The development of Indian logic dates back to the Chandahsutra of Pingala and anviksiki of Medhatithi Gautama (c. 6th century BCE); the Sanskrit grammar rules of Pāṇini (c. 5th century BCE); the Vaisheshika school's analysis of atomism (c. 6th century BCE to 2nd century BCE); the analysis of inference by Gotama (c. 6th century BC to 2nd century CE), founder of the Nyaya school of Hindu philosophy; and the tetralemma of Nagarjuna (c. 2nd century CE).
Indian logic stands as one of the three original traditions of logic, alongside the Organon and the Chinese logic. The Indian tradition continued to develop through early to modern times, in the form of the Navya-Nyāya school of logic.
Medhatithi Gautama (c. 6th century BCE) founded the anviksiki school of logic.S. C. Vidyabhusana (1971). A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Schools. The Mahabharata (12.173.45), around the 4th century BCE to 4th century CE, refers to the anviksiki and tarka schools of logic. (c. 5th century BCE) developed a form of logic (to which Boolean logic has some similarities) for his formulation of Vyakarana. Logic is described by Chanakya (c. 350-283 BCE) in his Arthashastra as an independent field of inquiry anviksiki.R. P. Kangle (1986). The Kautiliya Arthashastra (1.2.11). Motilal Banarsidass.
The Nyaya school of philosophical speculation is based on texts known as the Nyaya Sutras, which were written by Gotama in around the 2nd century CE. The most important contribution made by the Nyaya school to modern Hindu thought is its methodology. This methodology is based on a system of logic that has subsequently been adopted by most of the other Indian schools (orthodox or not), much in the same way that Western philosophy can be said to be largely based on Aristotelian logic.
Followers of Nyaya believed that obtaining valid knowledge was the only way to obtain release from suffering. They therefore took great pains to identify valid sources of knowledge and to distinguish these from mere false opinions. According to the Nyaya school, there are exactly four sources of knowledge (pramanas): perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Knowledge obtained through each of these can, of course, still be either valid or invalid. As a result, Nyaya scholars again went to great pains to identify, in each case, what it took to make knowledge valid, in the process creating a number of explanatory schemes. In this sense, Nyaya is probably the closest Indian equivalent to contemporary analytic philosophy.
These Jain philosophy concepts made most important contributions to the ancient Indian philosophy, especially in the areas of skepticism and relativity.* p335"
Following is the list of Jain philosophers who contributed to Jain Logic:
Gangeśa's book Tattvacintāmaṇi ("Thought-Jewel of Reality") was written partly in response to Śrīharśa's Khandanakhandakhādya, a defence of Advaita Vedānta, which had offered a set of thorough criticisms of Nyāya theories of thought and language. In his book, Gangeśa both addressed some of those criticisms and – more importantly – critically examined the Nyāya darśana himself. He held that, while Śrīharśa had failed successfully to challenge the Nyāya realist ontology, his and Gangeśa's own criticisms brought out a need to improve and refine the logical and linguistic tools of Nyāya thought, to make them more rigorous and precise.
Tattvacintāmani dealt with all the important aspects of Indian philosophy, logic, set theory, and especially epistemology, which Gangeśa examined rigorously, developing and improving the Nyāya scheme, and offering examples. The results, especially his analysis of cognition, were taken up and used by other darśanas.
Navya-Nyāya developed a sophisticated language and conceptual scheme that allowed it to raise, analyse, and solve problems in logic and epistemology. It systematised all the Nyāya concepts into four main categories: sense or perception (pratyakşa), inference (anumāna), comparison or similarity (upamāna), and testimony (sound or word; śabda).
This later school began around East India and Bengal, and developed theories resembling modern logic, such as Gottlob Frege's "distinction between sense and reference of proper names" and his "definition of number," as well as the Navya-Nyaya theory of "restrictive conditions for universals" anticipating some of the developments in modern set theory. Udayana in particular developed theories on "restrictive conditions for universals" and "Infinity regress" that anticipated aspects of modern set theory. According to Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti:
Jonardon Ganeri has observed that this period saw George Boole (1815-1864) and Augustus De Morgan (1806-1871) make their pioneering applications of algebraic ideas to the formulation of logic (such as algebraic logic and Boolean logic), and has suggested that these figures were likely to be aware of these studies in xeno-logic, and further that their acquired awareness of the shortcomings of propositional logic are likely to have stimulated their willingness to look outside the system.
Indian logic attracted the attention of many Western scholars, and had an influence on pioneering 19th-century logicians such as Charles Babbage (1791-1871), Augustus De Morgan, and particularly George Boole, as confirmed by Boole's wife Mary Everest Boole in an "open letter to Dr Bose" titled "Indian Thought and Western Science in the Nineteenth Century" written in 1901.Boole, Mary Everest. "Collected Works", eds E M Cobham and E S Dummer. London, Daniel 1931. Letter also published in the Ceylon National Review in 1909, and published as a separate pamphlet "The Psychologic Aspect of Imperialism" in 1911.
De Morgan himself wrote in 1860 of the significance of Indian logic: "The two races which have founded the mathematics, those of the Sanskrit and Greek languages, have been the two which have independently formed systems of logic."
Mathematicians became aware of the influence of Indian mathematics on the European. For example, Hermann Weyl wrote: "Occidental mathematics has in past centuries broken away from the Greek view and followed a course which seems to have originated in India and which has been transmitted, with additions, to us by the Arabs; in it the concept of number appears as logically prior to the concepts of geometry. ... But the present trend in mathematics is clearly in the direction of a return to the Greek standpoint; we now look upon each branch of mathematics as determining its own characteristic domain of quantities."
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