In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when a complex entity has properties or behaviors that its parts do not have on their own, and emerge only when they interact in a wider whole.
Emergence plays a central role in theories of integrative levels and of . For instance, the phenomenon of life as studied in biology is an emergent property of chemistry and physics.
In philosophy, theories that emphasize emergent properties have been called emergentism.[
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In philosophy
Philosophers often understand emergence as a claim about the etiology of a system's properties. An emergent property of a system, in this context, is one that is not a property of any component of that system, but is still a feature of the system as a whole. Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950), one of the first modern philosophers to write on emergence, termed this a categorial novum (new category).
Definitions
This concept of emergence dates from at least the time of Aristotle.[Aristotle, Metaphysics (Aristotle), Book VIII (Eta) 1045a 8–10: "... the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts ...", i.e., the whole is other than the sum of the parts.] Many scientists and philosophers[
] have written on the concept, including John Stuart Mill ( Composition of Causes, 1843)["The chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with properties entirely different from those of either of the two substances separately, or of both of them taken together."] and Julian Huxley[Julian Huxley: "now and again there is a sudden rapid passage to a totally new and more comprehensive type of order or organization, with quite new emergent properties, and involving quite new methods of further evolution" ] (1887–1975).
The philosopher G. H. Lewes coined the term "emergent" in 1875, distinguishing it from the merely "resultant":
Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same – their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.[
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Strong and weak emergence
Usage of the notion "emergence" may generally be subdivided into two perspectives, that of "weak emergence" and "strong emergence". One paper discussing this division is Weak Emergence, by philosopher Mark Bedau. In terms of physical systems, weak emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is amenable to computer simulation or similar forms of after-the-fact analysis (for example, the formation of a traffic jam, the structure of a flock of starlings in flight or a school of fish, or the formation of galaxies). Crucial in these simulations is that the interacting members retain their independence. If not, a new entity is formed with new, emergent properties: this is called strong emergence, which it is argued cannot be simulated, analysed or reduced.
David Chalmers writes that emergence often causes confusion in philosophy and science due to a failure to demarcate strong and weak emergence, which are "quite different concepts".[ Chalmers, David J. (2002). "Strong and Weak Emergence" [1] Republished in P. Clayton and P. Davies, eds. (2006) The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press]
Some common points between the two notions are that emergence concerns new properties produced as the system grows, which is to say ones which are not shared with its components or prior states. Also, it is assumed that the properties are supervenient rather than metaphysically primitive.
Weak emergence describes new properties arising in systems as a result of the interactions at a fundamental level. However, Bedau stipulates that the properties can be determined only by observing or simulating the system, and not by any process of a Reductionism analysis. As a consequence the emerging properties are scale dependent: they are only observable if the system is large enough to exhibit the phenomenon. Chaotic, unpredictable behaviour can be seen as an emergent phenomenon, while at a microscopic scale the behaviour of the constituent parts can be fully deterministic.
Mark Bedau notes that weak emergence is not a universal metaphysical solvent, as the hypothesis that consciousness is weakly emergent would not resolve the traditional philosophical questions about the physicality of consciousness. However, Bedau concludes that adopting this view would provide a precise notion that emergence is involved in consciousness, and second, the notion of weak emergence is metaphysically benign.
Strong emergence describes the direct causal action of a high-level system on its components; qualities produced this way are irreducible to the system's constituent parts. The whole is other than the sum of its parts. It is argued then that no simulation of the system can exist, for such a simulation would itself constitute a reduction of the system to its constituent parts. Physics lacks well-established examples of strong emergence, unless it is interpreted as the impossibility in practice to explain the whole in terms of the parts. Practical impossibility may be a more useful distinction than one in principle, since it is easier to determine and quantify, and does not imply the use of mysterious forces, but simply reflects the limits of our capability.
Viability of strong emergence
One of the reasons for the importance of distinguishing these two concepts with respect to their difference concerns the relationship of purported emergent properties to science. Some thinkers question the plausibility of strong emergence as contravening our usual understanding of physics. Mark A. Bedau observes:
The concern that strong emergence does so entail is that such a consequence must be incompatible with metaphysical principles such as the principle of sufficient reason or the Latin dictum ex nihilo nihil fit, often translated as "nothing comes from nothing".
Strong emergence can be criticized for leading to causal overdetermination. The canonical example concerns emergent mental states (M and M∗) that supervene on physical states (P and P∗) respectively. Let M and M∗ be emergent properties. Let M∗ supervene on base property P∗. What happens when M causes M∗? Jaegwon Kim says:
If M is the cause of M∗, then M∗ is overdetermined because M∗ can also be thought of as being determined by P. One escape-route that a strong emergentist could take would be to deny downward causation. However, this would remove the proposed reason that emergent mental states must supervene on physical states, which in turn would call physicalism into question, and thus be unpalatable for some philosophers and physicists.
Carroll and Parola propose a taxonomy that classifies emergent phenomena by how the macro-description relates to the underlying micro-dynamics.
- Type‑0 (Featureless) Emergence
- A coarse-graining map Φ from a micro state space A to a macro state space B that commutes with time evolution, without requiring any further decomposition into subsystems.
- Type‑1 (Local) Emergence
- Emergence where the macro theory is defined in terms of localized collections of micro-subsystems. This category is subdivided into:
- : Type‑1a (Direct) Emergence: When the emergence map Φ is algorithmically simple (i.e. compressible), so that the macro behavior is easily deduced from the micro-states.
- : Type‑1b (Incompressible) Emergence: When Φ is algorithmically complex (i.e. incompressible), making the macro behavior appear more novel despite being determined by the micro-dynamics.
- Type‑2 (Nonlocal) Emergence
- Cases in which both the micro and macro theories admit subsystem decompositions, yet the macro entities are defined nonlocally with respect to the micro-structure, meaning that macro behavior depends on widely distributed micro information.
- Type‑3 (Augmented) Emergence
- A form of strong emergence in which the macro theory introduces additional ontological variables that do not supervene on the micro-states, thereby positing genuinely novel macro-level entities.
Objective or subjective quality
Crutchfield regards the properties of complexity and organization of any system as Subjectivity qualities determined by the observer.
Defining structure and detecting the emergence of complexity in nature are inherently subjective, though essential, scientific activities. Despite the difficulties, these problems can be analysed in terms of how model-building observers infer from measurements the computational capabilities embedded in non-linear processes. An observer's notion of what is ordered, what is random, and what is complex in its environment depends directly on its computational resources: the amount of raw measurement data, of memory, and of time available for estimation and inference. The discovery of structure in an environment depends more critically and subtly, though, on how those resources are organized. The descriptive power of the observer's chosen (or implicit) computational model class, for example, can be an overwhelming determinant in finding regularity in data.[
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The low entropy of an ordered system can be viewed as an example of subjective emergence: the observer sees an ordered system by ignoring the underlying microstructure (i.e. movement of molecules or elementary particles) and concludes that the system has a low entropy.[
See f.i. Carlo Rovelli: The mystery of time, 2017, part 10: Perspective, p.105-110
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On the other hand, chaotic, unpredictable behaviour can also be seen as subjective emergent, while at a microscopic scale the movement of the constituent parts can be fully deterministic.
In science
In physics, emergence is used to describe a property, law, or phenomenon which occurs at macroscopic scales (in space or time) but not at microscopic scales, despite the fact that a macroscopic system can be viewed as a very large ensemble of microscopic systems.
An emergent behavior of a physical system is a qualitative property that can only occur in the limit that the number of microscopic constituents tends to infinity.
According to Robert Laughlin, for many-particle systems, nothing can be calculated exactly from the microscopic equations, and macroscopic systems are characterised by broken symmetry: the symmetry present in the microscopic equations is not present in the macroscopic system, due to phase transitions. As a result, these macroscopic systems are described in their own terminology, and have properties that do not depend on many microscopic details.
Novelist Arthur Koestler used the metaphor of Janus (a symbol of the unity underlying complements like open/shut, peace/war) to illustrate how the two perspectives (strong vs. weak or holistic vs. reductionistic) should be treated as non-exclusive, and should work together to address the issues of emergence. Theoretical physicist Philip W. Anderson states it this way:
Meanwhile, others have worked towards developing analytical evidence of strong emergence. Renormalization methods in theoretical physics enable physicists to study critical phenomena that are not tractable as the combination of their parts.
In humanity
Human beings are the basic elements of social systems, which perpetually interact and create, maintain, or untangle mutual social bonds. Social bonds in social systems are perpetually changing in the sense of the ongoing reconfiguration of their structure.
Economic trends and patterns which emerge are studied intensively by economists.[Daniel C. Taylor, Carl E. Taylor, Jesse O. Taylor, Empowerment on an Unstable Planet: From Seeds of Human Energy to a Scale of Global Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012)]
Looking at emergence in the context of social and Systems theory change, invites us to reframe our thinking on parts and wholes and their interrelation. Unlike machines, living systems at all levels of recursion - be it a sentient body, a tree, a family, an organisation, the education system, the economy, the health system, the political system etc - are continuously creating themselves. They are continually growing and changing along with their surrounding elements, and therefore are more than the sum of their parts. As Peter Senge and co-authors put forward in the book Presence: Exploring profound change in People, Organizations and Society, "as long as our thinking is governed by habit - notably industrial, "machine age" concepts such as control, predictability, standardization, and "faster is better" - we will continue to recreate institutions as they have been, despite their disharmony with the larger world, and the need for all living systems to evolve."
The works of Nora Bateson and her colleagues at the International Bateson Institute delve into this. Since 2012, they have been researching questions such as what makes a living system ready to change? Can unforeseen ready-ness for change be nourished? Here being ready is not thought of as being prepared, but rather as nourishing the flexibility we do not yet know will be needed. These inquiries challenge the common view that a theory of change is produced from an identified preferred goal or outcome. As explained in their paper An essay on ready-ing: Tending the prelude to change:
Another approach that engages with the concept of emergence for social change is Theory U, where "deep emergence" is the result of self-transcending knowledge after a successful journey along the U through layers of awareness.
In linguistics, the concept of emergence has been applied in the domain of stylometry to explain the interrelation between the syntactical structures of the text and the author style (Slautina, Marusenko, 2014).
In technology
The bulk conductive response of binary (RC) electrical networks with random arrangements, known as the Universal dielectric response (UDR), can be seen as emergent properties of such physical systems. Such arrangements can be used as simple physical prototypes for deriving mathematical formulae for the emergent responses of complex systems.[See review of related research in ] Some artificially intelligent (AI) computer applications simulate emergent behavior.
In religion and art
In religion, emergence grounds expressions of religious naturalism and syntheism in which a sense of the sacred is perceived in the workings of entirely naturalistic processes by which more Complexity forms arise or evolve from simpler forms. Examples are detailed in The Sacred Emergence of Nature by Ursula Goodenough & Terrence Deacon and Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred by Stuart Kauffman, both from 2006, as well as Syntheism – Creating God in The Internet Age by Alexander Bard & Jan Söderqvist from 2014 and Emergentism: A Religion of Complexity for the Metamodern World by Brendan Graham Dempsey (2022).
Michael J. Pearce has used emergence to describe the experience of works of art in relation to contemporary neuroscience.
See also
Bibliography
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Bejan, Adrian; Zane, J. P. (2012). Design in Nature: How the Constructal Law Governs Evolution in Biology, Physics, Technology, and Social Organizations. Doubleday.
Further reading
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Alexander, V. N. (2011). The Biologist's Mistress: Rethinking Self-Organization in Art, Literature and Nature. Litchfield Park AZ: Emergent Publications.
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Chalmers, David J. (2002). "Strong and Weak Emergence" Republished in P. Clayton and P. Davies, eds. (2006) The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Philip Clayton & Paul Davies (eds.) (2006). The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Felipe Cucker and Stephen Smale (2007), The Japanese Journal of Mathematics, The Mathematics of Emergence
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Hoffmann, Peter M. "Life's Ratchet: How Molecular Machines Extract Order from Chaos" (2012), Basic Books.
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Ignazio Licata & Ammar Sakaji (eds) (2008). Physics of Emergence and Organization, , World Scientific and Imperial College Press.
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Solé, Ricard and Goodwin, Brian (2000) Signs of life: how complexity pervades biology, Basic Books, New York
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Jakub Tkac & Jiri Kroc (2017), Cellular Automaton Simulation of Dynamic Recrystallization: Introduction into Self-Organization and Emergence (Software) (PDF) Cellular Automaton Simulation of Dynamic Recrystallization: Introduction into Self-Organization and Emergence "Video - Simulation of DRX"
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architectureofemergence.com
External links
