In war, civilians are people who are not members of any Military to the conflict. It is a war crime under the law of armed conflict to deliberately target civilians with military attacks, along with numerous other considerations to minimize civilian casualties during times of war. Civilians engaging in hostilities are considered unlawful combatants, and lose their protection from attack. Under the law of armed conflict, civilians may not be targeted by virtue of their status as persons not taking up arms against an enemy.Art. 51(1)–(2), Additional Protocol I. Civilians are a type of non-combatant protected under the laws of war including in international humanitarian law Treaty and conventions, as well as customary international law.
A civilian is slightly different from a non-combatant, because some non-combatants are not civilians (for example, military chaplains, or military personnel who are serving with a neutral country). Civilians in the territories of a party to an armed conflict are entitled to certain privileges under the customary laws of war and Treaty such as Geneva Convention IV. The privileges that they enjoy under international law depends on whether the conflict is a civil war or an international one.
In some nations, uniformed members of civilian police, the fire service, or other emergency services colloquially refer to members of the public as civilians.
Article 50(1)–(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states that:
As legal scholar Emily Crawford states, "Given the centrality of the concept of civilian status to the law of armed conflict, it is noteworthy that civilians do not have their own discrete definition; rather, civilians are defined in the negative in relation to combatants in the treaty law of armed conflict.”Crawford, Emily. Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict (pp. 17-18). Kindle Edition. The definition is negative and defines civilians as persons who do not fall in the categories of persons outlined in Article 4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of Geneva Convention III and in Article 43 of Additional Protocol I. No definition of the term ‘civilian’ is contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 — including Geneva Convention IV, which relates to the treatment of civilians in time of armed conflict — or the Hague Regulations. The Additional Protocol I is the first IHL instrument to define the term.
The Commentary to Additional Protocol I has pointed out that anyone who is not a member of the armed forces and does not take part of hostilities in time of war is a civilian. Civilians cannot take part in armed conflict. Civilians are given protection under the Geneva Conventions and Protocols thereto. Article 50 defines civilians in international armed conflict as “all persons who are neither members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict nor participants in a levée en masse."Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Int’l Armed Conflict art. 50, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 hereinafter. Article 51 describes the protection that must be given to the civilian population and individual civilians.
Chapter III of Additional Protocol I regulates the targeting of civilian objects. Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) also includes this in its list of war crimes: "Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities". Not all states have ratified the 1977 Additional Protocol I or the 1998 Rome Statute, but it is an accepted principle of international humanitarian law that the direct targeting of civilians is a breach of the customary laws of war and is binding on all belligerents.
Starting in the 1980s, it was often claimed that 90 percent of the victims of modern wars were Non-combatant.Kahnert, M., D. Pitt, et al., Eds. (1983). Children and War: Proceedings of Symposium at Siuntio Baths, Finland, 1983. Geneva and Helsinki, Geneva International Peace Research Institute, IPB and Peace Union of Finland, p. 5, which states: "Of the human victims in the First World War only 5% were civilians, in the Second World War already 50%, in Vietnam War between 50 - 90% and according to some information in Lebanon 97%. It has been appraised that in a conventional war in Europe up to 99% of the victims would be civilians."Graça Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, Report of the expert of the Secretary-General, 26 Aug 1996, p. 9. .Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 107.Howard Zinn, Moises Samam, Gino Strada. Just war, Charta, 2005, p. 38. These claims, though widely believed, are not supported by detailed examination of the evidence, particularly that relating to wars (such as those in Yugoslav Wars and in Afghanistan) that are central to the claims.Adam Roberts, "Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilians?", Survival, London, vol. 52, no. 3, June–July 2010, pp. 115–35. Print edition ISSN 0039-6338. Online ISSN 1468-2699.
In the opening years of the 21st century, despite the many problems associated with it, the legal category of the civilian has been the subject of considerable attention in public discourse, in the media and at the United Nations, and in justification of certain uses of armed force to protect endangered populations. It has "lost none of its political, legal and moral salience."Adam Roberts, "The Civilian in Modern War", Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol. 12, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2010, pp. 13–51. ; ISSN 1389-1359. One part of this article, relating to casualties, also appeared in Survival, June–July 2010, as footnoted above.
Although it is often assumed that civilians are essentially passive onlookers of war, sometimes they have active roles in conflicts. These may be quasi-military, as when in November 1975 the Moroccan government organized the "green march" of civilians to cross the border into the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara to claim the territory for Morocco — all at the same time as Moroccan forces entered the territory clandestinely.Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia, C. Hurst, London, for Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 149-59 gives a useful account of the background and origin of the dispute over Western Sahara. In addition, and without necessarily calling into question their status as non-combatants, civilians sometimes take part in campaigns of civil resistance as a means of opposing dictatorial rule or foreign occupation: sometimes such campaigns happen at the same time as armed conflicts or guerrilla insurrections, but they are usually distinct from them as regards both their organization and participation.See for example the chapters on the anti-Marcos movement in the Philippines (by Amado Mendoza) and on resistance against apartheid in South Africa (by Tom Lodge) in Adam Roberts and Timothy_Garton_Ash (eds.), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, Oxford University Press, 2009 [6], pp. 179-96 and 213-30.
Officials directly involved in the maiming of civilians are conducting offensive combat operations and do not qualify as civilians.
Article 51(1)–(3), (7) and (8) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions dictates that:
Through a series of resolutions (1265, 1296, 1502, 1674 and 1738) and presidential statements the UN Security Council addresses:
In addition to the UN treaties, regional treaties have also been established, such as the African Union Constitutive Act Article 4(h) which also outlines the protection of civilians and "affords the Union a right to forcibly intervene in one of its member states in "grave circumstances", namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity." This is proposed to indicate the African Union will no longer stand by to watch atrocities happen within the Union. As described by Said Djinnit (AU's Commissioner for Peace and Security) in 2004, "Africans cannot ... watch the tragedies developing in the continent and say it is the UN's responsibility or somebody else's responsibility. We have moved from the concept of non-interference to non-indifference. We cannot, as Africans, remain indifferent to the tragedy of our people" (IRIN News 2004). Although Article 4(h), while drafted, has not been activated, which raises the question of the AU's willingness to intervene in situations of "grave circumstance."
Regardless of the lead organization (UN, AU, other) "there is clearly a risk involved for international organizations that in assuming a complicated security role such as civilian protection, they may raise expectations among local populations that cannot be met, usually not even by large-scale peace operations with a comprehensive political component, supported by high force levels, overall professionalism, and the political stamina to stay present long-term. The disappointing outcomes, in Africa and elsewhere, have led some to criticize the way in which the decentralization policies have been implemented (MacFarlane and Weiss 1992; Berman 1998; Boulden 2003)."
Under the Protocol I, civilians are entitled to protection against direct attack unless and as long as they take a direct part in hostilities.Additional Protocol I art. 51. Direct participation in hostilities refers to specific acts carried out by individuals.Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under Int’l Humanitarian Law, 2009, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0990.pdf. Civilians lose their immunity from direct attack when, and only so long as, they are directly participating in hostilities.Additional Protocol I art. 51(3). When unclear as to a person’s civilian status, there is a presumption that that person is a civilian.Additional Protocol I art. 50. One’s presence within a population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the person of their civilian character.Additional Protocol I art. 50(3). Customary international law puts the onus on an attacking party to do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civiliab objects and are not subject to special protection.Additional Protocol I art. 57(2)(a)(i). Military objectives can be directly targeted, meaning that they offer a definite military advantage. Under Article 28 of Geneva Convention IV, it is prohibited to use civilians to render military objectives immune from attack. This prohibition includes human shields under customary international law and Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I.Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 97, IHL Database: Customary IHL, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/ docs/v1_rul.
Involvement and jurisdiction of the armed forces in civil affairs varies from nation to nation.
In France and Italy, the National Gendarmerie and Carabinieri are military agencies permanently tasked to supporting domestic civilian law-enforcement, usually focussed on serious organised crime and counter-terrorism. Until 2008, the South African Commando System (a volunteer militia within the South African Army) assisted the Police Service in rural areas until they were replaced by specialised Police units. Section 201 of the South African constitution allows military forces to assist Police only with Presidential approval.
The British military does not intervene in law enforcement matters other than by exceptional ministerial approval. During the 1980 Iranian Embassy Siege, the Metropolitan Police were able to request military support and the Prime Minister approved deployment of the SAS. Unarmed military personnel routinely deploy in support for natural disasters, bomb disposal, etc. under MACA. In 1969 the British Army was deployed to Northern Ireland under Operation Banner to support the local police in the wake of rioting. This deployment inflamed local tensions, with the Provisional IRA launching a guerilla campaign from 1970 to 1997, during which time controversial actions such as Operation Demetrius took place, as well as atrocities such as the Bloody Sunday massacre. Operation Banner ultimately lasted 37 years, formally ending in 2007 and becoming the British Armed Forces' longest continuous operation. The many problems faced (and arguably caused by) Operation Banner have been influential in policy-making and the reluctance to deploy military forces domestically in anything other than exceptional circumstances (usually relating to serious terrorist threats).
By contrast, German law prohibits entirely the peacetime intervention of military forces within Germany in armed roles. Military personnel may only be deployed in unarmed roles such as disaster relief. This was found to be deeply restrictive during the 1972 Munich massacre when army snipers could not be deployed to assist Munich Police. GSG 9 was later formed within the Bundesgrenzschutz to provide an armed tactical capability within the civilian law enforcement structure.
In the US, the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act forbids the use of the US Army for law enforcement purposes without the approval of Congress. A 2013 directive clarified that this included the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corp. In practice there are many nuances to this. The most notable being that the US Coast Guard operates under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security during peacetime but can be transferred to the U.S. Department of the Navy and rendered "military" during times of war. The US National Guard are organised at a State level and under mixed control. Under Title 32, State Governors may deploy National Guard personnel in support of civilian law enforcement - Posse Comitatus would only apply to personnel activated under Title 10 and operating under federal control.
In the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in keeping with Peelian Principles, the term "member of the public" is preferred by some people to avoid categorizing police as non-civilian.
In the United States, “civilian oversight" or “citizen oversight" is used to distinguish external committees (typically monitoring police conduct on behalf of civil administrations and taxpayers) from the internal management structure.
Civilian crisis management is a central pillar of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which in turn is part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSDP is an important instrument supporting the EU's role as a global security provider.
Currently, the EU maintains civilian missions in countries including Georgia, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, and the Central African Republic.
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