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The () was a pogrom carried out against the Jewish population of Baghdad, Iraq, on 1–2 June 1941 (coinciding with the Jewish holiday of Shavuot), immediately following the British victory in the Anglo-Iraqi War. The riots occurred in a power vacuum that followed the collapse of the pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi government of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani while the city was in a state of instability. The violence came immediately after the rapid defeat of Rashid Ali by British forces, whose earlier coup had generated a short period of national euphoria, and was fueled by allegations that Iraqi Jews had aided the British. "The quick defeat of Rashid 'Ali, after a short period of national euphoria, and the allegations that the Jews had aided the British, made for a volatile situation, which exploded violently on the first and second days of June." More than 180 Jews were killed and 1,000 injured, although some non-Jewish rioters were also killed in the attempt to quell the violence. Looting of Jewish property took place and 900 Jewish homes were destroyed.
On account of the role of Axis and pro-Axis elements in inciting and eventually carrying out the pogrom, it is often argued to have constituted the extension of the Shoah in Iraq, though this classification, and even its inclusion as part of the wider Holocaust, have been disputed. In any case, as with other persecutions of Jews outside of Europe, it is often overlooked when compared to the Holocaust in Europe, especially outside of Israel (where the vast majority of Iraqi Jews, as well as their descendants, currently live).
The event spurred a migration of Iraqi Jews out of the country, although a direct connection to the 1951–1952 Jewish exodus from Iraq is also disputed, as many Jews who left Iraq immediately following the Farhud later returned to the country, and permanent Jewish emigration out of Iraq did not accelerate significantly until 1950–1951.
By 1941 the approximately 150,000 Iraqi Jews played active roles in many aspects of Iraqi life, including farming, banking, commerce and the government bureaucracy.
Much of the population had retained significant anti-British sentiments since the 1920 Iraqi revolt, although the Jewish population was viewed as pro-British during World WarII, contributing to the separation of the Muslim and Jewish communities.
In addition, between 1932 and 1941, the German embassy in Iraq, headed by Dr. Fritz Grobba, significantly supported antisemitic and fascist movements. Intellectuals and army officers were invited to Germany as guests of the Nazi party, and antisemitic material was published in the newspapers. The German embassy purchased the newspaper Al-alam Al-arabi ("The Arab world") which published, in addition to antisemitic propaganda, a translation of Mein Kampf in Arabic. The German embassy also supported the establishment of Al-Fatwa, a youth organization based upon the model of the Hitler Youth.
Iraq's new government then was quickly involved in confrontation with the British over the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed in 1930. The treaty gave the British unlimited rights to base and transit forces through Iraq. In response to the coup, the British landed the 10th Indian Infantry Brigade at Basra. Officials of the new regime refused to let them land and confrontations afterward occurred both near Basra in the south and to the west of Baghdad near the British base complex and airfield. The Germans dispatched a group of 26 heavy fighters to aid in a futile air attack on RAF Habbaniya which was defeated.
Winston Churchill sent a telegram to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, warning him that if the Middle East fell to Germany, victory against the Nazis would be a "hard, long and bleak proposition" given that Hitler would have access to the oil reserves there. The telegram dealt with the larger issues of war in the Middle East rather than Iraq exclusively.
On 25 May Hitler issued his Order 30, stepping up German offensive operations: "The Arab Freedom Movement in the Middle East is our natural ally against England. In this connection special importance is attached to the liberation of Iraq... I have therefore decided to move forward in the Middle East by supporting Iraq."
On 30 May the British-organized force called Kingcol led by Brigadier J.J. Kingstone reached Baghdad, causing the "Golden Square" and their supporters to escape via Iran to Germany. Kingcol included some elements of the Arab Legion led by Major John Bagot Glubb known as Glubb Pasha.
On 31 May Regent Abdul Illah prepared to fly back into Baghdad to reclaim his leadership. To avoid the impression of a British-organized countercoup, the regent entered Baghdad without a British escort.
Michael Eppel, in his book "The Palestinian Conflict in Modern Iraq", blames the Farhud on the influence of German ideology on the Iraqi people, as well as extreme nationalism, both of which were heightened by the Golden Square coup.
, the secretary of the Jewish community in Baghdad, testified that several days before the Farhud, the homes of Jews were marked with a red palm print ("Hamsa"), by Futuwa youth. Al-Sabawi also instructed Jews in Baghdad to pack suitcases and to wait to be taken to "detention camps" "for their own safety".
Two days before the Farhud, Yunis al-Sabawi, a government minister who proclaimed himself the governor of Baghdad, summoned Rabbi Sasson Khaduri, the community leader, and recommended to him that Jews stay in their homes for the next three days as a protective measure. He had planned for a larger massacre, preparing to broadcast a call for the Baghdad public to massacre Jews. However, the broadcast was never made since al-Sabawi was forced to flee the country.
During the fall of the Rashid Ali government, false rumors were circulated that Jews used radios to signal the Royal Air Force and distributed British propaganda.
According to Hayyim Cohen, the Farhud "was the only such instance of Jewish shops and synagogues destroyed, Jewish girls being gang raped, and mob violence known to the Jews of Iraq, at least during their last hundred years of life there". Historian Edy Cohen writes that up until the Farhud, Jews had enjoyed relatively favorable conditions and coexistence with Muslims in Iraq.
However, Zvi Yehuda, a professor of Jewish Studies, has suggested that the event that set off the rioting was anti-Jewish preaching in the Jami-Al-Gaylani mosque, and that the violence was premeditated rather than a spontaneous outburst. Mordechai Ben-Porat, who later became the leader of the Iraqi Zionists, described his experience as follows:
We were mostly cut off from the center of the Jewish community and our Muslim neighbors became our friends. It was because of one Muslim neighbor, in fact, that we survived the Farhoud. We had no weapons to defend ourselves and were utterly helpless. We put furniture up against the doors and windows to prevent the rioters from breaking in. Then, Colonel Arif's wife came rushing out of her house with a grenade and a pistol and shouted at the rioters, 'If you don’t leave, I will explode this grenade right here!' Her husband was apparently not home and she had either been instructed by him to defend us or decided on her own to help. They dispersed, and that was thatshe saved our lives.(2025). 9780230616233, Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780230616233
In some instances, common criminals came to the help of the Jews. In one case, a young Muslim woman, who, ironically, had been looting with her sister, saw a pogromist attacking a young Jewish man. The attacker responded by stabbing her to death. He was later convicted of murder and hanged. A man known to be a thief protected roughly 100 Jews in his neighborhood, forcing the local baker and grocery store owner to give them food. Jews themselves also fought back, using knives, rocks, pistols, and clubs.
The dean of Midrash Bet Zilkha, Yaakov Mutzafi, raced to open up the gates of the yeshiva to shelter the victims of the Farhud who were displaced from their homes, and secured money for their upkeep from philanthropists in the community.Hakhmei Bavel, Yeshivath Hod Yosef Publishing House, pp. 229–230.
Civil order was restored after two days of violence in the afternoon of 2 June, when Prime Minister Jamil Al Midfai imposed a curfew and shot violators on sight. An investigation conducted by British journalist Tony Rocca of the Sunday Times attributed the delay to a personal decision by Kinahan Cornwallis, the British Ambassador to Iraq, who failed to immediately carry out orders he received from the Foreign Office in the matter, and initially denied requests from British Empire military and civil officers on the scene for permission to act against the attacking Arab mobs. The British also delayed their entry into Baghdad for 48 hours, which some testimonies suggest was due to having ulterior motives in allowing a clash to happen between Muslims and Jews in the city.
When the forces loyal to the regent entered to restore order, many rioters were killed. The Iraqi Commission Report noted that: "After some delay the Regent... arranged for the dispatch of troops to take control... There was no more aimless firing into the air; their machine guns swept the streets clear of people and quickly put a stop to looting and rioting."Iraqi Commission of Inquiry. The British Ambassador noted that the second day was more violent than the first, and that "Iraqi troops killed as many rioters as the rioters killed Jews." The Iraqi Commission Report estimated the total number of Jews and Muslims killed at 130. Eliahu Eilat, a Jewish Agency agent estimated 1,000 as the total number of Jews and Muslims who died, with other similar accounts estimating 300–400 pogromists killed by the Regent's army.
The monarchist government acted quickly to suppress supporters of Rashid Ali. Many Iraqis were exiled as a result, and hundreds were jailed. Military courts were convened to try the rioters and those responsible for the coup. A number of men, including Yunis al-Sabawi and multiple Iraqi Army officers and policemen, were legally sentenced to death in consequence of the violence by the newly established pro-British Iraqi government.
Either way, the Farhud is broadly understood to mark the start of a process of politicization of the Iraqi Jews in the 1940s, primarily amongst the younger population, especially as a result of the impact it had on hopes of long term integration into Iraqi society. In the direct aftermath of the Farhud, many joined the Iraqi Communist Party in order to protect the Jews of Baghdad, yet they did not want to leave the country and rather sought to fight for better conditions in Iraq itself. At the same time the Iraqi government which had taken over after the Farhud reassured the Iraqi Jewish community, and normal life soon returned to Baghdad, which saw a marked betterment of its economic situation during World WarII.
It was only after the Iraqi government initiated a policy shift towards the Iraqi Jews in 1948, curtailing their civil rights and firing many Jewish state employees, that the Farhud began to be regarded as more than just an outburst of violence instigated by foreign influences, namely Nazi propaganda.
On 23 October 1948, Shafiq Ades, a respected Jewish businessman, was publicly hanged in Basra on charges of selling weapons to Israel and the Iraqi Communist Party, despite the fact he was an outspoken anti-Zionist. The event increased the sense of insecurity among Jews. The Jewish community general sentiment was that if a man as well connected and powerful as Ades could be eliminated by the state, other Jews would not be protected any longer, and the Farhud was no longer seen as an isolated incident. During this period, the Iraqi Jewish community became increasingly fearful. "During this time, the Iraqi Jewish community became increasingly fearful ..."
1 June 2015, was the first International Farhud Day at the United Nations.
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