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Skirmishers are light infantry or light cavalry deployed as a vanguard, flank guard or rearguard to screen a tactical position or a larger body of friendly troops from enemy advances. They may be deployed in a skirmish line, an irregular open formation that is much more spread out in depth and in breadth than a traditional line formation. Their purpose is to harass the enemy by engaging them in only light or sporadic combat to delay their movement, disrupt their attack, or weaken their morale. Such tactics are collectively called skirmishing. An engagement with only light, relatively indecisive combat is sometimes called a skirmish even if heavier troops are sometimes involved.
Skirmishers can be either regular army units that are temporarily detached to perform skirmishing or specialty units that were specifically armed and trained for such low-level irregular warfare tactics. Light infantry, light cavalry (historically), and irregular units often specialize in skirmishing. Skirmishers' open formations and smaller numbers can give them superior mobility over the regular forces, allowing them to engage only on favorable terms, taking advantage of better position or terrain, and quickly withdrawing from any threat of superior enemy forces. Though often critical in protecting the main army from sudden enemy advances, skirmishers were historically poor at taking or defending ground from heavy infantry or heavy cavalry.
Once preliminary skirmishing was over, skirmishers participated in the main battle by shooting into the enemy formation, or they joined in melée combat with daggers or short swords. Their mobility made skirmishers also valuable for reconnaissance, especially in wooded or urban areas.
In Classical Greece, skirmishers originally had a low status. For example, Herodotus, in his account of the Battle of Plataea of 479 BC, mentioned that the Spartan Army fielded 35,000 lightly armed to 5,000 , but there is no mention of them in his account of the fighting.Greek Warfare, Myths and Realities, Hans van Wees p61 Often, Greek historians ignored them altogether, but Xenophon distinguished them explicitly from the statary troops.Xenophon, (tr. Bingham, John). The Historie of Xenophon. 1623. Publ: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum. It was far cheaper to equip oneself as lightly armed than a fully-armed hoplite. Indeed, it was common for the lightly armed to go into battle equipped with stones.Greek Warfare, Myths and Realities, Hans van Wees p64p The low status of skirmishers reflected the low status of the poorer sections of society that made up skirmishers.Greek Warfare, Myths and Realities, Hans van Wees p65 Additionally, hit-and-run tactics went against the Greek ideal of heroism. Plato gives the skirmisher a voice to advocate "flight without shame" but only to denounce it as an inversion of decent values.Greek Warfare, Myths and Realities, Hans van Wees p65. Laws 706c
Nevertheless, skirmishers then chalked up significant victories, such as the Athenian defeat at the hands of the Aetolian javelin men in 426 BC and, during the same war, the Athenian victory at the Battle of Sphacteria.
Skirmisher infantry gained more respect in subsequent years, as their usefulness was more widely recognised and as the ancient bias against them waned. , light javelin infantry, played a vital role in the Peloponnesian War, and well-equipped skirmisher troops such as thureophoroi and thorakites would be developed to provide a strong mobile force for the Greek and the Macedonian armies.
The Celts did not, in general, favour ranged weapons. The exceptions tended not to include the use of skirmishers. The Britons used the sling and javelin extensively but for siege warfare, not skirmishing.The Ancient Celts, Barry Cunliffe pp 94–95 Among the Gauls, likewise, the bow was employed to defend a fixed position.Caesar, De Bello Gallico, Book 7, XLI The Celts' lack of skirmishers cost them dearly during the Gallic Invasion of Greece of 279 BC when they found themselves helpless in the face of Aetolian skirmishing tactics.Peter Green, Alexander to Actium, p 133 Thracians were famous for their skirmish war tactics and offered their services as mercenaries more than once in the Greek civil wars in ancient times.
In the Punic Wars, despite the Roman and Carthaginian armies' different organisations, both had the role for skirmishers as screening the main armies.Hannibal's Last Battle: Zama and the Fall of Carthage, Brian Todd Carey p. 12 (Carthage) and p. 18 (Rome) The Roman legions had a specialised infantry class, Velites, which acted as skirmish troops who engaged the enemy before the Roman heavy infantry made contact, and the Carthaginians recruited their skirmishers from the native peoples across the Carthaginian Empire.
The Roman army of the late republican and early imperial periods frequently recruited foreign auxilia to act as skirmishers to supplement the citizen Roman legion.
A skirmish force screening the main body of infantry became so important to any army in the field that eventually, all major European powers developed specialised skirmishing infantry. Examples included the German Jäger, the French and the British riflemen.
Muskets were the predominant infantry weapon of the late 18th century, but the British Army learned firsthand of the importance of rifles during the American Revolutionary War and began experimenting with them shortly thereafter, resulting in the Baker rifle. Although slower to reload and more costly to produce than a musket, it was much more accurate and proved its worth during the Peninsular War. Throughout the conflict, British riflemen could selectively target and eliminate the officers and NCOs of French forces from outside musket range.Urban, Mark. Rifles: Six Years with Wellington's Legendary Sharpshooters. Faber & Faber 2004,
During the War of 1812, American riflemen again contributed to British casualties but also had to contend with the revised British light infantry tactics.
A consequence of those wars' experiences was a trend to training line troops to adopt tactics that had been used only by skirmishers.History of the Art of War, Vol IV Hans Delbrück p449-51
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