In mathematical logic, a sequent is a very general kind of conditional assertion.
A sequent may have any number m of condition formulas Ai (called "antecedents") and any number n of asserted formulas Bj (called "succedents" or ""). A sequent is understood to mean that if all of the antecedent conditions are true, then at least one of the consequent formulas is true. This style of conditional assertion is almost always associated with the conceptual framework of sequent calculus.
The word "OR" here is the inclusive OR.The disjunctive semantics for the right side of a sequent is stated and explained by , , , , , , and . The motivation for disjunctive semantics on the right side of a sequent comes from three main benefits.
Not all authors have adhered to Gentzen's original meaning for the word "sequent". For example, used the word "sequent" strictly for simple conditional assertions with one and only one consequent formula., wrote: "Thus a sequent is an argument-frame containing a set of assumptions and a conclusion which is claimed to follow from them. ... The propositions to the left of '⊢' become assumptions of the argument, and the proposition to the right becomes a conclusion validly drawn from those assumptions." The same single-consequent definition for a sequent is given by .
The symbol ' ' is often referred to as the "turnstile", "right tack", "tee", "assertion sign" or "assertion symbol". It is often read, suggestively, as "yields", "proves" or "entails".
In the extreme case where the list of consequent formulas of a sequent is empty, the rule is still that at least one term on the right be true, which is clearly Contradiction. This is signified by the 'always false' proposition, called the "falsum", denoted "⊥". Since the consequence is false, at least one of the antecedents must be false. Thus for example, ' A1, A2 ⊢ ' means that at least one of the antecedents A1 and A2 must be false.
One sees here again a symmetry because of the disjunctive semantics on the right hand side. If the left side is empty, then one or more right-side propositions must be true. If the right side is empty, then one or more of the left-side propositions must be false.
The doubly extreme case ' ⊢ ', where both the antecedent and consequent lists of formulas are empty is "not satisfiable".. In this case, the meaning of the sequent is effectively ' ⊤ ⊢ ⊥ '. This is equivalent to the sequent ' ⊢ ⊥ ', which clearly cannot be valid.
Similarly, a sequent of the form ' α, β ⊢ ', for logical formulas α and β, means that either α is false or β is false. But it does not mean that either α is a contradiction or β is a contradiction. To clarify this, consider the example ' B ∧ A, C ∧ ¬A ⊢ '. This is a valid sequent because either B ∧ A is false or C ∧ ¬A is false. But neither of these expressions is a contradiction in isolation. It is the conjunction of these two expressions which is a contradiction.
A typical rule is:
This indicates that if we can deduce that yields , and that yields , then we can also deduce that yields . (See also the full set of sequent calculus inference rules.)
In 1934, Gentzen did not define the assertion symbol ' ⊢ ' in a sequent to signify provability. He defined it to mean exactly the same as the implication operator ' ⇒ '. Using ' → ' instead of ' ⊢ ' and ' ⊃ ' instead of ' ⇒ ', he wrote: "The sequent A1, ..., Aμ → B1, ..., Bν signifies, as regards content, exactly the same as the formula (A1 & ... & Aμ) ⊃ (B1 ∨ ... ∨ Bν)"..
(Gentzen employed the right-arrow symbol between the antecedents and consequents of sequents. He employed the symbol ' ⊃ ' for the logical implication operator.)
In 1939, David Hilbert and Paul Bernays stated likewise that a sequent has the same meaning as the corresponding implication formula..
In 1944, Alonzo Church emphasized that Gentzen's sequent assertions did not signify provability.
Numerous publications after this time have stated that the assertion symbol in sequents does signify provability within the theory where the sequents are formulated. Haskell Curry in 1963, John Lemmon in 1965, and Huth and Ryan in 2004 all state that the sequent assertion symbol signifies provability. However, states that the assertion symbol in Gentzen-system sequents, which he denotes as ' ⇒ ', is part of the object language, not the metalanguage., defines sequents to have the form U ⇒ V for (possibly non-empty) sets of formulas U and V. Then he writes:
According to Dag Prawitz (1965): "The calculi of sequents can be understood as meta-calculi for the deducibility relation in the corresponding systems of natural deduction.". And furthermore: "A proof in a calculus of sequents can be looked upon as an instruction on how to construct a corresponding natural deduction."See , for this and further details of interpretation. In other words, the assertion symbol is part of the object language for the sequent calculus, which is a kind of meta-calculus, but simultaneously signifies deducibility in an underlying natural deduction system.
The intuitive meaning of the sequent is that under the assumption of Γ the conclusion of Σ is provable. Classically, the formulae on the left of the turnstile can be interpreted conjunctively while the formulae on the right can be considered as a disjunction. This means that, when all formulae in Γ hold, then at least one formula in Σ also has to be true. If the succedent is empty, this is interpreted as falsity, i.e. means that Γ proves falsity and is thus inconsistent. On the other hand an empty antecedent is assumed to be true, i.e., means that Σ follows without any assumptions, i.e., it is always true (as a disjunction). A sequent of this form, with Γ empty, is known as a logical assertion.
Of course, other intuitive explanations are possible, which are classically equivalent. For example, can be read as asserting that it cannot be the case that every formula in Γ is true and every formula in Σ is false (this is related to the double-negation interpretations of classical intuitionistic logic, such as Glivenko's theorem).
In any case, these intuitive readings are only pedagogical. Since formal proofs in proof theory are purely syntax, the semantics of (the derivation of) a sequent is only given by the properties of the calculus that provides the actual rules of inference.
Barring any contradictions in the technically precise definition above we can describe sequents in their introductory logical form. represents a set of assumptions that we begin our logical process with, for example "Socrates is a man" and "All men are mortal". The represents a logical conclusion that follows under these premises. For example "Socrates is mortal" follows from a reasonable formalization of the above points and we could expect to see it on the side of the turnstile. In this sense, means the process of reasoning, or "therefore" in English.
Similarly, one can obtain calculi for dual-intuitionistic logic (a type of paraconsistent logic) by requiring that sequents be singular in the antecedent.
In many cases, sequents are also assumed to consist of or sets instead of sequences. Thus one disregards the order or even the numbers of occurrences of the formulae. For classical propositional logic this does not yield a problem, since the conclusions that one can draw from a collection of premises do not depend on these data. In substructural logic, however, this may become quite important.
Natural deduction systems use single-consequence conditional assertions, but they typically do not use the same sets of inference rules as Gentzen introduced in 1934. In particular, System L systems, which are very convenient for practical theorem-proving in propositional calculus and predicate calculus, were applied by and for teaching introductory logic in textbooks.
Kleene makes the following comment on the translation into English: "Gentzen says 'Sequenz', which we translate as 'sequent', because we have already used 'sequence' for any succession of objects, where the German is 'Folge'."
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