037387
Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, who worked with Lipset in the book, Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, argue that economic performance affects the development of democracy in at least three ways. First, they argue that economic growth is more important for democracy than given levels of socioeconomic development. Second, socioeconomic development generates social changes that can potentially facilitate democratization. Third, socioeconomic development promotes other changes, like organization of the middle class, which is conducive to democracy.
As Seymour Martin Lipset put it, "All the various aspects of economic development—industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education—are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy". The argument also appears in Walt W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth (1971); A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (1965); and David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (1965). In the 1960s, some critics argued that the link between modernization and democracy was based too much on the example of European history and neglected the Third World.
One historical problem with that argument has always been German Empire, whose economic modernization in the 19th century came long before the democratization after 1918. Political science professor Sheri Berman, however, concludes that a process of democratization was underway in Imperial Germany, for "during these years Germans developed many of the habits and mores that are now thought by political scientists to augur healthy political development".
One contemporary problem for modernization theory is the argument of whether modernization implies more human rights for citizens or not. China, one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world, can be observed as an example. The modernization theory implies that this should correlate to democratic growth in some regards, especially in relation to the liberalization of the middle and lower classes. However, active human rights abuses and constant oppression of Chinese citizens by the government seem to contradict the theory strongly. Interestingly enough, the irony is that increasing restrictions on Chinese citizens are a result of modernization theory.
In the 1990s, the Chinese government wanted to reform the legal system and emphasized governing the country by law. This led to a legal awakening for citizens as they were becoming more educated on the law, yet more understanding of their inequality in relation to the government. Looking down the line in the 2000s, Chinese citizens saw even more opportunities to liberalize and were able to be a part of urbanization and could access higher levels of education. This in turn resulted in the attitudes of the lower and middle classes changing to more liberal ideas, which went against the CCP. Over time, this has led to their active participation in civil society activities and similar adjacent political groups in order to make their voices heard. Consequently, the Chinese government represses Chinese citizens at a more aggressive rate, all due to modernization theory.
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel contend that the realization of democracy is not based solely on an expressed desire for that form of government, but democracies are born as a result of the admixture of certain social and cultural factors. They argue the ideal social and cultural conditions for the foundation of a democracy are born of significant modernization and economic development that result in mass political participation.
Randall Peerenboom explores the relationships among democracy, the rule of law and their relationship to wealth by pointing to examples of Asian countries, such as Taiwan and South Korea, which have successfully democratized only after economic growth reached relatively high levels and to examples of countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and India, which sought to democratize at lower levels of wealth but have not done as well. He suggests China will grant democratic rights when it is as modern and as rich as the West per capita.
Adam Przeworski and others have challenged Lipset's argument. They say political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of gross domestic product per capita remain democratic. Epstein et al. (2006) retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and a three-way, rather than dichotomous, classification of regimes. Contrary to Przeworski, this study finds that the modernization hypothesis stands up well. Partial democracies emerge as among the most important and least understood regime types.
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2008) further weaken the case for Lipset's argument by showing that even though there is a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy, once one controls for country fixed effects and removes the association between income per capita and various measures of democracy, there is "no causal effect of income on democracy." In "Non-Modernization" (2022), they further argue that modernization theory cannot account for various paths of political development "because it posits a link between economics and politics that is not conditional on institutions and culture and that presumes a definite endpoint—for example, an 'end of history'."
Sirianne Dahlum and Carl Henrik Knutsen offer a test of the Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel revised version of modernization theory, which focuses on cultural traits triggered by economic development that are presumed to be conducive to democratization.Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy. Cambridge University Press, 2005; Dahlum, S., & Knutsen, C., "Democracy by Demand? Reinvestigating the Effect of Self-expression Values on Political Regime Type." British Journal of Political Science 47(2)(2017): 437-61. They find "no empirical support" for the Inglehart and Welzel thesis and conclude that "self-expression values do not enhance democracy levels or democratization chances, and neither do they stabilize existing democracies."Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Dahlum, S., & Knutsen, C., "Democracy by Demand? Reinvestigating the Effect of Self-expression Values on Political Regime Type." British Journal of Political Science 47(2)(2017): 437-61, p 437.
A meta-analysis by Gerardo L. Munck of research on Lipset's argument shows that a majority of studies do not support the thesis that higher levels of economic development leads to more democracy.Gerardo L.Munck, "Modernization Theory as a Case of Failed Knowledge Production." The Annals of Comparative Democratization 16, 3 (2018): 37-41. [3]
Modernization theorists such as Samuel P. Huntington held in the 1960s and 1970s that authoritarian regimes yielded greater economic growth than democracies.Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. However, this view had been challenged. In Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (2000),Adam Przeworski, with Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Adam Przeworski argued that "democracies perform as well economically as do authoritarian regimes."Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, "Adam Przeworski: Capitalism, Democracy, and Science," pp. 456-503, in Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, p 457. A study by Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson shows that "democracy has a positive effect on GDP per capita."Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson, "Democracy Does Cause Growth." Journal of Political Economy 127(1) 2019: 47-100, p. 47. [4]
Global trade has grown continuously since the European discovery of new continents in the early modern period; it increased particularly as a result of the Industrial Revolution and the mid-20th century adoption of the intermodal container.
Annual trans-border tourist arrivals rose to 456 million by 1990 and almost tripled since, reaching a total of over 1.2 billion in 2016.(Knowles, 1994: FT, 7 January 1997: V11) Communication is another major area that has grown due to modernization. Communication industries have enabled capitalism to spread throughout the world. Telephony, television broadcasts, news services and online service providers have played a crucial part in globalization. Former U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson was a supporter of the modernization theory and believed that television had potential to provide educational tools in development.
With the many apparent positive attributes to globalization there are also negative consequences. The dominant, neoliberal model of globalization often increases disparities between a society's rich and its poor. In major cities of developing countries there exist pockets where technologies of the modernised world, computers, cell phones and satellite television, exist alongside stark poverty. Globalists are globalization modernization theorists and argue that globalization is positive for everyone, as its benefits must eventually extend to all members of society, including vulnerable groups such as women and children.
Kennedy and his top advisers were working from implicit ideological assumptions regarding modernization. They firmly believed modernity was not only good for the target populations, but was essential to avoid communism on the one hand or extreme control of traditional rural society by the very rich landowners on the other. They believed America had a duty, as the most modern country in the world, to promulgate this ideal to the poor nations of the Third World. They wanted programs that were altruistic, and benevolent—and also tough, energetic, and determined. It was benevolence with a foreign policy purpose. Michael Latham has identified how this ideology worked out in three major programs: the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, and the strategic hamlet program in South Vietnam. However, Latham argues that the ideology was a non-coercive version of the modernization goals of the imperialistic of Britain, France and other European countries in the 19th century.Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology. American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era (2000). See also Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.
As Tipps has argued, by conflating modernization with other processes, with which theorists use interchangeably (democratization, liberalization, development), the term becomes imprecise and therefore difficult to disprove.
The theory has also been criticised empirically, as modernization theorists ignore external sources of change in societies. The binary between traditional and modern is unhelpful, as the two are linked and often interdependent, and "modernization" does not come as a whole.
Modernization theory has also been accused of being Eurocentrism, as modernization began in Europe, with the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution and the Revolutions of 1848 and has long been regarded as reaching its most advanced stage in Europe. Anthropologists typically make their criticism one step further and say that the view is ethnocentric and is specific to Western culture.
Dependency models arose from a growing association of southern hemisphere nationalists (from Latin America and Africa) and Marxists. It was their reaction against modernization theory, which held that all societies progress through similar stages of development, that today's underdeveloped areas are thus in a similar situation to that of today's developed areas at some time in the past, and that, therefore, the task of helping the underdeveloped areas out of poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common path of development, by various means such as investment, technology transfers, and closer integration into the world market. Dependency theory rejected this view, arguing that underdeveloped countries are not merely primitive versions of developed countries, but have unique features and structures of their own; and, importantly, are in the situation of being the weaker members in a world market economy.Newschool, "Economic Development" , retrieved July 2009.
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