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Antinatalism or anti-natalism is the philosophical value judgment that procreation is unethical or unjustifiable. Antinatalists thus argue that humans should abstain from making children. Some antinatalists consider coming into existence to always be a serious harm. Their views are not necessarily limited only to humans but may encompass all sentient creatures, arguing that coming into existence is a serious harm for sentient beings in general.
There are various reasons why antinatalists believe human reproduction is problematic. The most common arguments for antinatalism include that life entails inevitable suffering, death is inevitable, and humans are born without their consent (that is to say, they cannot choose whether or not they come into existence). Additionally, although some people may turn out to be happy, this is not guaranteed, so to procreate is to gamble with another person's suffering. There is also an axiological asymmetry between good and bad things in life, such that coming into existence is always a harm, which is known as Benatar's asymmetry argument.
Antinatalism as a philosophical concept is to be distinguished from antinatalist policies employed by some countries (governmental population control measures). In antinatalist population policy, it is not always implied that coming into existence is a universal problem and is an ever-present harm to the one whose existence was started.
There exists a taxonomy that divides the so-called "antiprocreative" (at times called antinatalist) thought into four major branches: childfreeness, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement (VHEMT), efilism (an ideology that advocates for extreme promortalism and forced extinction), and antinatalism itself. Only the latter one is philosophical antinatalism per se, meeting the definition of philosophical antinatalism and having no other features on top of that, whereas the first three items can only be deemed antinatalistic in the sense that they oppose the alleged duty to procreate.
From Gustave Flaubert, The Letters of Gustave Flaubert 1830–1857, 1846:
From Arthur Schopenhauer's Parerga and Paralipomena, 1851:
The issue of Buddhist antinatalism is also raised by Amy Paris Langenberg. She writes, among other things:
Buddhism was understood as antinatalist by Jack Kerouac. Masahiro Morioka argues that ancient Buddhism was both antinatalist and anti-antinatalist:
Augustine of Hippo wrote:
Gregory of Nyssa warns that no one should be lured by the argument that procreation is a mechanism that creates children and states that those who refrain from procreation by preserving their virginity "bring about a cancellation of death by preventing it from advancing further because of them, and, by setting themselves up as a kind of boundary stone between life and death, they keep death from going forward".Gregory of Nysssa, Ascetical Works (The Fathers of the Church, volume 58), Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010, p. 48 Søren Kierkegaard believed that man enters this world by means of a crime, that their existence is a crime, and procreation is the fall which is the culmination of human egoism.C. Léon, S. Walsh, Feminist Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010, p. 76. According to him, Christianity exists to block the path of procreation; it is "a salvation but at the same time it is a stopping" that "aims at stopping the whole continuation which leads to the permanence of this world."P. Sheil, Starting with Kierkegaard, London: A&C Black, 2011, p. 121.
The Marcionites, led by the theologian Marcion of Sinope, believed that the visible world is an evil creation of a crude, cruel, jealous, and angry demiurge, Yahweh. According to this teaching, people should oppose him, abandon his world, not create people, and trust in the good God of mercy, foreign and distant.
The Encratites observed that birth leads to death. In order to conquer death, people should desist from procreation: "not produce fresh fodder for death".P. Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 96.G. Quispel, Gnostica, Judaica, Catholica: Collected Essays of Gilles Quispel, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2008, p. 228.Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, Books 1–3 (The Fathers of the Church, volume 85), Washington: CUA Press, 2010, pp. 263–271.
The Manichaeans, the Bogomils,D. Obolensky, The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 114, 130. (2025). 9788364031670, Institute of Slavic Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences. ISBN 9788364031670 and the CatharsJ. Duvernoy, La religion des cathares, Toulouse: Editions Privât, 1976. believed that procreation sentences the soul to imprisonment in evil matter. They saw procreation as an instrument of an evil god, demiurge, or of Satan that imprisons the divine element in the matter and thus causes the divine element to suffer.
Shakers believe that sex is the root of all sin.L.V. Powles, The Faith and Practice of Heretical Sects, Westminster: Mothers' Union, 1962, p. 73.D. Sasson, The Shaker Spiritual Narrative, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983, p. 198. Thus although not strictly antinatalist, they see procreation is a sign of the fallen state of humanity.
Water is a traditional representation of the Tao, as it flows without shape. Ice represents the arrest of the natural flow of the Tao in rigid human consciousness. Taoist sages return to the flow like ice melting to water. But it would have been better if human consciousness never had appeared.
Karim Akerma, due to the moral problem of man as creator, introduces anthropodicy, a twin concept for theodicy. He is of the opinion that the less faith in the Almighty Creator–God there is, the more urgent the question of anthropodicy becomes. Akerma thinks that for those who want to lead ethical lives, the causation of suffering requires a justification. Man can no longer shed responsibility for the suffering that occurs by appealing to an imaginary entity that sets moral principles. For Akerma, antinatalism is a consequence of the collapse of theodicy endeavors and the failure of attempts to establish an anthropodicy. According to him, there is no metaphysics nor moral theory that can justify the production of new people, and therefore, anthropodicy is indefensible as well as theodicy.
Jason Marsh finds no good arguments for what he calls "evil asymmetry"; that the amount and kinds of suffering provide strong arguments that our world is not an act of creation made by a good God, but the same suffering does not affect the morality of the act of procreation. (2025). 9780199378111 ISBN 9780199378111
Cabrera regards procreation as an ontological issue of total manipulation: one's very being is manufactured and used; in contrast to intra-worldly cases where someone is placed in a harmful situation. In the case of procreation, no chance of defense against that act is even available. According to Cabrera: manipulation in procreation is visible primarily in the unilateral and non-consensual nature of the act, which makes procreation per se inevitably asymmetrical; be it a product of forethought, or a product of neglect. It is always connected with the interests (or disinterests) of other humans, not the created human. In addition, Cabrera points out that in his view the manipulation of procreation is not limited to the act of creation itself, but it is continued in the process of raising the child, during which parents gain great power over the child's life, who is shaped according to their preferences and for their satisfaction. He emphasizes that although it is not possible to avoid manipulation in procreation, it is perfectly possible to avoid procreation itself and that then no moral rule is violated.
Cabrera believes that the situation in which one is placed through procreation, human life is structurally negative in that its constitutive features are inherently adverse. The most prominent of them are, according to Cabrera, the following:
Cabrera calls the set of these characteristics A–C the "terminality of being". He is of the opinion that a huge number of humans around the world cannot withstand this steep struggle against the terminal structure of their being, which leads to destructive consequences for them and others: , major or minor , or aggressive behavior. He accepts that life may be – thanks to human's own merits and efforts – bearable and even very pleasant (though not for all, due to the phenomenon of moral impediment), but also considers it problematic to bring someone into existence so that they may attempt to make their life pleasant by struggling against the difficult and oppressive situation we place them in by procreating. It seems more reasonable, according to Cabrera, simply not to put them in that situation, since the results of their struggle are always uncertain.
Cabrera believes that in ethics, including affirmative ethics, there is one overarching concept which he calls the "Minimal Ethical Articulation", "MEA" (previously translated into English as "Fundamental Ethical Articulation" and "FEA"): the consideration of other people's interests, not manipulating them and not harming them. Procreation for him is an obvious violation of MEA – someone is manipulated and placed in a harmful situation as a result of that action. In his view, values included in the MEA are widely accepted by affirmative ethics, they are even their basics, and if approached radically, they should lead to the refusal of procreation.
For Cabrera, the worst thing in human life and by extension in procreation is what he calls "moral impediment": the structural impossibility of acting in the world without harming or manipulating someone at some given moment. This impediment does not occur because of an intrinsic "evil" of human nature, but because of the structural situation in which the human being has always been. In this situation, we are cornered by various kinds of structural discomforts while having to conduct our lives in a limited amount of time and in limited spaces of action, such that different interests often conflict with each other. We do not have to have bad intentions to treat others with disregard; we are compelled to do so in order to survive, pursue our projects, and escape from suffering. Cabrera also draws attention to the fact that life is associated with the constant risk of one experiencing strong physical pain, which is common in human life, for example as a result of a serious illness, and maintains that the mere existence of such possibility impedes us morally, as well as that because of it, we can at any time lose, as a result of its occurrence, the possibility of a dignified, moral functioning even to a minimal extent.[2] J. Cabrera, A critique of affirmative morality (A reflection on death, birth and the value of life), Brasília: Julio Cabrera Editions, 2014.[3] J. Cabrera, T. Lenharo di Santis, Because I Love You, You Will Not Be Born!: Nascituri te salutant, Brasília: LGE, 2009.
Shiffrin lists four factors that, in her opinion, make the justification for having hypothetical consent to procreation a problem:
Gerald Harrison and Julia Tanner argue that when we want to significantly affect someone by our action and it is not possible to get their consent, then the default should be to not take such action. The exception is, according to them, actions by which we want to prevent greater harm of a person (for example, pushing someone out of the way of a falling piano). However, in their opinion, such actions certainly do not include procreation, because before taking this action a person does not exist.
Asheel Singh emphasizes that one does not have to think that coming into existence is always an overall harm in order to recognize antinatalism as a correct view. In his opinion, it is enough to think that there is no moral right to inflict serious, preventable harms upon others without their consent.
Chip Smith and Max Freiheit argue that procreation is contrary to non-aggression principle of right-wing libertarians, according to which nonconsensual actions should not be taken toward other people.
Hermann Vetter agrees with the assumptions of Jan Narveson:
Instead, he presents the following decision-theoretic matrix:
Based on this, he concludes that we should not create people:
Karim Akerma argues that utilitarianism requires the least metaphysical assumptions and is, therefore, the most convincing ethical theory. He believes that negative utilitarianism is the right one because the good things in life do not compensate for the bad things; first and foremost, the best things do not compensate for the worst things such as, for example, the experiences of terrible pain, the agonies of the wounded, sick or dying. In his opinion, we also rarely know what to do to make people happy, but we know what to do so that people do not suffer: it is enough that they are not created. What is important for Akerma in ethics is the striving for the fewest suffering people (ultimately no one), not striving for the happiest people, which, according to him, takes place at the expense of immeasurable suffering. (1995). 9783926848369, Junghans. ISBN 9783926848369
Miguel Steiner believes that antinatalism is justified by two converging perspectives:
| 4. Absence of pleasure (Not bad) |
Regarding procreation, the argument follows that coming into existence generates both good and bad experiences, pain and pleasure, whereas not coming into existence entails neither pain nor pleasure. The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.
Some antinatalists are also or for moral reasons, and postulate that such views should complement each other as having a common denominator: not causing harm to other sentient beings.[7] Karim Akerma, Ist der Vegetarismus ein Antinatalismus?, Pro iure animalis, 24 March 2014. [8] Karim Akerma, Is Vegetarianism an Antinatalism? (English translation).[9] V. Palley, This Extreme Sect of Vegans Thinks Your Baby Will Destroy the Planet, 29 January 2018. This attitude was already present in Manichaeism and Catharism. The Cathars interpreted the commandment "thou shalt not kill" as relating also to other mammals and birds. It was recommended not to eat their meat, dairy and eggs.
Peter Wessel Zapffe identifies four repressive mechanisms humans use, consciously or not, to restrict their consciousness of life and the world:
According to Zapffe, depressive disorders are often "messages from a deeper, more immediate sense of life, bitter fruits of a geniality of thought". Some studies seem to confirm this: it is said about the phenomenon of depressive realism, and both Colin FelthamC. Feltham, Keeping ourselves in the dark, Charleston: Nine-Banded Book, 2015.C. Feltham, Depressive Realism: Interdisciplinary perspectives, London-New York: Routledge, 2016. and John Pollard write about antinatalism as one of its possible consequences.
David Benatar, citing numerous studies, lists three phenomena described by psychologists, which, according to him, are responsible for making personal self-assessments about the quality of one’s life unreliable:
Benatar concludes:
Thomas Ligotti draws attention to the similarity between Zapffe's philosophy and terror management theory. Terror management theory argues that humans are equipped with unique cognitive abilities beyond what is necessary for survival, which includes symbolic thinking, extensive self-consciousness and perception of themselves as temporal beings aware of the finitude of their existence. The desire to live alongside the awareness of the inevitability of death triggers terror in humans. Opposition to this fear is among humans' primary motivations. To escape it, humans build defensive structures around themselves to ensure their symbolic or literal immortality, to feel like valuable members of a meaningful universe, and to focus on protecting themselves from immediate external threats. (2025). 9780982429693, Hippocampus Press. ISBN 9780982429693
According to David Benatar, one comes into existence in the morally relevant sense when consciousness arises, when a fetus becomes sentient, and up until that time an abortion is moral, whereas continued pregnancy would be immoral. Benatar refers to EEG brain studies and studies on the pain perception of the fetus, which states that fetal consciousness arises no earlier than between twenty-eight and thirty weeks of pregnancy, before which it is incapable of feeling pain. A 2010 report from the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists also showed that a fetus could not gain consciousness prior to week twenty-four of the pregnancy, and apparently never does at any point in utero, stating that "there appeared to be no clear benefit in considering the need for fetal analgesia prior to termination of pregnancy, even after 24 weeks".[17] Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Fetal Awareness – Review of Research and Recommendations for Practice, London: RCOG Press, 2010. Some assumptions of this report regarding sentience of the fetus after the second trimester were criticized. In a similar way argues Karim Akerma. He distinguishes between organisms that do not have mental properties and living beings that have mental properties. According to his view, which he calls the mentalistic view, a living being begins to exist when an organism (or another entity) produces a simple form of consciousness for the first time.Karim Akerma, Lebensende und Lebensbeginn: Philosophische Implikationen und mentalistische Begründung des Hirn-Todeskriterium, Lit: Hamburg 2006.
Julio Cabrera believes that the moral problem of abortion is totally different from the problem of abstention of procreation because in the case of abortion, there is no longer a non-being, but an already existing being – the most helpless and defenseless of the parties involved, that someday might have the autonomy to decide, and we cannot decide for them. From the point of view of Cabrera's negative ethics, abortion is immoral for similar reasons as procreation. For Cabrera, the exception in which abortion is morally justified is cases of irreversible illness of the fetus (or some serious "social illnesses" like American conquest or Nazism), according to him in such cases we are clearly thinking about the unborn, and not simply of our own interests. In addition, Cabrera believes that under certain circumstances, it is legitimate and comprehensible to commit unethical actions, for example, abortion is legitimate and comprehensible when the mother's life is at risk or when pregnancy is the result of rape – in such situations it is necessary to be sensitive without assuming a rigid principialism.
David Benatar emphasizes that his argumentation applies to all sentient beings and mentions that humans play a role in deciding how many animals there will be: humans breed other species of animals and are able to sterilize other species of animals. He says it would be better if all species of sentient beings became extinct. In particular, he is explicit in judging the breeding of animals as morally bad:
Magnus Vinding argues that the lives of wild animals suffering in their natural environment are generally very bad. He draws attention to phenomena such as dying before adulthood, starvation, disease, parasitism, infanticide, predation and being eaten alive. He cites research on what animal life looks like in the wild. One of eight male lion cubs survives into adulthood. Others die as a result of starvation, disease and often fall victims to the teeth and claws of other lions. Attaining adulthood is much rarer for fish. Only one in a hundred male chinook salmon survives into adulthood. Vinding is of the opinion that if human lives and the survival of human children looked like this, current human values would disallow procreation; however, this is not possible when it comes to animals, who are guided by instinct. He takes the view that even if one does not agree that procreation is always morally bad, one should recognize procreation in wildlife as morally bad and something that ought to be prevented (at least in theory, not necessarily in practice). He maintains that non-intervention cannot be defended if we reject speciesism and that we should reject the unjustifiable dogma stating that what is happening in nature is what should be happening in nature.
Similar arguments to that of Vinding are made by Ludwig Raal, who is in favor of a more practical approach. He argues for introducing non-violent population control through immunocontraception. This would sustain the ecosystem and human population, and allow people to perform helpful interventions in nature.
A common motivation for pro-mortalism is to prevent the perceived future suffering of oneself and/or other sentient beings. Promortalism positively values death, whereas antinatalism negatively values birth, so both value judgments are distinct from each other. Antinatalism is generally supportive of abortion rights and anti-pro-life, while pro-mortalism and efilism are plainly anti-life.
Antinatalists and promortalists generally agree that if one accepts that life is suffering and no other premises are assumed, then antinatalism (ceasing the propagation of life) and promortalism (ending life) are both implied. As an analogy, if one believes that smoking causes harm, then not only should people not start smoking, but they should also stop if they already smoke.
Similarly, Jiwoon Hwang argued that the hedonistic interpretation of Benatar's asymmetry argument of harms and benefits entails promortalism — the view that it is always preferable to cease to exist than to continue to live. Hwang argues that the absence of pleasure is not bad in the following cases: for the one who never exists, for the one who exists, and for the one who ceased to exist. By "bad", we mean that it is not worse than the presence of pleasure for the one who exists. This is consistent with Benatar's statement that the presence of pleasure for the existing person is not an advantage over the absence of pleasure for the never existing and vice versa.
However, emeritius professor David Benatar of the University of Cape Town has argued that if one accepts antinatalism, many arguments and premises besides antinatalism would be necessary in order for antinatalism to imply promortalism. Hence, antinatalism does not imply pro-mortalism by itself. It is possible to simultaneously support antinatalism and oppose promortalism. For example, an antinatalist who is also a rights theorist would support antinatalism while opposing murder on the basis that people have a right not to be killed or murdered. An antinatalist could also oppose promortalism by believing that it is worse for anyone to die earlier than they need to, or simply because it is troubling to kill people. An antinatalist can believe that while life is not worth starting, life can be worth continuing. The promortalist Jiwoon Hwang asserted:
Hwang later died by suicide. The antinatalist and promortalist communities sympathisized with his choice while mourning his death as a loss.
Brian Tomasik challenges the effectiveness of human antinatalism in reducing suffering by pointing out that humans appropriate the habitats of wild animals thereby sparing wild animals from being born into lives containing suffering.
Émile P. Torres argues that, contra Benatar, antinatalism need not entail human extinction. For example, if people were to develop radical Life extension technologies that enable them to live as long as the human species itself could survive, procreation could cease entirely without the global population dwindling to zero.
Robbert Zandbergen has argued that the definition of antinatalism is too narrow. As a consequence of this, people are unduly focused on human reproduction (and the limiting or stopping thereof), which should only ever be the terminus of antinatalism. The starting point, rather, is the grim diagnosis that life emerges as the result of some cosmic mistake. In order to rectify this situation, humans are tasked with undoing the unnecessary pressures exerted by their existence. One avenue of this rectification is the limiting or concluding of human reproduction.
(2025). 9783495479124, Verlag Karl Alber. ISBN 9783495479124
(2025). 9783754923658, Neopubli GmbH. ISBN 9783754923658
(2025). 9780199296422, Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199296422
Gunter Bleibohm, Fluch der Geburt – Thesen einer Überlebensethik, Landau-Godramstein: Gegensich, 2011.
K. J. Coyle, Manichaeism and Its Legacy, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2009, pp. 15 (introduction), 67, 283–295 and 311.
(2025). 9798645624255, Independently Published. EAN 9798645624255
(2025). 9780199296422, Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199296422
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