Teleology (from , and )Partridge, Eric. 1977. Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English. London: Routledge, p. 4187. or finalityDubray, Charles. 2020 1912. " Teleology". In The Catholic Encyclopedia 14. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Retrieved 3 May 2020. – via New Advent, transcribed by D. J. Potter is a branch of causality giving the reason or an explanation for something as a function of its end, its purpose, or its goal, as opposed to as a function of its cause. James Wood, in his Nuttall Encyclopaedia, explained the meaning of teleology as "the doctrine of final causes, particularly the argument for the being and character of God from the being and character of His works; that the end reveals His purpose from the beginning, the end being regarded as the thought of God at the beginning, or the universe viewed as the realisation of Him and His eternal purpose."
A purpose that is imposed by human use, such as the purpose of a fork to hold food, is called extrinsic. Natural teleology, common in classical philosophy, though controversial today, contends that natural entities also have intrinsic purposes, regardless of human use or opinion. For instance, Aristotle claimed that an acorn's intrinsic telos is to become a fully grown oak tree.Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1050a9–17 Though ancient rejected the notion of natural teleology, teleological accounts of non-personal or non-human nature were explored and often endorsed in ancient and medieval philosophies, but fell into disfavor during the modern era (1600–1900).
Socrates here argues that while the materials that compose a body are necessary conditions for its moving or acting in a certain way, they nevertheless cannot be the sufficient condition for its moving or acting as it does. For example, if Socrates is sitting in an Athenian prison, the elasticity of his tendons is what allows him to be sitting, and so a physical description of his tendons can be listed as necessary conditions or auxiliary causes of his act of sitting. Phaedo, Plato, 99b Timaeus, Plato, 46c9–d4, 69e6. However, these are only necessary conditions of Socrates' sitting. To give a physical description of Socrates' body is to say that Socrates is sitting, but it does not give any idea why it came to be that he was sitting in the first place. To say why he was sitting and not not sitting, it is necessary to explain what it is about his sitting that is good, for all things brought about (i.e., all products of actions) are brought about because the actor saw some good in them. Thus, to give an explanation of something is to determine what about it is good. Its goodness is its actual cause—its purpose, telos or 'reason for which'. Timaeus, Plato, 27d8–29a.
In Physics, using the Hylomorphism, (using eternal Platonic form as his model), Aristotle rejects Plato's assumption that the universe was created by an intelligent designer. For Aristotle, natural ends are produced by "natures" (principles of change internal to living things), and natures, Aristotle argued, do not deliberate:Hardie, R. P., and R. K. Gaye, trans. 2007. "Aristotle – Physics". pp. 602–852 in Aristotle - Works, edited by W. D. Ross. Internet Archive (open source full text). pp. –644, .
These Platonic and Aristotelian arguments ran counter to those presented earlier by Democritus and later by Lucretius, both of whom were supporters of what is now often called accidentalism:
But while science was doing a great job at explaining natural phenomena, it stopped short from explaining how life develops. In the late 18th century, Immanuel Kant acknowledged this shortcoming in his Critique of Judgement:
The chief instance, and the largest polemic morass, of teleological viewpoint in modern cosmology and ontology is the teleological argument that posits an intelligent designer as a god.
Against this postmodern position, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that a narrative understanding of oneself, of one's capacity as an independent reasoner, one's dependence on others and on the social practices and traditions in which one participates, all tend towards an ultimate good of liberation. Social practices may themselves be understood as teleologically oriented to internal goods, for example, practices of philosophical and scientific inquiry are teleologically ordered to the elaboration of a true understanding of their objects. MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) famously dismissed the naturalistic teleology of Aristotle's "metaphysical biology", but he has cautiously moved from that book's account of a sociological teleology toward an exploration of what remains valid in a more traditional teleological naturalism.
In the classical notion, teleology is grounded in the inherent nature of things themselves, whereas in consequentialism, teleology is imposed on nature from outside by the human will. Consequentialist theories justify inherently what most people would call evil acts by their desirable outcomes, if the good of the outcome outweighs the bad of the act. So, for example, a consequentialist theory would say it was acceptable to kill one person in order to save two or more other people. These theories may be summarized by the maxim "."
In deontological ethics, the goodness or badness of individual acts is primary and a larger, more desirable goal is insufficient to justify bad acts committed on the way to that goal, even if the bad acts are relatively minor and the goal is major (like telling a small lie to prevent a war and save millions of lives). In requiring all constituent acts to be good, deontological ethics is much more rigid than consequentialism, which varies by circumstance.
Practical ethics are usually a mix of the two. For example, Mill also relies on deontic maxims to guide practical behavior, but they must be justifiable by the principle of utility.
Assuming reason and action to be predominantly influenced by ideological credence, Mises derived his portrayal of human motivation from Epicureanism, insofar as he assumes "atomistic individualism, teleology, and libertarianism, and defines man as an egoist who seeks a maximum of happiness" (i.e. the ultimate pursuit of pleasure over pain).Gonce, R. A. Natural Law and Ludwig von Mises' Praxeology and Economic Science. Chattanooga, TN: Southern Economic Association. "Man strives for," Mises remarks, "but never attains the perfect state of happiness described by Epicurus." Furthermore, expanding upon the Epicurean groundwork, Mises formalized his conception of pleasure and pain by assigning each specific meaning, allowing him to extrapolate his conception of attainable happiness to a critique of liberal versus socialist ideological societies. It is there, in his application of Epicurean belief to political theory, that Mises flouts Marxist theory, considering labor to be one of many of man's 'pains', a consideration which positioned labor as a violation of his original Epicurean assumption of man's manifest hedonistic pursuit. From here he further postulates a critical distinction between introversive labor and extroversive labor, further divaricating from basic Marxist theory, in which Marx hails labor as man's "species-essence", or his "species-activity".Berki, R. N. On the Nature and Origins of Marx's Concept of Labor. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Since the Novum Organum of Francis Bacon, teleological explanations in physical science tend to be deliberately avoided in favor of focus on material and efficient explanations, although some recent accounts of quantum phenomena make use of teleology. Final and formal causation came to be viewed as false or too subjective."The received intellectual tradition has it that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, revolutionary philosophers began to curtail and reject the teleology of the medieval and scholastic Aristotelians, abandoning final causes in favor of a purely mechanistic model of the Universe."
. pp. 23–24.
Contemporary philosophers and scientists still debate whether teleological are useful or accurate in proposing modern philosophies and scientific theories. An example of the reintroduction of teleology into modern language is the notion of an attractor.von Foerster, Heinz. 1992. "Cybernetics". p. 310 in Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence 1, edited by S. C. Shapiro. . Another instance is when Thomas Nagel (2012), though not a biologist, proposed a non-Darwinism account of evolution that incorporates impersonal and natural teleological laws to explain the existence of life, consciousness, rationality, and objective value.Thomas Nagel 2012. Mind and Cosmos. Oxford University Press. Regardless, the accuracy can also be considered independently from the usefulness: it is a common experience in pedagogy that a minimum of apparent teleology can be useful in thinking about and explaining Darwinian evolution even if there is no true teleology driving evolution. Thus it is easier to say that evolution "gave" wolves sharp canine tooth because those teeth "serve the purpose of" predation regardless of whether there is an underlying non-teleologic reality in which evolution is not an actor with intentions. In other words, because human cognition and learning often rely on the narrative structure of stories – with actors, goals, and immediate (proximate) rather than ultimate (distal) causation (see also proximate and ultimate causation) – some minimal level of teleology might be recognized as useful or at least tolerable for practical purposes even by people who reject its cosmology accuracy. Its accuracy is upheld by Barrow and Tipler (1986), whose citations of such teleologists as Max Planck and Norbert Wiener are significant for scientific endeavor.Barrow, John D., and Frank J. Tipler. 1986. The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. New York: Oxford University Press. .
Statements implying that nature has goals, for example where a species is said to do something "in order to" achieve survival appear teleological, and therefore invalid. Usually, it is possible to rewrite such sentences to avoid the apparent teleology. Some biology courses have incorporated exercises requiring students to rephrase such sentences so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless, biologists still frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even if that is not the intention. John Reiss argues that evolutionary biology can be purged of such teleology by rejecting the analogy of natural selection as a watchmaker.Reiss, John O. 2009. Not by Design: Retiring Darwin's Watchmaker. Berkeley: University of California Press. Other arguments against this analogy have also been promoted by writers such as Richard Dawkins.Richard Dawkins. 1987. The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design. New York: W W Norton & Company.
Some authors, like James Lennox, have argued that Charles Darwin was a teleologist,Lennox, James G. (1993). "Darwin was a Teleologist". Biology & Philosophy 8:409–21. while others, such as Michael Ghiselin, describe this claim as a myth promoted by misinterpretations of his discussions and emphasized the distinction between using teleological metaphors and being teleological.
Biologist philosopher Francisco Ayala has argued that all statements about processes can be trivially translated into teleological statements, and vice versa, but that teleological statements are more explanatory and cannot be disposed of.Ayala, Francisco (1998). "Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology". Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. Cambridge: MIT Press. Karen Neander has argued that the modern concept of biological 'function' is dependent upon selection. So, for example, it is not possible to say that anything that simply winks into existence without going through a process of selection has functions. We decide whether an appendage has a function by analysing the process of selection that led to it. Therefore, any talk of functions must be posterior to natural selection and function cannot be defined in the manner advocated by Reiss and Dawkins.Karen Neander. 1998. "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense". pp. 313–333 in Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology, edited by C. Allen, M. Bekoff, and G. Lauder. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ernst Mayr states that "adaptedness ... is an a posteriori result rather than an a priori goal-seeking".Ernst Mayr 1992. "The idea of teleology". Journal of the History of Ideas 53:117–35. Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, Simon Hugh Piper Maddrell writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation may substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection".Madrell, S. H. P. 1998. "Why are there no insects in the open sea?" The Journal of Experimental Biology 201:2461–64. Likewise, J. B. S. Haldane says, "Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he's unwilling to be seen with her in public."Hull, D. 1973. Philosophy of Biological Science, Foundations of Philosophy Series. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Ernst Mayr. 1974. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science XIV pp. 91–117.
Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow had conceived of feedback as lending a teleology to machinery. Wiener coined the term cybernetics to denote the study of "teleological mechanisms".Norbert Wiener. 1948. . In the cybernetic classification presented by Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow, teleology is feedback controlled purpose.
The classification system underlying cybernetics has been criticized by Frank Honywill George and Les Johnson, who cite the need for an external observability to the purposeful behavior in order to establish and validate the goal-seeking behavior. In this view, the purpose of observing and observed systems is respectively distinguished by the system's subjective autonomy and objective control.
Postmodern philosophy
Ethics
Consequentialism
Deontology
Economics
Science
Biology
Cybernetics
See also
Notes
Citations
Further reading
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