Hugh Dowding

 ( 1882 Births ) 

Dowding lacked tact when it came to dealing with politicians, and right from the onset he did not get along well with Churchill. The British historian Len Deighton wrote: "But Dowding was no paragon. Too often he resorted to caustic comments when a kind word of advice would have produced the same or better results...Dowding was indifferent to the boardroom politics of higher office, impatient and abrasive to men who failed to understand his reasoning". Just before a cabinet meeting on 15 May 1940, Dowding protested before an informal committee that consisted of Churchill; the minister of aircraft production, Lord Beaverbrook and the Air Minister Sir Archibald Sinclair that the number of fighter squadrons available to Fighter Command had been reduced from 52 to 36, and at present rate of losses in France, he would have no squadrons available within two weeks. Dowding attended the subsequent cabinet meeting, but did not speak. The meeting ended with the cabinet voting to send four more squadrons to France. On 16 May 1940, Churchill held a summit In Paris with the French Premier Paul Reynaud, and telephoned London afterwards to ask for six more fighter squadrons to be sent to France. At a cabinet meeting late in the afternoon of the same day, Sinclair mentioned Dowding's argument, which led to the cabinet to agree that the additional six squadrons could operate from French airfields in the day, but had to return to the United Kingdom at night. Churchill was angered by the way that Dowding's arguments had swayed the cabinet into a decision that he did not want and came to feel a grudge against Dowding. In a clear sign of disfavour, Churchill barely mentioned Dowding in Their Finest Hour, volume 2 of his memoirs/history of the Second World, and in the few times that he did, he gave distorted accounts that cast Dowding in a dark light. In Their Finest Hour, Churchill wrote: "Air Chief Marshal Dowding, at the head of the metropolitan Fighter Command, had declared to me that with twenty-five squadrons of fighters he could defend the island against the whole of the German Air Force, but that with less he would be overpowered". Deighton wrote that this statement was "nonsense" as Dowding in a letter to Churchill dated 15 May 1940 had expressed grave concerns about the ability of Fighter Command to hold out against the Luftwaffe with only thirty-six squadrons. When the Allied resistance in France collapsed, he worked closely with Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, the commander of 11 Fighter Group, in organising cover for the Operation Dynamo of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk.

Through the summer and autumn of 1940 in the Battle of Britain, Dowding's Fighter Command resisted the attacks of the Luftwaffe. Beyond the critical importance of the overall system of integrated air defence which he had developed for Fighter Command, his major contribution was to marshal resources behind the scenes (including replacement aircraft and air crew) and to maintain a significant fighter reserve, while leaving his subordinate commanders' hands largely free to run the battle in detail. The first phase of the Battle of Britain, namely Luftwaffe attacks on British shipping in the English Channel were what Deighton called a classic "heads I win, tails you lose" gambit. If Dowding committed his fighters at the near-range of German aircraft, he risked having the strength of Fighter Command reduced via attrition while he did not think the Luftwaffe would sink the merchantmen. Because of a shortage of pilots, Dowding only committed the minimal number of fighters during what the Germans called the Kanalkampf (Channel battle), which led to increased shipping losses in July–August 1940. He was forced to commit more fighter squadrons close to the coast even though he knew it was highly dangerous. The Luftwaffe planes were already flying at the optimal height over the Channel while it took time for the British fighters taking off at coastal airfields to reach the proper flying height, which thereby gave the Luftwaffe the advantage in any dogfights over the Channel. An additional concern for Dowding was that the planes of Fighter Command had no dinghies or sea dye while Britain at this point lacked an air-sea rescue organisation, so that any pilot shot down over the Channel were more likely than not to be lost. As more colliers were sunk in the Channel while Fighter Command losses increased, Dowding stoutly resisted pressure to send more fighters in the Kanalkampf and instead urged that more trains be used to move coal from Wales to London. By end of July 1940, Fighter Command had lost 145 aircraft in the Kanalkampf. Dowding had an influential patron in the form of Lord Beaverbrook, who became fond of him, all the more so because the civil servants of the Air Ministry disliked Dowding. On a more personal note, Beaverbrook's son, Maxwell Aitken, was serving in Fighter Command and Beaverbrook decided that Dowding with his concern for the lives of his pilots was the best man to keep his son alive.

British aircraft production continued at a brisk rate and it was the loss of pilots that was most concerning to Dowding. It took nearly a year to train a pilot to properly fly an aircraft, and the losses of pilots in the Battle of Britain imposed immense strain on Fighter Command, all the more so because the remaining pilots were forced to fly more to replace those killed or wounded. The majority of the 3,000 pilots under Dowding's command, namely 80% were British, but the fighter squadrons sent from the Commonwealth along with squadrons of emigres from Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, and Belgium were greatly appreciated to help ease the strain imposed by Fighter Command's losses. In early August 1940, Dowding learned via Ultra intelligence that the Luftwaffe was preparing for Adlertag (Eagle Day) set for 13 August 1940, which was intended to be a series of aerial attacks to win command of the sky. Eagle Day failed to achieve its stated goals as Fighter Command lost 34 planes in aerial combat while another 16 destroyed on the ground while shooting down 75 German planes. Eagle Day came to be known in the Luftwaffe as " der schwarze Donnerstag"" ("the black Thursday") owning to the heavy losses taken. During the fighting on Eagle Day, Dowding observed that the Luftwaffe bombers were no match for the Spitfires and Hurricanes, and that German bombers could only operate in the day with the escort of Bf-109 fighters. As the Bf-109 fighters could only fly over south-eastern England owing to their fuel ranges, it was possible to move RAF fighters to airfields out of range for the Bf-109s, which provided a respite of sorts for Fighter Command. Dowding noted that the grim irony that the more successful Fighter Command was at shooting down Luftwaffe bombers during the day, the more likely it was that the Luftwaffe would switch over to bombing by night, a course that Fighter Command was not prepared for. It was also during Eagle Day that Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the GOC of 12 Group, started to become increasing vocal in expressing criticism of Park for not adopting his favoured "big wing" tactics of forming up a large wing of fighters as Park much preferred to send in fighters in looser, informal small groups. Leigh-Mallory also started to attack Dowding for not imposing the "big wing" tactics upon all of Fighter Command. The requirement that not all of Fighter Command's planes be on the ground being fuelled and armed led Dowding to commit small groups to attack the Luftwaffe bombers and their fighter escorts in waves. It was during the summer of 1940 that Dowding first learned of the Knickebein (literally "dog-leg") radio beam system, which guided Luftwaffe bombers to their targets during the night. The British called the Knickebein radio guidance system "headache" and called their electronic jamming countermeasures "aspirins". Owing to the threat posed by bombers guided by the Knickebein radio beams, Dowding ordered that electronic jamming of the radio beams be made a priority.

By late August 1940, Dowding was seriously concerned about Fighter Command's losses along with a decline in pilot quality as the RAF was forced to transfer pilots from Bomber Command and Coastal Command to Fighter Command and training was degraded to allow more pilots to graduate on a shortened training course. The great advantage for Fighter Command in August 1940 was that Dowding rotated his fighter squadrons to give his pilots a rest while the opposing German commanders, Albert Kesselring and Hugo Sperrle, did not. On 1 September 1940, Dowding realised that the losses taken during the fighting in July–August 1940 was such that there were no more squadrons to rotate into the area of 11 Group of Fighter Command, which always endured the most heavy fighting. That day, Dowding took what he called "a desperate expedient" of breaking the squadrons into A, B and C types. The A type squadrons stationed in 11 Group were to continue to defend south-eastern England; the B type squadrons in 10 and 12 Groups were to relieve the A squadrons and the C type squadrons stationed elsewhere were to serve as training units, feeding new pilots into the A squadrons as needed. On 3 September 1940, Dowding reported to Churchill that 25% of all Fighter Command's pilots had been lost since the beginning of the Battle of Britain on top of the losses taken in France in the spring, and at current rate of losses Fighter Command would not be able to last much longer. Dowding also noted that about a quarter of his pilots were new pilots who had just graduated from the Operational Training Units who had less than two weeks' flying experience. Hermann Göring took personal charge of the Luftwaffe forces attacking Britain and on 7 September 1940 dispatched a huge force of 1,000 bombers to strike London. That day, Dowding was having a meeting with Park, when he learned via reports from radar operators of the bomber force heading towards London. During the fighting on 7 September, the "Big Wing" tactics favoured by Trafford Leigh-Mallory of 12 Group failed as it took too long to form up the "big wing" while Park's tactics proved superior as 11 Group actually met the Luftwaffe. On 9 September 1940, Göring dispatched another huge bombing raid on London, which met with fierce resistance from 11 Group. Deighton wrote: "Park's handling of the fighting of 9 September was as brilliant as any in the war. Virtually none of the German bombers achieved hits on its primary target".

Dowding received advance notice via Ultra intelligence of another large German raid scheduled for 15 September 1940. Park planned to attack the Luftwaffe both on its way to London and back, which forced his ground crews to work in record time to refuel and rearm his fighters as they landed after attacking the bombers on their way to London. The aerial battles on 15 September 1940 saw about 300 RAF fighters take on 400 Luftwaffe fighters. The Luftwaffe lost about 50 aircraft which convinced its commanders that Fighter Command possessed deeper reserves of pilots than what the RAF actually possessed. Churchill's speech on the radio that evening claimed: "Aided by Czech and Polish squadrons and using only a small proportion of their total strength, the Royal Air Force cut to rags and tatters separate waves of murderous assault upon the civil population of their native land". Fighter Command did not win command of the sky as the Luftwaffe continued to bomb Britain long after the battle of 15 September 1940, but the mere fact that Fighter Command had prevented the Luftwaffe from gaining command of the sky was sufficient to win the Battle of Britain. In an operational sense, Dowding had fought the Luftwaffe to a draw, but in strategical sense the battle was a British victory as the German invasion of Britain was strictly postulated on winning command of the sky first. On 17 September 1940, Hitler postponed Operation Sealion, the codename for the invasion of Britain, until "further notice".

Dowding was known for his humility and great sincerity. Fighter Command pilots came to characterise Dowding as one who cared for his men and had their best interests at heart. Dowding often referred to his "dear fighter boys" as his "chicks": indeed his son Derek was one of them. Because of his brilliant detailed preparation of Britain's air defences for the German assault, and his prudent management of his resources during the battle, Dowding is today generally given the credit for Britain's victory in the Battle of Britain.

Dowding's subsequent downfall has been attributed by some to his single-mindedness and perceived lack of diplomacy and political savoir faire in dealing with intra-RAF challenges and intrigues, most obviously the still, even now, hotly debated Big Wing controversy in which a number of senior and active service officers had argued in favour of large set-piece air battles with the Luftwaffe as an alternative to Dowding's successful Fabian strategy.Korda 2009, pp. 124–125. Another reason often cited for his removal, but characterised by some contemporary commentators more as a pretext, was the difficulty of countering German nighttime bombing raids on British cities.Dixon 2009, pp. 103–120

The account of radar pioneer, E. G. Bowen in Radar Days (1987) rebuts the claim that Dowding's grasp of the problems of British night fighters was inadequate. He suggests that if Dowding had been left to follow his own path, the ultimately effective British response to night bombing (which depended completely on developments in air-borne radar) would have come somewhat sooner.Bowen 1987, pp. 71, 119, 121.

Dowding himself showed that he had a good grasp of night fighter defence and was planning a defence system against night bombing in a letter he wrote some time after the Battle of Britain. However, there was great political and public pressure during the Blitz for something to be done, and Fighter Command's existing resources without, as yet, airborne radar, proved woefully inadequate. A committee of enquiry chaired by Sir John Salmond produced a long list of recommendations to improve night air defence; when Dowding approved only some of them, his erstwhile supporters, Lord Beaverbrook and Churchill, decided that it was time for him to step down.

On 8 October 1940, Dowding was advanced to Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath. Before the war, the leadership of the RAF was committed to winning the next war via strategical bombing, and it was an article of faith amongst the senior Air Marshals that it would be impossible for fighter aircraft to stop a bombing offensive. Deighton wrote that the RAF leadership "acted more vindictively" against Dowding and Park for winning the Battle of Britain than Hermann Göring did with the defeated Luftwaffe generals largely because Dowding and Park had proven the Air Ministry wrong by defeating a strategical bombing offensive. Dowding and Park were summoned to meet what Beaverbrook called a gang of "bloody Air Marshals" who in a quasi-trial accused Dowding and Park of failure in the Battle of Britain. Both Trafford Leigh-Mallory and the fighter ace Douglas Bader argued at the meeting that the Big Wing tactics were superior to those practiced by Dowding and Park, who were effectively treated as if they had lost the Battle of Britain.

Dowding unwillingly relinquished command on 24 November 1940 and was replaced by Big Wing advocate Sholto Douglas. Churchill tried to soften the blow by putting him in charge of the British Air Mission to the United States, responsible for the procurement of new aircraft types.McKinstry 2010, pp. 222–3

Publication of his book Twelve Legions of Angels was suppressed in November 1941. The British Government considered that it contained information which might be of use to the Germans. The book was finally published in 1946, soon after the war ended.