Sittlichkeit () is the concept of "ethical life" or "ethical order" furthered by German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. It was first presented in his work Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) to refer to "ethical behavior grounded in Customs and tradition and developed through habit and imitation in accordance with the objective laws of the community"Philip J. Kain, Marx and Modern Political Theory: From Hobbes to Contemporary Feminism, Rowman & Littlefield, 1993, p. 128.Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1998, p. 266. and it was further developed in his work Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820).
The second sphere constitutes Kantian morality, and is therefore called the sphere of morality ( Moralität). PR §106 This sphere constitutes what Isaiah Berlin would call positive freedom, which is to say, moral autonomy. However, Hegel criticizes the deployment of Kantian morality in society for being insufficient. He explains this deficiency through philosophical critique of pathologies such as loneliness, depression and agony.
The third sphere, the sphere of ethical life ( Sittlichkeit), PR §145 PR §150 PR §153 is marked by family life, civil society, and the State.Z. A. Pelczynski (ed.), The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 9.Alan Patten, Hegel's Idea of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 25. This idea is traditionally associated with conservatism.
To properly understand the movement from the two first spheres to the last, one must understand that Sittlichkeit's normativity transcends the individual—while Moralität may be rational and reflective, it is also individualistic. The third sphere is an attempt at describing a limited conception of the person through an appeal to the greater institutional context of the communityDrucilla Cornell and Nick Friedman, The Mandate of Dignity: Ronald Dworkin, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, and the Claims of Justice, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 119. and an attempt at bridging individual subjective feelings and the concept of general rights.
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