Sthiramati (Sanskrit; Chinese: Anhui 安慧, and Jianhui 堅慧; Standard Tibetan: Blo gros brtan pa) was a 6th-century Buddhism scholar-monk.Edelglass, W., Harter, P.-J., & McClintock, S. (Eds.). (2022). The Routledge Handbook of Indian Buddhist Philosophy (1st ed.), Chapter 22, STHIRAMATI, A Yogācāra Commentator and Innovator (pp. 376-392). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351030908 Sthiramati was a student of a Yogacara scholar named Gunamati, and he was also a contemporary of another 6th century Yogācāra scholar, Dharmapala of Nālandā. Sthiramati is connected with Valābhi university (present-day Gujarat), and also with Nalanda. Evidence from two inscriptions indicate that a figure named Sthiramati founded a monastery at Valābhi.
Sthiramati is mainly known for his numerous commentaries to Yogacara and Abhidharma works which synthesized a varied tradition into a more coherent system.
One of Sthiramati's innovative contributions is his theory of meaning found in his Triṃśikā-bhāṣya. According to Sthiramati, all language use is figurative or Metaphor (Sanskrit: upacāra). Drawing on a passage in Vasubandhu, Sthiramati argues that all phenomena (dharmas) are mere mental appearances (nirbhāsa), i.e. mental representations (vijñapti). As such, no word can relate to an objectively existent phenomena (since no such thing exists). Words are only related to constructed mental appearances which come from the dependently arisen transformation of consciousness (vijñāna-pariṇāma). These phenomena deceptively appear as objectively existent things, but are ultimately unreal, like Optical illusion. Thus, no words have an objective referent, and thus all language is necessarily figurative, a theory that has been termed pan-figurative or pan-metaphorical.
Sthiramati's philosophy is one of various attempts to systematize and develop Yogācāra Buddhism. His system differed from that of other Yogācāra thinkers of his time, like Dharmapala of Nalanda, in various ways. Their varying interpretations are also discussed in Xuanzang (7th century) Chéng Wéishì Lùn. One point of contention was the status of the dependent nature. Sthiramati thought that the dependent nature was characterized by duality (of subject-object), which is the result of false imagination. So for Sthiramati, the dependent nature is empty and not ultimately real. In Sthiramati's system, the only thing that has real existence (dravyasat) is "the bare reality, free from the differentiation into subject and object".Williams, Paul. Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, p. 93. Routledge, 2008. This is the true essence of the dependent nature (i.e. the perfected nature). Because of this, Sthiramati's view has also been compared to the Nirākāravāda ("false aspectarian") view of Yogācāra by modern scholars, since he holds that all mental images are unreal and false.Zhihua Yao. The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cognition, pp. 149-150. Routledge, 2012.Kajiyama, Yuichi. “Controversy between the sakara- and nirakara-vadins of the Yogacara school-some materials.” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 14 (1965): n. pag. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Controversy-between-the-sakara-and-nirakara-vadins-Kajiyama/655a1f561c18725188c0916ca05ec334b5f9f7cd
Meanwhile, in Dharmapala's system, the dependent nature is the basis or pivot for both the imagined nature (if the dependent nature is discriminated dualistically) and the perfected nature (if duality is removed). For him, the dependent nature is both empty in one sense (when it is falsely discriminated) but also not-empty is another sense (in its true non-dual structure). Thus, for Dharmapala, the dependent nature and the perfected nature are both real, and they are also understood as being neither the same nor different.Cua, Antonio S.. Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy, "Xuanzang" pp. 814-818. Routledge, 2013. Because of this, Dharmapala's view has been seen as prefiguring the Sākāravāda view.
Another disagreement between these two leading Yogācāra interpretations was their understandings of the doctrine of the transformation of consciousness (vijñāna-pariṇāma). According to some Yogācāra thinkers, consciousness transforms into various aspects: the seeing aspect (darśana-bhāga, i.e. subjectivity), the objective aspect (nimitta-bhāga, i.e. all objects of experience), the self-reflexive or self-knowing aspect (saṃvitti-bhāga, a division introduced by Dignaga), and (in Dharmapala's system), awareness of self-awareness (svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti).Lal Mani Joshi. Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India During the 7th and 8th Centuries A.D. pp. 180-182. Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1977. For Dharmapala, these four divisions were seen as working simultaneously to give rise to experience. However, Sthiramati's system only accepts the first three divisions. Furthermore, for Sthiramati, the first two divisions are imagined and ultimately unreal, while only the self-reflexive aspect is ultimately real.Gelong Lodro Sangpo & Gelongma Migme Chodron. Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi: A Commentary (Chéng Wéishì Lùn) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā by Xuanzang, p. 34 (Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti: Introduction to the Cheng Weishi Lun). Motilal Banarsidass, 2017. Thus, in Sthiramati's system, there is truly only one aspect (bhāga), one single dynamic self-aware consciousness in which causes and effects arise moment by moment.
The view outlined above is the traditional understanding of Sthiramati's philosophy in Chinese Yogācāra scholasticism. Some modern scholars like Hidenori Sakuma have questioned theis tradition understanding of Sthiramati's Yogācāra views due to a lack of primary source evidence. Sakuma argues that this view derives from the work of Kuiji, and that this is unreliable.Sakuma, Hidenori. "Was There Really Only One Commentator Named Sthiramati?" Studies In Philosophy 45. 212(39)-190(61), 2020-03-28, http://doi.org/10.15068/00159942
Furthermore, Sakuma also argues that it is likely there were different Indian commentators whose work later became conflated into one figure named "Sthiramati".
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