Anti-submarine warfare ( ASW, or in the older form A/S) is a branch of underwater warfare that uses surface , aircraft, , or other platforms, to find, track, and deter, damage, or destroy enemy submarines. Such operations are typically carried out to protect friendly shipping and coastal facilities from submarine attacks and to overcome .
Successful ASW operations typically involve a combination of sensor and weapon technologies, along with effective deployment strategies and sufficiently trained personnel. Typically, sophisticated sonar equipment is used for first detecting, then classifying, locating, and tracking a target submarine. Sensors are therefore a key element of ASW. Common weapons for attacking submarines include and , which can both be launched from an array of air, surface, and underwater platforms. ASW capabilities are often considered of significant strategic importance, particularly following provocative instances of unrestricted submarine warfare and the introduction of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which greatly increased the lethality of submarines.
At the beginning of the 20th century, ASW techniques and submarines themselves were primitive. During the First World War, submarines deployed by Imperial Germany proved themselves to be a capable threat to shipping, being able to strike targets even out in the North Atlantic Ocean. Accordingly, multiple nations embarked on research into devising more capable ASW methods, resulting in the introduction of practical Depth charge and advances in sonar technology; the adoption of the convoy system also proved to be a decisive tactic.
After a lull in progress during the interwar period, the Second World War saw submarine warfare and ASW alike advance rapidly, particularly during the critical Battle of the Atlantic, during which Axis powers submarines sought to prevent Britain from effectively importing supplies. Techniques such as the Wolfpack achieved initial success, but became increasingly costly as more capable ASW aircraft were introduced. Technologies such as the Naxos radar detector gained only a temporary reprieve until detection apparatus advanced yet again. Intelligence efforts, such as Ultra, also played a major role in curtailing the submarine threat and guiding ASW efforts towards greater success.
During the post-war era, ASW continued to advance, as the arrival of nuclear submarines had rendered some traditional techniques less effective. The of the era constructed sizable submarine fleets, many of which were armed with ; in response to the heightened threat posed by such vessels, various nations chose to expand their ASW capabilities. , capable of operating from almost any warship and equipped with ASW apparatus, became commonplace during the 1960s. Increasingly capable fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft were also widely used, covering vast areas of ocean. The magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), diesel exhaust sniffers, and other electronic warfare technologies also became a staple of ASW efforts. Dedicated , purpose-built to track down and destroy other submarines, became a key component as well. Torpedo carrying missiles, such as ASROC and Ikara, were another area of advancement.
In 1866, British engineer Robert Whitehead invented the first effective self-propelled torpedo, the eponymous Whitehead torpedo; French and German inventions followed soon thereafter. The first submarine with a torpedo was Nordenfelt I, built in 1884–1885, though it had been proposed earlier. By the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, all the large navies except the Germans had acquired submarines. Nevertheless, at that time, all powers still defined the submarine as an experimental vessel and did not put it into operational use.
There were no means to detect submerged U-boat, and attacks on them were limited at first to efforts to damage their Periscope with hammers. The Royal Navy torpedo establishment, HMS Vernon, studied explosive grapnel sweeps; these sank four or five U-boats in the First World War. A similar approach featured a string of charges on a floating cable, fired electrically; an unimpressed Admiral Edward Evans considered any U-boat sunk by it deserved to be.
Another primitive technique of attacking submarines was the dropping of hand-thrown guncotton bombs. The Lance Bomb was also developed; this featured a cone-shaped steel drum on a shaft, intended to be thrown at a submarine. Firing Lyddite shells, or using , was tried. Use of nets to ensnare U-boats was also examined, as was a destroyer, , fitted with a spar torpedo. To attack at set depths, aircraft bombs were attached to lanyards which would trigger their charges; a similar idea was a guncotton charge in a lanyarded can; two of these lashed together became known as the Depth Charge Type A. Problems with the lanyards tangling and failing to function led to the development of a chemical pellet trigger as the Type B. These were effective at a distance of around .
Perhaps the best early concept arose in a 1913 Royal Navy Torpedo School report, describing a device intended for Demining, a "dropping mine". At Admiral John Jellicoe's request, the standard Mark II mine was fitted with a hydrostatic pistol (developed in 1914 by Thomas Firth & Sons of Sheffield) preset for firing, to be launched from a stern platform. Weighing , and effective at , the "cruiser mine" was also a potential hazard to the dropping ship.
During June 1915, the Royal Navy began operational trials of the Type D depth charge, with a charge of TNT (amatol, as TNT supplies became critical) and a hydrostatic pistol, firing at either , and believed to be effective at a distance of ; the Type D*, with a charge, was offered for smaller ships.
In July 1915, the British Admiralty set up the Board of Invention and Research (BIR) to evaluate suggestions from the public as well as carrying out their own investigations. Some 14,000 suggestions were received about combating submarines. In December 1916, the Royal Navy set up its own Anti-Submarine Division (ASD), from which came the term "Asdic", but relations with the BIR were poor. After 1917, most ASW work was carried out by the ASD. In the U.S., a Naval Consulting Board was set up in 1915 to evaluate ideas. After American entry into the war in 1917, they encouraged work on submarine detection. The U.S. National Research Council, a civilian organization, brought in British and French experts on underwater sound to a meeting with their American counterparts in June 1917. In October 1918, there was a meeting in Paris on "supersonics", a term used for echo-ranging, but the technique was still in research by the end of the war. The first recorded sinking of a submarine by depth charge was U-68, sunk by Q-ship off County Kerry, Ireland on 22 March 1916. By early 1917, the Royal Navy had also developed indicator loops which consisted of long lengths of cables lain on the seabed to detect the magnetic field of submarines as they passed overhead. At this stage, they were used in conjunction with controlled mines which could be detonated from a shore station once a 'swing' had been detected on the indicator loop galvanometer. Indicator loops used with controlled mining were known as 'guard loops'. By July 1917, depth charges had developed to the extent that settings of between were possible. This design would remain mainly unchanged through the end of World War II. While sonar appeared before the war's end, the trials were abandoned.
and were also used to patrol for submarines. A number of successful attacks were made, but the main value of air patrols was in driving the U-boat to submerge, rendering it virtually blind and immobile.
However, the most effective anti-submarine measure was the introduction of escorted , which reduced the loss of ships entering the German war zone around the British Isles from 25% to less than 1%. The historian Paul E. Fontenoy states that "the convoy system defeated the U-boat campaign."Paul E. Fontenoy, "Convoy System", The Encyclopedia of World War I: A Political, Social and Military History, Volume 1, Spencer C. Tucker, ed. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 312–314. A major contributing factor was the interception of German submarine radio signals and breaking of their code by Room 40 of the British Admiralty.
To attack submerged boats, a number of anti-submarine weapons were derived, including the sweep with a contact-fused explosive. Bombs were dropped by aircraft and depth charge attacks were made by ships. Prior to the introduction of dedicated depth charge throwers, charges were manually rolled off the stern of a ship. The Q-ship, a warship disguised as a merchantman, was used to attack surfaced U-boats,Beyer, Kenneth M.: Q-Ships versus U-Boats. America's Secret Project. Naval Institute Press. Annapolis, Maryland, US. 1999. while the R1 was the first ASW submarine.
211 of the 360 U-boats were sunk during the war, usinga variety of ASW methods:
Several other technologies were developed; Echo sounding that allowed measurement by moving ships were a new innovation, along with a greater appreciation of the properties of the ocean that affected sound propagation. The bathythermograph was invented in 1937, which became a common fixture amongst ASW ships within only a few years.Scripps Institution of Oceanography: Probing the Oceans 1936 to 1976. San Diego, Calif: Tofua Press, 1978. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/kt109nc2cj/ There were relatively few major advances in weapons during the period; however, the performance of torpedoes continued to improve.
At the beginning of the conflict, most navies had few ideas how to combat submarines beyond locating them with sonar and then dropping on them. Sonar proved much less effective than expected, and was no use at all against submarines operating on the surface, as U-boats routinely did at night. The Royal Navy had continued to develop indicator loops between the wars but this was a passive form of harbour defense that depended on detecting the magnetic field of submarines by the use of long lengths of cable lain on the floor of the harbour. Indicator loop technology was quickly developed further and deployed by the US Navy in 1942. By then, there were dozens of loop stations around the world. Sonar was far more effective and loop technology for ASW purposes was discontinued shortly after the conflict's end.
The use and improvement of radar technology was one of the most important elements in the fight against submarines. Locating submarines was the first step in being able to defend against and destroy them. Throughout the war, Allied radar technology was much better than their German counterparts. German U-boats struggled to have proper radar detection capabilities and keep up with the successive generations of Allied airborne radar. The first generation of Allied airborne radar used a 1.7 meter wavelength and had a limited range. By the second half of 1942 the "Metox" radar detector was used by U-boats to give some warning from airborne attack. During 1943, the Allies began to deploy aircraft equipped with new cavity magnetron-based 10-centimeter wavelength radar (ASV III), which was undetectable by "Metox", in sufficient numbers to yield good results. Eventually the "Naxos" radar detector was fielded that could detect 10-cm wavelength radar, but it had a very short range and only gave a U-boat limited time to dive. Between 1943 and 1945, radar equipped aircraft would account for the bulk of Allied kills against U-boats. Allied anti-submarine tactics developed to defend (the Royal Navy's preferred method), aggressively hunt down (the U.S. Navy approach), and to divert vulnerable or valuable ships away from known U-boat concentrations.
During the Second World War, the Allies developed a huge range of new technologies, weapons and tactics to counter the submarine danger. These included:
Operating under the same clear-water conditions in the Mediterranean – such that British submarines were painted dark blue on their upper surfaces to make them less visible from the air when submerged at periscope depth – the Royal Navy, mostly operating from Malta, lost 41 submarines to the opposing German and Italian forces, including HMS Upholder and HMS Perseus.
Once the US was able to ramp up construction of destroyers and , as well as bringing over highly effective anti-submarine techniques learned from the British from experiences in the Battle of the Atlantic, they would take a significant toll on Japanese submarines, which tended to be slower and could not dive as deep as their German counterparts. Japanese submarines, in particular, never menaced the Allied merchant convoys and strategic shipping lanes to any degree that German U-boats did. One major advantage the Allies had was the breaking of the Japanese Purple code code by the US, so allowing friendly ships to be diverted from Japanese submarines and allowing Allied submarines to intercept Japanese forces.
In 1942 and early 1943, US submarines posed little threat to Japanese ships, whether warships or merchant ships. They were initially hampered by poor torpedoes, which often failed to detonate on impact, ran too deep, or even ran wild. As the US submarine menace was slight in the beginning, Japanese commanders became complacent and as a result did not invest heavily into ASW measures or upgrade their convoy protection to any degree to what the Allies in the Atlantic did. Often encouraged by the Japanese not placing a high priority on the Allied submarine threat, US skippers were relatively complacent and docile compared to their German counterparts, who understood the "life and death" urgency in the Atlantic.
However, US Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood pressured the ordnance department to replace the faulty torpedoes; famously when they initially ignored his complaints, he ran his own tests to prove the torpedoes' unreliability. He also cleaned out the "deadwood", replacing many cautious or unproductive submarine skippers with younger (somewhat) and more aggressive commanders. As a result, in the latter half of 1943, US subs were suddenly sinking Japanese ships at a dramatically higher rate, scoring their share of key warship kills and accounting for almost half of the Japanese merchant fleet. Japan's naval command was caught off guard; Japan had neither the anti-submarine technology or doctrine, nor the production capability to withstand a tonnage war of attrition, nor did she develop the organizations needed (unlike the Allies in the Atlantic).
Japanese antisubmarine forces consisted mainly of their destroyers, with sonar and depth charges. However, Japanese destroyer design, tactics, training, and doctrine emphasized surface nightfighting and torpedo delivery (necessary for fleet operations) over anti-submarine duties. By the time Japan finally developed a destroyer escort, which was more economical and better suited to convoy protection, it was too late; coupled to incompetent doctrine and organization, it could have had little effect in any case. Late in the war, the Japanese Army and Navy used Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) gear in aircraft to locate shallow submerged submarines. The Japanese Army also developed two small aircraft carriers and Ka-1 autogyro aircraft for use in an antisubmarine warfare role, while the Navy developed and introduced the Kyushu Q1W anti-submarine bomber into service in 1945.
The Japanese depth charge attacks by its surface forces initially proved fairly unsuccessful against U.S. fleet submarines. Unless caught in shallow water, a U.S. submarine commander could normally escape destruction, sometimes using temperature (). Additionally, IJN doctrine emphasized fleet action, not convoy protection, so the best ships and crews went elsewhere. Moreover, during the first part of the war, the Japanese tended to set their depth charges too shallow, unaware U.S. submarines could dive below 150 feet (45m). Unfortunately, this deficiency was revealed in a June 1943 press conference held by U.S. Congressman Andrew J. May, and soon enemy depth charges were set to explode as deep as 250 feet (76m). Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, , later estimated May's revelation cost the navy as many as ten submarines and 800 crewmen.
Much later in the war, active and passive were developed for aircraft use, together with MAD devices. Toward the end of the war, the Allies developed better forward-throwing weapons, such as Mousetrap and Squid, in the face of new, much better German submarines, such as the Type XVII and Type XXI.
British and Dutch submarines also operated in the Pacific, mainly against coastal shipping.
To deal with these more capable submarines new ASW weapons were essential. This new generation of diesel electric submarine, like the Type XXI before it, had no deck gun and a streamlined hull tower for greater underwater speed, as well as more storage battery capacity than a comparable WW2 submarine; in addition, they recharged their batteries using a snorkel and could complete a patrol without surfacing. This led to the introduction of longer-ranged forward-throwing weapons, such as Weapon Alpha, Limbo, RBU-6000, and of improved homing torpedoes. Nuclear submarines, even faster still, and without the need to snorkel to recharge batteries, posed an even greater threat; in particular, shipborne (recalling the of World War I) have emerged as essential anti-submarine platforms. A number of torpedo carrying missiles such as ASROC and Ikara were developed, combining ahead-throwing capability (or longer-range delivery) with torpedo homing.
Since the introduction of submarines capable of carrying ballistic missiles, great efforts have been made to counter the threat they pose; here, maritime patrol aircraft (as in World War II) and helicopters have had a large role. The use of nuclear propulsion and streamlined hulls has resulted in submarines with high speed capability and increased maneuverability, as well as low "indiscretion rates" when a submarine is exposed on the surface. This has required changes both to the sensors and weapons used for ASW. Because nuclear submarines were noisy, there was an emphasis on passive sonar detection. The torpedo became the main weapon (though nuclear depth charges were developed). The mine continued to be an important ASW weapon.
In some areas of the ocean, where land forms natural barriers, long strings of sonobuoys, deployed from surface ships or dropped from aircraft, can monitor maritime passages for extended periods. Bottom mounted hydrophones can also be used, with land based processing. A system like this SOSUS was deployed by the US in the GIUK gap and other strategically important places.
Airborne ASW forces developed better and , while for ships and submarines a range of towed sonar devices were developed to overcome the problem of ship-mounting. Helicopters can fly courses offset from the ships and transmit sonar information to their combat information centres. They can also drop sonobuoys and launch homing torpedoes to positions many miles away from the ships actually monitoring the enemy submarine. Submerged submarines are generally blind to the actions of a patrolling aircraft until it uses active sonar or fires a weapon, and the aircraft's speed allows it to maintain a fast search pattern around the suspected contact.
Increasingly anti-submarine submarines, called or hunter-killers, became capable of destroying, particularly, ballistic missile submarines. Initially these were very quiet diesel-electric propelled vessels but they are more likely to be nuclear-powered these days. The development of these was strongly influenced by the duel between and .
A significant detection aid that has continued in service is the Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD), a passive device. First used during the Second World War, MAD uses the Earth's magnetosphere as a standard, detecting anomalies caused by large metallic vessels, such as submarines. Modern MAD arrays are usually contained in a long tail boom (fixed-wing aircraft) or an aerodynamic housing carried on a deployable tow line (helicopters). Keeping the sensor away from the plane's engines and avionics helps eliminate interference from the carrying platform.
At one time, reliance was placed on electronic warfare detection devices exploiting the submarine's need to perform radar sweeps and transmit responses to radio messages from home port. As frequency surveillance and direction finding became more sophisticated, these devices enjoyed some success. However, submariners soon learned not to rely on such transmitters in dangerous waters. Home bases can then use extremely low frequency radio signals, able to penetrate the ocean's surface, to reach submarines wherever they might be.
In modern times forward looking infrared (FLIR) detectors have been used to track the large plumes of heat that fast nuclear-powered submarines leave while rising to the surface. FLIR devices are also used to see or snorkels at night whenever a submariner might be incautious enough to probe the surface.
A 2024 study found that climate change may decrease the detectability of submarines in certain locations.
In early 2010 DARPA began funding the ACTUV programme to develop a semi-autonomous oceangoing unmanned naval vessel.
Today some nations have seabed listening devices capable of tracking submarines. It is possible to detect man-made marine noises across the southern Indian Ocean from South Africa to New Zealand. Some of the SOSUS arrays have been turned over to civilian use and are now used for marine research.
Several countries developed anti-submarine missiles including United States, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan and India. Anti-submarine missiles give flexibility in terms of the launch platform. India developed supersonic long range anti-submarine missile called SMART. The missile helps to deliver torpedo 643 km away.
Inter-war period
Second World War
Battle of the Atlantic
Mediterranean
Pacific Theatre
Post-World War II
Modern warfare
Anti-submarine warfare technologies
Weapons
Platforms
Identifying friendly vs hostile submarines
See also
Notes
Citations
Bibliography
Further reading
External links
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