According to historian Thierry Bianquis, Rifq "had his hour of glory in the reign of Caliph Ali az-Zahir in 1024".Bianquis 1989, p. 559. He acquired a reputation as a loyal officer and commanded policing expeditions in the countryside, including the Nile Delta.Bianquis 1989, p. 394. He was relieved of command from operations in the Delta as a result of a dispute between him and Mi'dad, another black eunuch and qa'id (general) of the Fatimid royal regiment. During the early part of Caliph al-Mustansir's reign, Rifq managed the royal palace and supervised the Oghuz Turks regiment of the army.
According to an anecdote cited by al-Musabbihi, Rifq was once consulted by an Egyptian Christian man whose Muslim convert son was arrested by the authorities for adorning Christian symbols, an apparent act of apostasy. Rifq advised the man, with whom he had business dealings, to have his son feign insanity to avoid being convicted as an apostate, a capital offense in Fatimid Egypt.
Rifq was endowed amir al-umara (commander of commanders), along with the additional titles of al-muzaffar ("the victorious"), fakhr al-mulk ("glory of the realm"), and ʿumdat al-dawla wa-ʿimāduhā ("mainstay and pillar of the dynasty"). Before he departed, he was bade farewell by the caliph at the outskirts of Cairo. The army he headed consisted of 30,000 troops, according to Ibn Muyassar, and was composed of Berbers, Turks and Black Africans; these regiments were not only diverse, but often antagonistic as they competed for influence within the Fatimid military and court.
Rifq halted his army at al-Ramla in Palestine after meeting with a Byzantine Empire envoy with a message from Emperor Constantine IX advising al-Mustansir to reconcile with Thimal; if the Fatimids continued their expedition, the emperor promised to give his backing to Thimal, who was a formal vassal of Byzantium.Zakkar 1971, p. 144. Rifq sent the Byzantine envoy to Cairo and waited for further instructions. Al-Mustansir's vizier, Abu'l-Barakat al-Jarjara'i, delayed the return of the envoy and ordered Rifq to hasten the conquest of Aleppo, intending it to be a crafty response to Emperor Constantine's appeal and warning.Zakkar 1971, pp. 144–145.
Before he could depart from al-Ramla, Rifq's army became bogged down in raids by the Banu Tayy, a large Bedouin tribe from the area, which seized part of Rifq's equipment and supplies.Zakkar 1971, p. 145. Instead of attacking the Tayy, Rifq found himself obliged to pay and recruit them as mercenaries. As he continued toward Damascus, he was forced to make similar arrangements with the Banu Kalb and Banu Fazara tribes. The incorporation of Bedouin mercenaries exacerbated the factional tensions within his army, leading to quarrels and infighting between the various regiments, some of whom launched looting raids in the Damascene countryside.
The Fatimid army eventually came together and moved north, capturing Homs then Hama; in both cities, quarreling between the factions took place and Rifq was forced to recruit more local forces. On 24 August 1049, he reached the suburbs of Aleppo "in very bad shape", according to Zakkar. Thimal had long prepared the city's defenses and his forces consisted of his Banu Kilab tribesmen and the city's inhabitants. He was also sent funds from Constantine and had the backing of Antioch-based Byzantine troops on standby.
The following morning, Rifq and a handful of his soldiers, were captured by Thimal's Bedouin horsemen and taken to Aleppo. At some point, Rifq was wounded in the head, causing him to be in a daze before dying on 30 August. In Zakkar's assessment, "There is no doubt that al-Munstansir built great hopes on the success of this army ... Rifq, who was appointed to lead the expedition, was incompetent ... and, as it proved, lacked military knowledge."Zakkar 1971, pp. 143–144.
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