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Bhāviveka, also called Bhāvaviveka (;Xuanzang, Bianji (646). Great Tang Records on the Western Regions, vol.10. ), and Bhavya was a sixth-century (c. 500 – c. 570) madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher.Qvarnström 1989 p. 14. Alternative names for this figure also include Bhavyaviveka, Bhāvin, Bhāviviveka, Bhagavadviveka and Bhavya.Qvarnström 1989 p. 21. Bhāviveka is the author of the Madhyamakahrdaya ( Heart of the Middle), its auto-commentary the Tarkajvālā ( Blaze of Reasoning) and the Prajñāpradīpa ( Lamp for Wisdom).Vose, Kevin A. (2015) Resurrecting Candrakirti: Disputes in the Tibetan Creation of Prasangika, pp. 31 , Simon and Schuster.
In Tibetan Buddhism Bhāviveka is regarded as the founder of the Svatantrika tradition of Madhyamaka, as opposed to the Prasangika madhyamaka of Chandrakirti.
There is also another later author called Bhāvaviveka who wrote another set of madhyamaka texts. He is sometimes called Bhāvaviveka II by modern scholars .Vose, Kevin A. (2015) Resurrecting Candrakirti: Disputes in the Tibetan Creation of Prasangika, pp. 30-32 , Simon and Schuster.
Eckel states that Bhāviveka may have been one of the many itinerant scholars at the time who traveled the country engaging their opponents in debate.Eckel 2008, p. 11. During this time, formal debate was a high stakes endeavor which played a central role in Indian monastic life and could determine the support monasteries received from kings who attended the debates.Eckel 2008, pp. 12-14. In some cases, one was not even allowed to enter an elite institution like Nalanda unless one demonstrated a certain amount of knowledge to the gatekeeper scholar.Eckel 2008, p. 13. Because of this, an effective debater like Bhāviveka needed to be conversant with the doctrines of their opponents, and this need is reflected in the writing of doxographical works like Bhāviveka's.Eckel 2008, pp. 14-16.
According to Olle Qvarnström, Bhavya developed and revised some of the methods and ideas of the Madhyamaka philosophy first established by Nagarjuna. Qvarnström argues that the need for this revision was that Madhyamaka was in danger of "being absorbed or overshadowed by the Yogacara school" and was also coming under pressure from various Brahmanical systems of philosophy. Qvarnström writes that "in order to avert these threats and to bring Madhyamaka philosophy into conformity with the prevalent philosophical requirements of the intellectual milieu in the sixth century, Bhavya used logical devices originally formulated by Dignaga and others."
Qvarnström outlines Bhāviveka's development of madhyamaka as follows:
According to Bhavya, the refutation of a system by depicting its inherent contradictions without stating a positive thesis of one's own was not sufficient to settle a debate. This "reductio ad absurdum" ( prāsaṇgika) argumentation had to be supplemented by independent propositions ( svatantra), sometimes incorporated in formal syllogisms ( prayogavākya). By means of independent inferences ( svatantrānumāna) and proper syllogisms, Bhavya considered himself capable of both proving the validity of his own propositions and of refuting any upcoming counterposition, Buddhist or Hindus.Bhāviveka held that even though Nagarjuna himself had only relied on prāsaṇgika style reductios which do not put forth any positive thesis (and only refutes the arguments of the opponent), it was the responsibility of the commentator to make explicit the implications and logical consequences of Nagarjuna's text. This was to be done by making use of Pramana reasoning in order to establish logical arguments that proved the truth of mādhyamaka in a positive sense. That is to say, Bhavya sought to prove madhyamaka by arguing for the truth of independent theses ( pratijñā) which did not rely on refuting the theses of others.Eckel 2008, p. 49.
Because of this, he criticized Buddhapalita, an earlier commentator on Nagarjuna, for failing to properly draw out these implications and construct proper syllogistic arguments to prove the truth of Madhyamaka.Shantarakshita (author); Mipham (commentator); Padmakara Translation Group (translators) (2005). The Adornment of the Middle Way: Shantarakshita's Madhyamakalankara with commentary by Jamgön Mipham. Boston, Massachusetts, USA: Shambhala Publications, Inc. (alk. paper), p.386Blumenthal, James (2009). 'Śāntarakṣita', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Source: [1](accessed: Monday October 12, 2009)Hayes, Richard, "Madhyamaka", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
. As Richard Hayes notes, Bhavya took pains to show that "Mādhyamikas do have a conviction that they are prepared to state and defend, namely, that all phenomena are devoid of an inherent nature, that is, a nature that they have independently." Hence, Bhavya held that mādhyamaka philosophers needed to provide proper arguments in favor of the basic mādhyamaka theory which states that all phenomena ( dharmas) are empty ( śūnya).
Eckel illustrates the differences in method between Bhavya and Buddhapalita as follows:
The first substantive verse of Nagarjuna's MMK says: "Nothing arises from itself, from something else, from both, or from no cause at all." Buddhapalita explains the first part of this verse as follows: "Nothing arises from itself, because its arising would be useless, and because it would lead to an absurd conclusion. There would be no point for things that already exist in their own right to arise again, and, if something arises after it already exists, it would never cease to arise." Bhaviveka reformulates this argument as a positive assertion: "The internal sense media ultimately do not arise from themselves, because they already exist, like consciousness." By making this logical transformation, Bhaviveka takes an argument that reduces the opponent's assertion to an absurd conclusion (prasaṇga) and substitutes an independent (svatantra) inference, with a proper thesis (pratijñā), reason (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta).Eckel 2008, pp. 49-50Regarding the fact that Nagarjuna himself states that he does not defend any thesis in his The Avoidance of Refutations ( Vigrahavyāvartanī), Bhavya makes use of the doctrine of two truths to defend his method. Though he agrees that ultimately there can be no thesis, it is still possible to use words in a conventional manner to convince others through reasoning as a "skillful means" ( Upaya).Eckel 2008, pp. 50, 52 Eckel notes that his defense of positive syllogisms may have been motivated by its importance in the sixth century Indian circles of formal debate. In these circles, the practice of merely attacking the views of one's opponent without defending a thesis of one's own (which was called vitaṇḍā) was seen as bad form and not well respected.Eckel 2008, pp. 51-53.
Furthermore, inference allows one to examine all the differences which are found among the various spiritual traditions and philosophies ( darśana), and then to be able to determine which is true in a rational manner. This is because "if tradition has the status of tradition because it has an unbroken transmission, then everything is tradition, and it is necessary to determine which is true."Eckel 2008, p. 31.
Thus Bhavya sees reasoning about spiritual and philosophical matters as an key preliminary step which prepares the mind to develop a pure and non-conceptual type of wisdom ( prajñā) that sees ultimate truth. In chapter three of the Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way, Bhavya states:Eckel 2008, pp. 41-42.
- 3.10-11. Ultimate wisdom negates the entire network of concepts, and it moves without moving into the clear sky of reality, which is peaceful, directly known, non-conceptual, non-verbal, and free from unity and diversity.
- 3.12-13. Surely it is impossible to climb to the top of the palace of reality without the steps of correct relative truth . For that reason, one should first discriminate according to relative truth, then one should analyze the particular and universal characteristics of things.
Bhavya also explored the various Indian philosophical schools ( darśanas) in depth. Bhavya is notable in the Indian tradition for his work on comparative philosophy and doxography. According to Malcolm D. Eckel, "no Indian Mahayana thinker played a more crucial role in mapping the landscape of Indian philosophy and defining the relationships of its different traditions. At a time when major branches of Indian philosophy were still in the process of formation, Bhaviveka provided a model of textual classification (the philosophical compendium or doxography) that became the classic vehicle for the study of Indian philosophy."Eckel 2008, p. 3. Bhavya's work discusses most of the major schools of Indian philosophy (Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Vedanta, Mīṃāṃsā as well as Jainism).
Bhaviveka also engages with the doctrines of Śrāvakayāna (non-Mahayana) Buddhists and addresses their various criticisms against Mahayana.
According to Qvarnström, Bhavya's Madhyamakahrdayakārikā and its Tarkajvālā commentary is one of the earliest sources on early (pre-Adi Shankara) Vedanta (aside from the Brahmasūtra, the Vākyapadīya and the Gaudapādīyakārikā).Qvarnström 1989 pp. 15-16. Regarding Bhavya's view of Vedanta, Qvarnström writes:Qvarnström 1989 p. 18.
the Vedāntatattvaviniścaya of the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā is interesting because it is the first Buddhist text to distinguish Madhyamaka philosophy from purely Vedanta notions. In VTV, Bhavya maintains that the notion of a "Self'- or in his terminology, an "intrinsic nature" - actually was borrowed from the Madhyamaka school. Bhavya consequently considers it his duty not only to refute the Vedanta interpretation of this notion, but also to outline his own view on this matter at great length. The question of "intrinsic nature" or "Self' constitutes, therefore, the main object of the polemics between the Vedāntavādins and the Mādhyamikas in VTV. Bhavya may thus be said to have initiated on a systematical basis the main issue of the prolonged controversies between Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophy which were to continue well beyond his time.
The text survives in an incomplete Sanskrit manuscript as well in Tibetan translation by Atiśa and Lotsawa Jayaśīla (which has allowed for a reconstruction of the full Sanskrit).Qvarnström 1989 pp. 23-25.
According to Qvarnström, this text outlines the main views found in the Buddhist Śrāvakayāna and Yogachara schools as well as the Brahmanical Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Vedanta and Mīṃāṃsā schools. All these schools are presented as the Purva paksha (opponent's view). Their views are critiqued and the Madhymaka view is then outlined as the uttarapakṣa (superior view).
The Madhyamakahrdayakārikā is divided into the following chapters:Eckel 2008, pp. 18-20.
However, according to Georges Dreyfus and McClintock, such a classification is problematic and was not used in India, where instead the " svātantrika and prasangika" schools were camped together then contrasted with Santaraksita and Kamalasila" (Yogacara-Madhyamaka) schools.Dreyfus, Georges B.J. & Sara L. McClintock (eds). The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Wisdom Publications, 2003, pages 1-3 The former accepted "external objects exist", while the latter camp accepted "external objects do not exist". The svātantrika versus prāsaṅgika sub-schools may have been an 11th–12th century innovation of the Tibetan translator Patsab Nyima Drakpa while he was translating a Sanskrit text by Candrakirti into Tibetan.
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