Wahhabism () is a Salafi movement Islamic revival movement within Sunni Islam named after the 18th-century Hanbali school scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It was initially established in the central Arabian region of Najd and later spread to other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, and was the official policy of Saudi Arabia until 2022.
The Wahhabi movement staunchly denounced rituals related to the Wali and Ziyarat, which were widespread amongst the people of Najd. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his followers were highly inspired by the Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263–/Anno Hegirae 661–728) who advocated a return to the purity of the first three generations () to rid Muslims of (innovation) and regarded his works as core scholarly references in theology. While being influenced by Hanbali school, the movement repudiated Taqlid to legal authorities, including oft-cited scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim (/AH 751).
Wahhabism has been characterized by historians as "puritanical", while its adherents describe it as an Islamic "reform movement" to restore "pure monotheistic worship". Socio-politically, the movement represented the first major Arab world-led revolt against the Turkish, Persian and foreign empires that had dominated the Islamic world since the Mongol invasions and the fall of Abbasid Caliphate in the 13th century; and would later serve as a revolutionary impetus for 19th-century pan-Arabism trends. In 1744, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab formed a Diriyah Pact with a local leader, Muhammad bin Saud, establishing a politico-religious alliance with the Saudi monarchy that lasted for more than 250 years. The Wahhabi movement gradually rose to prominence as an influential anti-colonial reform trend in the Islamic world that advocated the re-generation of the social and political prowess of Muslims. Its revolutionary themes inspired several , scholars, Pan-Islamism ideologues and Anti-colonialism activists as far as West Africa.
For more than two centuries, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings were championed as the official creed in the three Saudi States. As of 2017, changes to Saudi religious policy by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have led to widespread crackdowns on Islamism in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab world. By 2021, the waning power of the religious clerics brought about by the social, economic, political changes, and the Saudi government's promotion of a nationalist narrative that emphasizes non-Islamic components, led to what has been described as the "post-Wahhabi era" of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's annual commemoration of its founding day on 22 February since 2022, which marked the establishment of Emirate of Dir'iyah by Muhammad ibn Saud in 1727 and de-emphasized his Diriyah Pact in 1744, has led to the official "uncoupling" of the religious clergy by the Saudi state.
The designation for this movement was likely first used by Sulayman ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an ardent critic of his brother's views, who used the term in his purported treatise . The movement's political opponents widely used the term to denounce it. Modern-day followers of the movement continue to reject the term for themselves.
The term "Wahhabi" should not be confused with Wahbi, which is the dominant creed within Ibadism.
Supporters of the Wahhabi movement characterize it as being "pure Islam", indistinct from Salafism, and in fact "the true Salafi movement movement" seeking "a return to the pristine message of the Prophet" and attempted to free Islam from "superimposed doctrines" and superstitions". Opponents of the movement and what it stands for label it as "a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances".. "While Wahhabism claims to represent Islam in its purest form, other Muslims consider it a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances." The term "Wahhabism" has also become as a blanket term used inaccurately to refer to "any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith".
Abdallah al Obeid, the former dean of the Islamic University of Medina and member of the Saudi Consultative Council, has characterized the movement as "a political trend" within Islam that "has been adopted for power-sharing purposes", but not a distinct religious movement, because "it has no special practices, nor special rites, and no special interpretation of religion that differ from the main body of Sunni Islam".
The term "Wahhabism" has frequently been used by external parties as a sectarianSources:
The term used in this manner "most frequently used in countries where Salafis are a small minority" with the intent of "conjuring up images of Saudi Arabia" and foreign interference. Labelling by the term "Wahhabism" has historically been expansive beyond the doctrinal followers of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, who tend to all reject the label.
Since the Colonial empire, the Wahhabi epithet has been commonly invoked by various external observers to erroneously or pejoratively denote a wide range of Islah movements across the Muslim world. During the colonial era, the British Empire had commonly employed the term to refer to those Ulama and thinkers seen as obstructive to their imperial interests; punishing them under various pretexts. Many Muslim rebels inspired by Sufism Wali (saints) and Tariqa, were targeted by the British Raj as part of a wider "Wahhabi" conspiracy which was portrayed as extending from Bengal to Punjab. Despite sharing little resemblance with the doctrines of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, outside observers of the Muslim world have frequently traced various religious purification campaigns across the Islamic World to Wahhabi influence. According to Qeyamuddin Ahmed:
In general, the so-called Wahhabis do not like – or at least did not like – the term. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was averse to the elevation of scholars and other individuals, including using a person's name to label an Islamic school ( madhhab). Due to its perceived negative overtones, the members of the movement historically identified themselves as " Muwahhidun", Muslims, etc. and more recently as "Salafis".
Other terms Wahhabis have been said to use and/or prefer include Ahl al-Hadith ("People of the Hadith"), Salafi dawah ("Salafi preaching"), or al-da'wa ila al-tawhid ("preaching of monotheism" for the school rather than the adherents), al-Tariqa al-Salafiyya ("the way of the pious ancestors"), "the reform or Salafi movement of the Sheikh" (the sheikh being Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab), etc. Their self-designation "People of the Sunnah" was important for Wahhabism's authenticity, because during the Ottoman period only Sunnism was the legitimate doctrine.
Other writers such as Quinton Wiktorowicz, urge use of the term "Salafi", maintaining that "one would be hard pressed to find individuals who refer to themselves as Wahhabis or organizations that use Wahhabi in their title, or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliar with Islamic terminology; even then, its use is limited and often appears as Salafi/Wahhabi)". A New York Times journalist writes that Saudis "abhor" the term Wahhabism, "feeling it sets them apart and contradicts the notion that Islam is a monolithic faith".
Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud for example has attacked the term as "a doctrine that doesn't exist here" in and challenged users of the term to locate any "deviance of the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia from the teachings of the Quran and Prophetic ". Professor Ingrid Mattson stated that " Wahhbism is not a sect: It is a social movement that began 200 years ago to rid Islam of rigid cultural practices that had been acquired over the centuries." In an interview given to The Atlantic magazine in 2018, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asserted that the Western usage of the term itself has been a misnomer. Stating that the terminology itself is indefinable, Mohammed bin Salman said: "When people speak of Wahhabism, they don't know exactly what they are talking about."
On the other hand, according to authors at Global Security and Library of Congress the term is now commonplace and used even by Wahhabi scholars in the Najd, a region often called the "heartland" of Wahhabism. Journalist Karen House calls Salafi "a more politically correct term" for Wahhabi. In any case, according to Lacey, none of the other terms have caught on, and so like the Christian Quakers, Wahhabis have "remained known by the name first assigned to them by their detractors". However, the confusion is further aggravated due to the common practice of various authoritarian governments broadly using the label "Wahhabi extremists" for all opposition, legitimate and illegitimate, to justify massive repressions on any dissident.
Another movement, whose adherents are also called "Wahhabi" but whom were Ibadi Islam Kharijites, has caused some confusion in North and sub-Saharan Africa, where the movement's leader – Abd al-Wahhab ibn Abd al-Rahman – lived and preached in the eighth century Common Era. This movement is often mistakenly conflated with the Muwahhidun movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab..
According to Joas Wagemakers, associate professor of Islamic and Arabic Studies at Utrecht University, Salafism consists of broad movements of Muslims across the world who aspire to live according to the precedents of the Salaf; whereas "Wahhabism" – a term rejected by its adherents – refers to the specific brand of reformation ( islah) campaign that was initiated by the 18th century scholar Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and evolved through his subsequent disciples in the central Arabian region of Najd. Despite their relations with Wahhabi Muslims of Najd; other Salafis have often differed theologically with the Wahhabis and hence do not identify with them. These included significant contentions with Wahhabis over their unduly harsh enforcement of their beliefs, their lack of tolerance towards other Muslims and their deficient commitment to their stated opposition to taqlid and advocacy of ijtihad.
In doctrines of Aqidah (creed), Wahhabis and Salafis resemble each other; particularly in their focus on Tawhid. However, the Muwahidun movement historically were concerned primarily about Tawhid al-Rububiyya (Oneness of Lordship) and Tawhid al-Uloohiyya (Oneness of Worship) while the Salafiyya movement placed an additional emphasis on Tawhid al-Asma wa Sifat (Oneness of Divine Names and Attributes); with a literal understanding of God's Names and Attributes.
18th and 19th century European , scholars, travellers and compared the Wahhabi movement with various Euro-American socio-political movements in the Age of Revolutions. Calvinism scholar John Ludwig Burckhardt, author of the well-received works " Travels in Arabia" (1829) and " Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys" (1830), described the Muwahhidun as Arabian locals who resisted Turkish hegemony and its "Napoleonic" tactics. Historian Loius Alexander Corancez in his book " Histoire des Wahabis" described the movement as an revolution that sought a powerful revival of Arab civilisation by establishing a new order in Arabia and cleansing all the irrational elements and superstitions which had been normalised through Sufism excesses from Turkish and foreign influences. Scottish people historian Mark Napier attributed the successes of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's revolution to assistance from "frequent interpositions of Heaven".
After the Unification of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabis were able spread their political power and consolidate their rule over the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. After the discovery of petroleum near the Persian Gulf in 1939, Saudi Arabia had access to oil export revenues, revenue that grew to billions of dollars. This moneyspent on books, media, schools, universities, mosques, scholarships, fellowships, lucrative jobs for journalists, academics and Ulama Wahhabi ideals a "preeminent position of strength" in Islam around the world..
Driven by zealous and fiery rhetoric, Kadızade Mehmed was able to inspire many followers to join in his cause and rid themselves of any and all corruption found inside the Ottoman Empire. Leaders of the movement held official positions as preachers in the major mosques of Baghdad, and "combined popular followings with support from within the Ottoman state apparatus". Between 1630 and 1680 there were many violent quarrels that occurred between the Kadızadelis and those that they disapproved of. As the movement progressed, activists became "increasingly violent" and Kadızadelis were known to enter "mosques, Khanqah and Ottoman coffeehouses in order to mete out punishments to those contravening their version of orthodoxy."
The Wahhabi and Ahl-i-Hadith movements both oppose Sufi practices such as visiting shrines and seeking aid at the tombs of Islamic saints. Both the movements revived the teachings of the medieval Sunni theologian and jurist, Ibn Taymiyya, whom they both consider a Shaykh al-Islam. Suffering from the instabilities of 19th-century Arabia, many Wahhabi ulama would make their way to India and study under Ahl-i-Hadith patronage. After the establishment of Saudi Arabia and the subsequent oil boom, the Saudi Sheikhs would repay their debts by financing the Ahl-i-Hadith movement. The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Ibn Baz strongly supported the movement, and prominent Ahl-i-Hadith scholars were appointed to teach in Saudi Universities.
The Syrian-Albanians Islamic scholar Al-Albani (), an avid reader of Al-Manar and also student of Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (disciple of Rida and Al-Qasimi), was an adherent to the Salafiyya methodology. Encouraged by their call for hadith re-evaluation and revival, he would invest himself in Hadith studies, becoming a renowned Muhaddith. He followed in the footsteps of the ancient Ahl al-Hadith school and took the call of Ahl-i Hadith. In the 1960s, he would teach in Saudi Arabia making a profound influence therein. By the 1970s, Albani's thoughts would gain popularity and the notion of " Salafi Manhaj" was consolidated.
The Syrians-Albanians Salafi Muhaddith Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani () publicly challenged the foundational methodologies of the neo-Wahhabite establishment. According to Albani, although Wahhabis doctrinally professed exclusive adherence to the Quran, the Hadith, and the Ijma of Salaf; in practice they almost solely relied on Hanbali jurisprudence for their fatwas—acting therefore as undeclared partisans of a particular Madhhab. As the most prominent scholar who championed anti-madhab doctrines in the 20th century, Albani held that adherence to a madhab was a bid'ah (religious innovation). Albani went as far as to castigate Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a "Salafi in creed, but not in Fiqh". He strongly attacked Ibn Abd al-Wahhab on several points; claiming that the latter was not a mujtahid in fiqh and accused him of imitating the Hanbali school. Albani's outspoken criticism embarrassed the Saudi clergy, who finally expelled him from the Kingdom in 1963 when he issued a fatwa permitting women to uncover their face, which ran counter to Hanbali jurisprudence and Saudi standards."From there he Albani learned to oppose taqlid in a madhab." Bennett, The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 174. "Al-Albani had denounced Wahhabi attachment to the Hanbali school." Stephane Lacroix, George Holoch, Awakening Islam, p. 85
In addition, Albani would also criticise Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab for his weakness in Hadith studies. He distinguished between Salafism and Wahhabism, criticizing the latter while supporting the former. He had a complex relationship to each movement. Although he praised Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in general terms for his reformist efforts and contributions to the Muslim Ummah, Albani nonetheless censured his later followers for their harshness in Takfir.
In spite of this, Albani's efforts at Hadith studies revivalism and his claims of being more faithful to the spirit of Wahhabism than Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself; made the former's ideas highly popular amongst Salafi religious students across the World, including Saudi Arabia.
Hammad Ibn 'Atiq () was one of the first Wahhabi scholars who seriously concerned himself with the question of God's Names and Attributes; a topic largely neglected by the previous Wahhabi scholars whose primary focus was limited to condemning idolatry and necrolatry. Ibn 'Atiq established correspondence with Athari scholars like Sīddïq Hasān Khán, an influential scholar of the Ahl-i Hadith movement in the Islamic principality of Bhopal State. In his letters, Ibn 'Atiq praised Nayl al-Maram, Khan's Salafi commentary on Quran, which was published via prints in Cairo. He solicited Khan to accept his son as his disciple and requested Khan to produce and send more commentaries on the various treatises of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. Khan accepted his request and embarked on a detailed study of the treatises of both the scholars. Hammad's son Sa'd ibn Atiq would study under Khan and various traditionalist theologians in India. Thus, various Wahhabi scholars began making efforts to appropriate Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's legacy into mainstream Sunni Islam by appropriating them to the broader traditionalist scholarship active across the Indian subcontinent, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, etc.
The scholar Ibn Abi al-Izz's sharh (explanation) on Al-Tahawi's creedal treatise Al-Aqida al-Tahawiyya proved popular with the later adherents of the Muwahidun movement; who regarded it as a true representation of the work, free from Maturidi influences and as a standard theological reference for the Athari creed. A number of Salafi and Wahhabi scholars have produced super-commentaries and annotations on the sharh, including Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Saleh Al-Fawzan, etc. and is taught as a standard text at the Islamic University of Madinah.
In Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's major work, a small book called Kitab al-Tawhid, he states that Ibadah (Worship) in Islam consists of conventional acts of devotion such as the five daily prayers ( Salah); fasting for the holy month of Ramadan (Sawm); Dua (supplication); Istia'dha (seeking protection or refuge); Isti'âna (seeking help), and Istigātha to Allah (seeking benefits and calling upon Allah alone). Directing these deeds beyond Allahsuch as through du'a or Istigāthā to the dead – are acts of shirk and in violation of the tenets of Tawhid (monotheism).Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawhid Based on the doctrine of Tawhid espoused in Kitab al-Tawhid, the followers of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab referred themselves by the designation " Al-Muwahhidun" (Unitarians).
The essence of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's justification for fighting his opponents in Arabia can be summed up as his belief that the original pagans fought by Muhammad "affirmed that God is the creator, the sustainer and the master of all affairs; they gave alms, they performed pilgrimage and they avoided forbidden things from fear of God". What made them pagans whose blood could be shed and wealth plundered was that they performed sacrifices, vows and supplications to other beings. According to Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, someone who perform such things even if their lives are otherwise exemplary; is not a Muslims but an unbeliever. Once such people have received the call to "true Islam", understood it and then rejected it, their blood and treasure are forfeit. Clarifying his stance on Takfir, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab states:
The disagreement between Wahhabis and their opponents over the definition of worship ( Ibadah) and monotheism ( Tawhid) has remained much the same since 1740, according to David Commins: "One of the peculiar features of the debate between Wahhabis and their adversaries is its apparently static nature... the main points in the debate have stayed the same since." According to another source, Wahhabi jurists were unique for their literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah which tended to re-inforce local practices of the region of Najd. Whether the teachings of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab included the need for social renewal and "plans for socio-religious reform of society" in the Arabian Peninsula, rather than simply a return to "ritual correctness and moral purity", is disputed...
Condemning the doctrine of blind-following ( Taqlid) prevalent amongst the masses and obliging them to directly engage with the Scriptures; Sulāyman ibn Ābd-Allah Aal-Shaykh (1785–/AH 1199–1233) wrote:
The Wahhabis furthermore rejected the idea of closure of Ijtihad as an innovated principle. Although they professed adherence to Hanbali school, they refrained from taking its precepts as final. Since the issue of Ijtihad and Taqlid was amongst their principal concerns, Wahhabis developed a new set of juristic procedures to solve legal questions. Accordingly, they first search the Qur'an and Hadith as the primary sources of legislation In case the solution was not accessible from the Scriptures, the principle of Ijma (consensus) was employed. Ijma was restricted to Ahl al-Sunnah and consisted of consensus of Companions of the Prophet, Salaf and the consensus of scholars.
Prominent Wahhabi Qadi of the Second Saudi State, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan Al ash-Sheikh (1782–/AH 1196–1285) strongly condemned the practice of taqlid as a form of shirk (polytheism) in his treatises, writing:
The Wahhabis also advocated a principle in Islamic legal theory often referred to as "the rule against Ijtihad reversal". This principle allows overturning a scholar's fatwa (legal judgement) when he bases it on personal Ijtihad (personal legal reasoning), rather than a clear textual source from Quran and Hadith. In effect, this allowed the Wahhabi to remain autonomous. Opponents of Wahhabi movement harshly rebuked them for advocating Ijtihad and not recognising the finality of Madhhab (law schools).
This does not mean, however, that all adherents agree on what is required or haram, or that rules have not varied by area or changed over time. In Saudi Arabia, the strict religious atmosphere of Wahhabi doctrines were visible as late as the 1990s; such as the conformity in dress, public deportment, public prayers. Its presence was visible by the wide freedom of action of the "religious police", clerics in , teachers in schools, and (i.e. judges who are religious legal scholars) in Saudi courts.
While other Muslims might urge salat prayer, modest dress, and abstention from alcohol, for Wahhabis, prayer "that is punctual, ritually correct, and communally performed not only is urged but publicly required of men." Not only is modest dress prescribed, but the type of clothing that should be worn, especially by women (a black abaya, covering all but the eyes and hands) is specified. Not only is wine forbidden, but so are "all intoxicating drinks and other stimulants, including tobacco". While being influenced by Hanbali doctrines, the movement repudiated Taqlid to legal authorities, including oft-cited scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim (/AH 751).
Following the preaching and practice of ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab that coercion should be used to enforce following of sharia (Islamic law), an official committee was empowered to "Command the Good and Forbid the Evil" (the so-called "religious police"). in Saudi Arabiathe one country founded with the help of Wahhabi warriors and whose scholars and pious citizens dominated many aspects of the Kingdom's life. Committee "field officers" enforce strict closing of shops at prayer time, segregation of the sexes, prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol, driving of motor vehicles by women, and other social restrictions. Saudi Arabia's religious police 'contains extremists' BBC, 4 February 2014
A large number of practices was reported to be forbidden by Saudi Wahhabi officials, preachers or religious police. Practices that have been forbidden as Bid'a (innovation) or shirk (polytheism) and sometimes "punished by flogging" during Wahhabi history include performing or listening to music; dancing; fortune telling; ; non-religious television programs; smoking; playing backgammon, chess, or card game; drawing human or animal figures; acting in a play or writing fiction; dissecting , even in criminal investigations and for the purposes of medical research; recorded music played over telephones on hold; or the sending of flowers to friends or relatives who are in the hospital. Common Muslim practices Wahhabis believe are contrary to Islam include listening to music in praise of Muhammad, praying to God while visiting tombs (including the tomb of Muhammad), celebrating mawlid (birthday of the Prophet), the use of ornamentation on or in mosques, all of which is considered orthodoxy in the rest of the Islamic world. Until 2018, driving of motor vehicles by women was allowed in every country except the Wahhabi-dominated Saudi Arabia. Certain forms of Dream interpretation, practiced by the famously strict Taliban, is sometimes discouraged by Wahhabis.
Wahhabism also emphasizes " Thaqafah Islamiyyah" or Islamic culture and the importance of avoiding non-Islamic cultural practices and non-Muslim friendship no matter how innocent these may appear,Husain, The Islamist, 2007, p. 250 on the grounds that the Sunnah forbids imitating non-Muslims. Foreign practices sometimes punished and sometimes simply condemned by Wahhabi preachers as un-Islamic, include celebrating foreign days (such as Valentine's Day or Mothers Day) giving of flowers, standing up in honor of someone, celebrating birthdays (including the Prophet's), keeping or petting dogs. Some Wahhabi activists have warned against taking non-Muslims as friends, smiling at or wishing them well on their holidays.
Wahhabis are not in unanimous agreement on what is forbidden as sin. Some Wahhabi preachers or activists go further than the official Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars in forbidding (what they believe to be) sin. Juhayman al Utaybi declared football forbidden for a variety of reasons including it is a non-Muslim, foreign practice, because of the revealing uniforms and because of the foreign non-Muslim language used in matches.Mansour .the . In response, the Saudi Grand Mufti rebuked such and called on the religious police to prosecute its author.
According to senior Saudi scholars, Islam forbids the traveling or working outside the home by a woman without their husband's permissionpermission which may be revoked at any timeon the grounds that the different physiological structures and biological functions of the two sexes mean that each is assigned a distinctive role to play in the family. Sexual intercourse out of wedlock may be punished with flogging,
Despite this strictness, throughout these years senior Saudi scholars in the kingdom made exceptions in ruling on what is haram (forbidden). Foreign non-Muslim troops are forbidden in Arabia, except when the king needed them to confront Saddam Hussein in 1990; gender mixing of men and women is forbidden, and fraternization with non-Muslims is discouraged, but not at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). Until 2018, movie theaters and driving by women were forbidden, except at the ARAMCO compound in eastern Saudi, populated by workers for the company that provides almost all the government's revenue. The exceptions made at KAUST were also in effect at ARAMCO.House, Karen Elliott, On Saudi Arabia: Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future, Knopf, 2012, p. 9
More general rules of permissiveness changed over time. Ibn Saud imposed Wahhabi doctrines and practices "in a progressively gentler form" as his early 20th-century conquests expanded his state into urban areas, especially the Hejaz. After vigorous debate Wahhabi religious authorities in Saudi Arabia allowed the use of paper money (in 1951), the abolition of slavery (in 1962), education of females (1964), and use of television (1965). Music, the sound of which once might have led to summary execution, is now commonly heard on Saudi radios. Minarets for and use of funeral markers, which were once forbidden, are now allowed. Prayer attendance, which was once enforced by flogging, is no longer.
A "badge" of a particularly pious Wahhabi man is a robe too short to cover the ankle, an untrimmed beard,. and no cord ( Agal) to hold the head scarf in place. The warriors of the Wahhabi Ikhwan religious militia wore a white turban in place of an agal.
The movement is heavily influenced by the works of thirteenth-century Hanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya who rejected Kalam theology; and his disciple Ibn Qayyim who elaborated Ibn Taymiyya's ideals. Ibn Taymiyya's priority of ethics and worship over metaphysics, in particular, is readily accepted by Wahhäbis.
In a reply dated 2003, the Saudi Arabian government "has strenuously denied the above allegations", including claims that "their government exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education."
Throughout his letters and treatises, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb maintained that the military campaigns of the Emirate of Dirʿiyya were strictly defensive and rebuked his opponents as being the first to initiate Takfir. Justifying the Wahhabi military campaigns as defensive operations against their enemies, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab asserts:
This defensive approach to warfare largely got abandoned after Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's retirement in 1773. Emir Abdulaziz, Muhammad ibn Saud's son and successor, was an advocate of expansionist policy and launched offensive military campaigns. The excesses reported to have committed by soldiers of Emirate of Diriyah were regularly rebuked by the traditional Wahhabi Al ash-Sheikh (descendants of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab) who took care to condemn and religiously delegitimise . Condemning the military excesses committed during the Wahhabi conquest of Mecca in 1218–1803, Abdullah ibn Muhammad Al ash-Sheikh (1751–/AH 1164–1244) stated:
Although Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his son and successor 'Abdullah categorised various Shi'ite sects like Raafida, Zaydism, etc. as heretics and criticized many of their tenets, they had regarded them as Muslims. Abdullah's son, Sulayman () would articulate a new doctrine of Takfir which set the foundations for the excommunication of Shi'ites outside the pale of Islam. Sulayman's doctrines were revived by later scholars of the Muwahhidun like 'Abd al-Latif ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (1810–1876) during the Ottoman annexation of Al-Hasa in 1871. Hofuf was a Shi'ite majority area, and Ottoman invasion was assisted by the British. The Ottoman invasion had become a major danger to the Emirate of Nejd. From 1871, 'Abd al-Latif began to write tracts harshly condemning the Ottoman Turks, Shia Islam and British Empire as Mushrik and called upon Muslims to boycott them. Integrating the concept of Hijrah into his discourse of Takfir, 'Abd al-Latif also forbade Muslims to travel or stay in the lands of Ottomans, Rafida, British, etc. 'Abd al-Latif viewed the Shi'ite sects of his time as idolators and placed them outside the pale of Islam.
When he was asked on a religious matter, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab praised the pious Sufis, stating:
Scholars like Esther Peskes point to the cordial relations between the Muwahidun movement and the Sufi Sheikh Ahmad Ibn Idris and his followers in Mecca during the beginning of the 19th century; to aver that notions of absolute incompatibility between Sufism and Wahhabism are misleading. The early Wahhabi historiography had documented no mention that suggested any direct confrontations between Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and contemporary Sufis nor did it indicate that his activism was directed specifically against Sufism. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's reforms were not aimed against socio-religious orientations such as Sufism; but were directed against the status quo prevalent in Islamic societies. Thus his efforts attempted a general transformation of Islamic culture, including Sufis and non-Sufis; the elite as well as the commoners. This resulted in the widespread desacralisation of the public sphere that heralded the advent of a new socio-political model in Arabia.
Explaining the stance of early Wahhabis on Tasawwuf, Abdullah Aal al-Shaykh (), son of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab writes:
On the other hand, some influential Wahhabi clerics had also been noteworthy for issuing various archaic Fatwa such as declaring "that the sun orbited the Earth", and forbidding "women from riding bicycles on the grounds that they were "the devil's horses", and "from watching TV without veiling, just in case the presenters could see them through the screen". The most senior cleric in Saudi Arabia as of early 2022, Saleh Al-Fawzan, once issued a fatwa forbidding "all-you-can-eat buffets, because paying for a meal without knowing what you'll be eating is akin to gambling". Despite this, the contemporary Wahhabi religious framework has largely been able to maintain Saudi Arabia's global image as a pious society which is also aptly capable of addressing modern challenges.
To resolve the novel issues of the 20th century, King Ibn Saud appointed Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Aal Al-Shaykh () as the Grand Mufti in 1953 to head Dar al-Ifta, the legal body tasked with crafting Wahhabi juristic response to the novel problems faced by Arabian Muslims. In 1971, Dar al-Ifta was re-organized to include a larger number of elder scholars to boost its intellectual output. Dar al-Ifta headed by the Saudi Grand Mufti, consists of two agencies: i) Board of Senior Ulema (BSU) ii) Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions (C.R.L.O) Wahhabi scholars advocated a positive approach to embracing technology, political affairs, etc. while maintaining a traditional stance on social issues. Contemporary fatwas also demonstrate a receptive outlook on visual media, medical field, economic affairs, etc. Dar al-Ifta became an influential institution in Arabian society and it sought a balanced approach to modernity; positioning itself between religious idealism and varying societal, economic and material demands. As a result, some scholars like Fandy Mamoun have stated that "In Saudi Arabia, different times and different places exist at once. Saudi Arabia is both a pre-modern and a post-modern society." The legal approach is characterized by taking from all law schools ( Madhhab) through Scriptural precedents to sustain a legal system compatible with modernity.
In opposition to the Taqlid doctrine, Wahhabi scholars advocated the proof-evaluation theory which believes in the continuous appearance of absolute ( Mujtahid Mutlaq) and claims an
In the financial sector, Wahhabi approach is based on Islamic economics. Islamic banking system is encouraged and digital transactions like have been sanctioned. Employing the results from observatories to sight the monthly Crescent moon is today permitted and preferred by the clerics. In the medical field, various fatwas legalising novel procedures like corneal transplant, Autopsy, , etc. have been issued. In marital and gender-related issues, divorce is encouraged for incompitable marriages. On the issues of birth control, and family planning, the legal bodies are conservative and generally prohibit them, viewing them as a contrary to Quran commandments and Islamic principles to raise Muslim population. However, family planning measures are permitted in certain scenarios, wherein the legal principles of necessity are applicable. The Board of Senior Ulema (BSU) stated in a 1976 fatwa:
Historically, many established figures from Hanbalite and Shafiite schools were noteworthy for their denunciation of taqlid since the classical period. Influenced by these scholars, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, fervently denounced Taqlid and upheld that the Gates of Ijtihad remained open. According to Edward Mortimer, it was imitation of past judicial opinion in the face of clear contradictory evidence from hadith or Qur'anic text that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab condemned.Mortimer, Edward, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Vintage Books, 1982, p. 61 According to Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his followers, God's commandments to obey Him alone and follow the Prophetic teachings, necessitated a complete adherence to Qur'an and hadith. This entailed a rejection of all interpretations offered by the four legal schools – including the Muwahhidun
According to an expert on law in Saudi Arabia (Frank Vogel), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself "produced no unprecedented opinions". The "Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh rules at all, but over Aqidah, or theological positions". Professor of history at Dickinson College, David Commins also states that early disputes with other Muslims did not center on fiqh, and that the belief that the distinctive character of Wahhabism stems from Hanbali legal thought is a "myth".. Some scholars are ambivalent as to whether Wahhabis belong to the Hanbali legal school. The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World maintains Wahhabis "rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith". Cyril Glasse's The New Encyclopedia of Islam states that "strictly speaking", Wahhabis "do not see themselves as belonging to any school", and that in doing so they correspond to the ideal aimed at by Ibn Hanbal, and thus they can be said to be of his 'school'.Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam Altamira, 2001, p. 407 According to DeLong-Bas, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never directly claimed to be a Hanbali jurist, warned his followers about the dangers of adhering unquestionably to Fiqh, and did not consider "the opinion of any law school to be binding". In the absence of a hadith, he encouraged following the examples of the companions of Muhammad rather than following a law school.. He did, however, follow the Hanbali methodology of judging everything not explicitly forbidden to be permissible, avoiding the use of qiyas (analogical reasoning), and taking maslaha (public interest) and Adl (justice) into consideration.
The Wahhabi legal theory stipulated proof-evaluation based on Hanbali principles as one of its major hallmarks. By claiming themselves as Hanbali, Muwahhidun scholars implied directly adhering to the five Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of jurisprudence) of the Hanbali school. Despite the main methodology of Wahhabi movement being derived from Hanbalite Ahl al-Hadith, scholars also take the rulings from other Madhhabs, as long they regard them as being verified through Hadith and traditions or Sunnah authenticated by Sahabah. ( Qaul Sahabiyyah according to modern contemporary Muslim scholars). Prominent Wahhabi scholar Muhammad ibn Salih al-Uthaymeen derived rulings from the Shafiite jurisprudence in his commentary of The Meadows of the Righteous book authored by al-Nawawi, wherein the Ijtihad (reasoning) of Abu Hurairah was taken by al-Nawawi for rulings of Wudu (ablution ritual).
With the resurgence of rising Islah currents of Salafiyya across the Muslim world from the late 19th century, the Wahhabis of Najd too underwent a rejuvenation. After the establishment of the Saudi Arabia and Unification of Saudi Arabia, a Salafiyya Global movement would crystallise with the backing of a state. Ibn Saud's reforms would get criticism from zealots amongst some of his Wahhabi clergy-men; reminiscent of the 19th-century harshness. However, other Ulama would allow them, eventually paving way for gradual reforms in KSA. Thus, new education policies would be approved that taught foreign languages, sciences, geography, etc. Overruling the objections of Ikhwan, the Wahhabi ulema would permit the introduction of telegraph and other wireless communication systems. Soon after, oil industries would be developed with the discovery of petroleum. Influential clerics such as Mufti Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Aal ash-Shaykh would endorse female education.
He also believed that the Muslim ruler is owed unquestioned allegiance as a religious obligation from his subjects; so long as he leads the community according to the laws of God ( Sharia). A Muslim must present a bay'ah (oath of allegiance) to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death. Any counsel given to a ruler from community leaders or ulama should be private, not through public acts such as petitions, demonstrations, etc.. This principle caused confusion during the dynastic disputes of the Second Saudi State during the late 19th-century, when rebels succeeded in overthrowing the monarch, to become ruler.Struggle between designated heir Abdullah and his half brother Saud. While it gave the king a wide range of power, respecting shari'a does impose limits, such as giving qadi (Islamic judges) independence. This meant non-interference in their deliberations, as well as not codifying laws, following precedents or establishing a uniform system of law courtsboth of which violate the qadi's independence..
Wahhabis have traditionally given their allegiance to the House of Saud, but a movement of "Salafi jihadis" has emerged in the contemporary among those who believe that Al-Saud has abandoned the laws of God.. According to Zubair Qamar, while the "standard view" is that "Wahhabis are apolitical and do not oppose the State", there is another "strain" of Wahhabism that "found prominence among a group of Wahhabis after the fall of the second Saudi State in the 1800s", and post 9/11 is associated with Jordanian/Palestinian scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and "Wahhabi scholars of the 'Shu'aybi' school".
Wahhabis share the belief of Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Islamic dominion over politics and government and the importance of Dawah (proselytizing or preaching of Islam) not just towards non-Muslims but towards erroring Muslims. However Wahhabi preachers are conservative and do not deal with concepts such as social justice, anticolonialism, or economic equality, expounded upon by Islamist Muslims.. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's original pact promised whoever championed his message, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men'." While socio-political issues constituted a major aspect of his Islah programme, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab nonetheless didn't advocate revolutionary overthrowal of the ruling order to establish a Caliphate across the Muslim world. Following the classical Sunni understanding, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab advocated accommodation with the status quo, stating: 18th and 19th century European travellers, ambassadors and writers considered the Muwahhidun as championing an "Islamic revolution" that campaigned for a pristine Islam stripped of all complex rituals, cultural accretions, superstitions, etc. and a simpler creedal ethos based on universal brotherhood and fraternity; analogous to various European frondeurs during the Age of Revolutions. Contemporary European diplomats and observers who witnessed its emergence drew parallels with the American and French revolutions in Wahhabi opposition to Ottoman Empire clerical hierarchy and foreign imperialism; with some even labelling them as "Wahhabi " and its reformist efforts as a sort of "Protestantism".
Cambridge historian Christopher Allen Bayly noted that the religious movement of the Arabian Muwahhidun also had a revolutionary political programme comparable to the European revolutions in the 18th and 19th centuries. The difference lied in their political language; wherein themes of anti-imperialism, opposition to foreign aggression, promotion of civic values, Civic duties & Civic rights, etc. were conveyed to the local populace in terms of Islamic culture. Tracing the movement's popularity to the wider phenomenon of Ottoman decline, the far-reaching impacts of the French revolution on the Arab world; and deciphering the sudden collapse of its revolutionary Emirate to invasion by military despots of the old order; Bayly wrote:
The "boundaries" of Wahhabism have been called "difficult to pinpoint", but in contemporary usage, the terms " Wahhabi" and " Salafi" are sometimes used interchangeably, and they are considered to be movements with different roots that have merged since the 1960s.Stephane Lacroix, Al-Albani's Revolutionary Approach to Hadith . ISIM Review, Spring 2008, No. 21. However, Wahhabism is generally recognised as form of Salafi movement", contextualised as an ultra-conservative, Saudi brand of the wider movement. Muhammad Iqbal, praised the 18th-century Najdi movement as "the first throb of life in modern Islam", and noted that its influence on 19th-century religious reformers was "traceable, directly or indirectly in nearly all the great modern movements of Muslim Asia and Africa".
Peter Mandaville lists two more reasons:
According to French scholar and critic of Islamism Gilles Kepel, the tripling in the price of oil in the mid-1970s and the progressive takeover of Saudi Aramco in the 1974–1980 period, provided the source of much influence of Wahhabism in the Muslim World.
Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim world, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.Dawood al-Shirian, 'What Is Saudi Arabia Going to Do?' Al-Hayat, 19 May 2003 It extended to young and old, from children's madrasah to high-level scholarship.Abou al Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, HarperSanFrancisco, 2005, pp. 48–64 "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for. It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.Murphy, Caryle, Passion for Islam : Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, Simon and Schuster, 2002 p. 32 Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools". Apart from state patronage, a major source of proselytization has been the private charities and religious activities of Muslim individuals and organizations.
This financial aid has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian and Lee Kuan Yew, arguing that it caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam") to be perceived as the correct interpretationor the "gold standard" of Islamin many Muslims' minds.
Peter Mandaville asserts that the commonly reported data estimates regarding Saudi religious funding are unreliable due to the sources being "internally inconsistent" and based on "non-specific hearsay". According to Mandaville, the wide-ranging and controversial usage of the term "Wahhabism" has rendered researching Saudi religious transnationalism and assessing its actual magnitude even more confusing. Moreover, the post-Cold War era governments had commonly used the label "Wahhabism" to designate a wide swathe of religious sects, including those which were doctrinally at odds with Wahhabism.
The Yemeni origins of the Bin Laden family also reflected a non-Wahhabi heritage. Bin Laden's feud with the Saudi government intensified during the Gulf War; prompting Saudi authorities to place Bin Laden under house arrest in 1991, before exiling him the same year. In 1994, Saudi Arabia revoked Bin Laden's citizenship and froze all his assets, turning him into a fugitive and the Bin Laden family disowned him. After Saudi pressure on Sudan, the Al-Qaeda leader sought refuge under the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Taliban's denial of Saudi requests to extradite Bin Laden led to a diplomatic row between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. Throughout the 1990s, mainstream Wahhabi clerics in the Kingdom supported US-Saudi alliance against Ba'athist Iraq during the Gulf War and condemned terrorist acts by Al-Qaeda. Anti-establishment Wahhabi scholars have also been vehemently opposed to tactics advocated by Bin Laden, not withstanding their opposition to American foreign policy in West Asia. Scholars like Professor F. Gregory Gause have strongly opposed hysterical assertions made by in the Bush administration, contrasting their portrayals of Wahhabism with attempts made by far-right militants to appropriate American patriotism.
According to M. Reza Pirbhai, Associate Professor of History at Georgetown University, notions of a "Wahhabi conspiracy" against the Western world have in recent times resurfaced in various sections of the Western media; employing the term as a catch-all phrase to frame an official narrative that erases the concerns of broad and disparate disenchanted groups pursuing redress for local discontentment caused by Neocolonialism. The earliest mention of "Wahhabism" in The New York Times had appeared in a 1931 editorial which described it as a "traditional" movement; without associating it with "militant" or "anti-Western" trends. Between 1931 and 2007, The New York Times published eighty-six articles that mentioned the word "Wahhabism", out of which six articles had appeared before September 2001, while the rest were published since. During the 1990s, it began to be described as "militant", but not yet as a hostile force. By the 2000s, the 19th century terminology of "Wahhabism" had resurfaced, reprising its role as the " 'fanatical' and 'despotic' antithesis of a civilized world. Reza Pirbhai asserts that this use is deployed to manufacture an official narrative that assists imperial purposes by depicting a coherent and coordinated international network of ideological revolutionaries. Common neo-liberal depictions of Wahhabism define it as a collection of restrictive dogmas, particularly for women, while Neoconservatism depictions portray "Wahhabis" as "savages" or "fanatics".
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's brother allegedly wrote a book in refutation of his brother's new teachings, called: "The Final Word from the Qur'an, the Hadith, and the Sayings of the Scholars Concerning the School of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab", also known as: "Al-Sawa`iq al-Ilahiyya fi Madhhab al-Wahhabiyya" ("The Divine Thunderbolts Concerning the Wahhabi School"). It has been reported that his brother repented and eventually returned to his call...
In "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932", Hamadi Redissi provides original references to the description of Wahhabis as a divisive sect ( firqa) and outliers ( Kharijites) in communications between Ottoman Empire and Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali. Redissi details refutations of Wahhabis by scholars (); among them Ahmed Barakat Tandatawin, who in 1743 describes Wahhabism as ignorance ( Jahala).
In the 18th century, prominent Ottoman Empire Hanafi scholar Ibn Abidin declared the Wahhabi movement of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab to be a modern-day manifestation of the Kharijites.Khaled Abou El Fadl, "9/11 and the Muslim Transformation". Taken from "September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment?", p. 87. Ed. Mary L. Dudziak. Durham: Duke University Press 2003. He said:
The followers of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab considered the ideas of the Hanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyyah () highly attractive and made him their central classical scholarly reference. However, for centuries Ibn Taymiyya's thoughts were mostly ignored by those who constituted the scholarly mainstream; who would accuse the Wahhabis for overemphasizing the scholarly works of Ibn Taymiyya. It was only during the 19th century that Ibn Taymiyya came to exercise prominent scholarly influence over Muslim youth and by the 20th century he would be a major reference for Islamic revolutionaries. On the other hand, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab would deny that he had bias towards Ibn Taymiyya; and states in Hadiyya al-Thaniyya:
Another early rebuttal of Wahhabism came from the Sunni Sufism jurist Ibn Jirjis, who argued that supplicating the saints is permitted to whoever "declares that there is no god but God and prays toward Mecca" for, according to him, supplicating the saints is not a form of worship but merely calling out to them, and that worship at graves is not idolatry unless the supplicant believes that buried saints have the power to determine the course of events. These arguments were specifically rejected as heretical by the Wahhabi leader at the time.
Salafi scholar Bilal Philips asserted that the charge of "Wahhabi" was deployed by the proponents of Madhhab fanaticism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to Takfir (excommunicate) the legal Ghair muqallid. According to Philips:
Syrians-Egyptians Islamic revivalist scholar Muhammad Rashid Rida was one of the most influential supporters of the Wahhabi movement during the 20th century. Rida had developed favourable views towards the Wahhabis as early as his arrival in Egypt during the 1890s; after reading about the movement in the histories of Al-Jabartī and Al-Nāṣiri. Rida asserted that the social and military expansion of the Wahhabi movement could successfully launch an authentic Islamic revival throughout the Muslim world. Rida believed that the decline of Muslims was a result of the stagnation caused by the excesses of Sufism; which had distorted the pristine message of Islam. As a leading figure of the Salafi movement,Daniel Ungureanu, Wahhabism, Salafism and the Expansion of Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology, p146. Rida launched his project of re-habilitating WahhabismRashid Rida, al-Manar, vol 8. No. 731, 732. and would popularise Najdi scholarly treatises across the Muslim World through his Al-Manar printing press.
Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, had openly expressed his view in his book Dibawah bendera revolusi, that the progressive Tajdid movement by Wahhabis was essentially a positive influence on Islam globally, particularly in developing nations struggling to gain independence. Sukarno also appreciated the "wisdom of Ibn Saud to support Wahhabi scholars in their effort to reject various one thousand one kind of Bidʻah". It is argued by some that Sukarno was also influenced by Islamist figures such as Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi, Agus Salim, and particularly Hamka, his elementary teacher.
According to notable Arab Linguist Taha Hussein (1889–), the Wahhabi movement was new, yet simultaneously old. Although it was novel for its contemporary generations, it was also ancient in its powerful calls for return to a pure Islam untainted by the impurities of Shirk (polytheism). Acclaiming its role in the Nahda and intellectual renewal, Taha Hussein states:
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